Military History

Blogging about the Battlefield since 2005

Posts Tagged ‘Wars of Louis XIV’

Book Review of The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions, 1588-1688

Posted by William Young on May 20, 2012

Olaf van Nimwegen. The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions, 1588-1688. Translated by Andrew May. Warfare in History series. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2010. ISBN 978-1-84383-575-2. Illustrations. Maps. Appendices. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xx, 577. $130.00.

Dr Olaf van Nimwegen, an Affiliated Researcher in International and Political History at the Research Institute for History and Culture at the University of Utrecht, is quickly making a name for himself in Dutch military history in the early modern era.  He is the author of De Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden als grote mogendheid [The Republic of the United Netherlands as a Great Power] (2004) which examines the role of the Dutch Republic in the European states system from 1713 to 1756.  Now he gives us an important study of the Dutch army from the late sixteenth to the late seventeenth centuries.  This work on the Dutch army was originally published in the Dutch language as “Deser landen crijchsvolck”: Het Staatse leger en de militaire revoluties 1588-1688 in 2006.

In this study Nimwegen argues that the Dutch army is paramount to all discussions on the so-called Military Revolution concerning tactical, strategic, and organizational changes during Early Modern Europe.  His work examines the changes in tactics and organization of the Dutch army over a century.  The author stresses that the Dutch army underwent two military revolutions from 1588 to 1688.  As such, he breaks up his work into two parts that contain both chronological and thematic discussions.

The first part looks at the Dutch military during its struggle for independence from Spain in the late sixteenth century to the end of the Eighty Years’ War (1568-1648).  Nimwegen examines the organization of the Dutch army, the revolution in infantry tactics (the development of an orderly volley fire with firearms), field operations (including logistics and siege warfare), and military operations against Spain in the Low Countries.  The author depicts how the Dutch army transformed from an unreliable band of mercenaries into a disciplined military that held its own against the power of Spain.  Under the leadership of Maurits of Nassau and his cousin Willem Lodewijk, a tactical revolution, concerning the use of volley fire, was achieved that had a profound impact on battle.  But, the author points out the mutual distrust between the government and the Dutch army over military finances, which greatly hampered the recruitment, payment, and provisioning of troops. The lack of trust contributed to the inadequate organization structure of the Dutch army, the small size of the army, and the limited deployment of military forces.  Troop concentrations rarely reached a maximum of 25,000 to 30,000 men within the Dutch borders (p.294).  The Dutch Republic continued to rely on mercenaries and military entrepreneurs throughout the Eighty Years’ War.

In the second part of this study, Nimwegen addresses the Dutch army from the Peace of Westphalia (1648) to the outbreak of conflict with France in the Nine Years’ War (1688-97).  He notes that in the 1660s France underwent developments that led to a revolution in military organization, resulting in a massive expansion of the French army and its military potential.  Louis XIV’s France was the leading military power in Europe.  This military might was used against coalitions in the Wars of Louis XIV (1667-1713).  In the first conflict, the War of Devolution (1667-68), France quickly conquered most of the Spanish Netherlands.  In the second conflict, the Dutch War (1672-78), Louis XIV led the French army that invaded and promptly occupied half of the Dutch Republic.  The French threat and invasion led to the Dutch Republic making numerous changes.  Nimwegen shows that the Dutch army had to undergo its own organizational revolution to defend itself against the military might of France.  He writes: “It was not until the ‘struggle for survival’ (Existenzkampf), in which the Republic became entangled because of the French invasion in 1672, that a climate was created which made far-reaching structural reforms in the Dutch army possible.  At an astonishing speed the Republic’s land forces were then transformed from an army of mercenaries into a standing army of professional soldiers” (p.518).  The Dutch government, with the Province of Holland taking the lead, provided the financial resources to recruit, equip, pay, and feed a large-scale, professional standing army under the command of Prince William III of Orange.  This army adopted French innovations, including the establishment and use of supply magazines, advanced techniques in siege warfare, and the employment of modern military arms and equipment, resulting in an “organizational revolution” in the conduct of war.  The Dutch army, along with other coalition operations against Louis XIV, forced France to withdraw from the United Provinces in 1673.  The Dutch Republic kept and improved its standing army after the conflict because it could not afford to fight another lengthy war against Louis XIV without being prepared.

Nimwegen’s study is the first major work on the Dutch army during the Military Revolution of Early Modern Europe in the English language.  It is based largely on primary sources from various archives throughout the Netherlands.  The work is well-written and will be the definitive study on the Dutch army during this period for a long time to come.  This study is highly recommended for individuals interested in the Eighty Years’ War, Dutch War, and the military history of Early Modern Europe.

Dr William Young
University of North Dakota
Grand Forks, North Dakota

Posted in Book Reviews, Early Modern European (1494-1648), Early Modern European (1648-1792), General, Military Revolution | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | Leave a Comment »

Book Review of Marshal Vauban and the Defence of Louis XIV’s France

Posted by William Young on January 4, 2012

James Falkner. Marshal Vauban and the Defence of Louis XIV’s France. Barnsley, England: Pen and Sword Military, 2011. ISBN 978-1-84415-927-7. Maps. Illustrations. Appendices. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. viii, 226. $50.00.

James Falkner, a former British Army officer, has written a study concerning Sebastien Le Prestre, Marshal Vauban, and his contributions to fortress building and siege warfare during the reign of Louis XIV.  Falkner has previously provided us valuable studies on the Duke of Marlborough’s campaigns, battles, and sieges during the War of the Spanish Succession in Great and Glorious Days: The Duke of Marlborough’s Battles, 1704-1709 (2003), Blenheim 1704: Marlborough’s Greatest Victory (2004), Marlborough’s Wars: Eye Witness Accounts, 1702-1713 (2005), Ramillies 1706: Year of Miracles (2006), Marlborough’s Sieges (2007), and James Falkner’s Guide to Marlborough’s Battlefields (2008).  In this current study, the author examines the military career and role of Vauban in French military efforts in the later years of the Franco-Spanish War (1635-1659), War of Devolution (1667-1668), Dutch War (1672-1678/79), War of Reunions (1683-1684), Nine Years War (1688-1697), and early years of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713/14).

Falkner’s study examines both Vauban’s contribution to attack and defense in siege warfare.  Vauban was noted for his genius in the conduct of calculated offensive siege operations that included lines of circumvallation and contravallation as well as a systematic approach by the use of parallel trenches to capture enemy fortresses.  His system of siege warfare, not always adhered to by impatient French commanders, saved numerous men from the slaughter of massive assaults against well-defended positions.  Vauban’s experience grew from his first siege operation at Sainte-Menehould during the Fronde in 1652 and throughout the Wars of Louis XIV until his last effort at Alt-Breisach during the War of the Spanish Succession in 1703.  Vauban’s system would remain the standard method of attacking a fortress to the twentieth century.

Louis XIV expanded French territory, especially in northeastern France during the War of Devolution, Dutch War, and War of Reunions.  French borders, particularly in this region, were vulnerable to attacks.  As such, the Sun King sought to beef up his defense against enemy threats.  Falkner focuses on Vauban and his engineering efforts to assess and improve, or redesign and rebuild, as far as the French treasury would permit, a credible defense system for France.  As a result, Marshal Vauban built the two-line system of fortresses (from Dunkirk to Givet, and Gravelines to Stenay) to defend France in the northeast.  This system was known as the pré carré (the dueling field), or what our author calls the “Fence of Iron.”  The dual line of fortresses would save France from an allied invasion led by the Duke of Marlborough in the War of the Spanish Succession.  Falkner notes that these fortifications also played an important part in French military history for the next 250 years.

The author blends Vauban’s contributions to fortress building and siege operations with a general depiction of siege warfare in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.  This well-written study contains valuable appendices providing a chronological listing of Vauban’s siege operations; a list of more than 180 fortresses, citadels, towns, and forts under French control that the engineer designed, constructed, or improved during the reign of the Louis XIV; and a glossary of siege terms.  This work is highly recommend to anyone interested in Early Modern European Military History.  Falkner’s study is an outstanding addition to the available literature in English on Vauban and siege warfare, including Reginald Blomfield’s Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban, 1633-1707 (1938), Christopher Duffy’s Fortress Warfare in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the Great, 1680-1789 (1985), F.J. Hebbert and George A. Rothrock’s Soldier of France: Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban, 1633-1707 (1989), Paddy Griffith’s The Vauban Fortifications of France (2006), and Jean-Denis G.G. Lepage’s Vauban and the French Military under Louis XIV: An Illustrated History of Fortifications and Strategies (2009).  Vauban’s writings are also available in Rothrock’s translation of A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification (1968). 

Dr. William Young
University of North Dakota

Vauban’s System of Parallel and Approach Trenches in Offensive Operations against a Fortress or Fortified Town


Le Pré Carré in northeast France (The Fence of Iron)


The Citadel and Fortress City of Lille

Posted in Book Reviews, Early Modern European (1648-1792) | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment »

Wayne's Journal

A life of a B-25 tail gunner with the 42nd Bombardment Group in the South Pacific

The ogre of the tale

“The historian is like the ogre of fairy tales:where he smells human flesh, there he finds his quarry.” / Marc Bloch

War and Security

History of war and current national security issues

Military History

Blogging about the Battlefield since 2005

The War Studies Group

Discussing war and peace throughout history

International History

Diplomatic and Military History since the Middle Ages

Skulking in Holes and Corners

Genteelly Observing the Enemy since 2011

Civil War History

The Blog Between the States.

Frontier Battles

Covering the wars for and against empire in America, 1607-1815

%d bloggers like this: