Looking Back: An exciting blog by the 34th ID

I was contacted earlier today by a member of the 34th ID serving in Iraq (I will not release their name unless requested by the person, as I do not want to unintentionally place them in danger), who asked me to consider linking to their blog Looking Back. I will happily do so and will seek to place a link in the sidebar somewhere and on the Links page as well. Though it is a relatively new blog, I sense great things from it and encourage you all to check it out.

Little girl’s Christmas wish granted

I saw this the other night on The O’Reilly Factor and had to share it with you. Of all the things little Kensley could have asked Santa for, one of the two things she wanted was her dad. As an Army brat, this video brought a tear to my eye. I am happy that she will be able to spend a few days with her father.

Interview with David H. Jones

After writing my review of Two Brothers, One North, One South, I found that I had some questions about the book that only the author could answer, so I contacted David H. Jones and put forth the following questions, which he was gracious enough to answer. I hope you enjoy and that he answers some of the questions you may have had about his book.

1. How did you choose the topic of your story and why did you choose to write a novel instead of a non-fiction historical work?

A. I found the story of the Prentiss brothers while researching the regiments of my Civil War ancestors. My great great grandfather, James Touchstone, served as an officer in the 6^th Maryland Infantry with Clifton Prentiss. I discovered that Clifton had a younger brother who served in the Confederate 1^st and 2^nd Maryland Battalions and that Walt Whitman had written about William Prentiss in “Memoranda During The War.” After three years of collecting historical data, it was apparent to me that the book could be written as either as a non-fiction or fiction.

In my view, the circumstance of “brother fighting brother” is the quintessential story of the American Civil War and, as such, could achieve greater readership as a novel rather than as a non-fiction. At the same time, I was aware that there is a downside to historical fiction. All too often these novels are full of inaccuracies and the story is one that could have happened at anytime; the author simply drops it into a certain time period and doesn’t care enough to make the details authentic. Thus, many Civil War buffs are prejudiced against any book that is not a non-fiction.

2. Your book is considered historical fiction. Aside from battles and locations, what percentage of the characters are fictional and how much of the story is based around actual events in the life of the real persons? How did you determine how much of your story elements would be fictitious?

A. There are only three fictitious characters in “Two Brothers.” Elijah and Alma Carter are created characters, as is Laura Watson, although there is some evidence of a stepsister in the Prentiss family. Otherwise, the scenes within the book are closely based on actual events in the lives of historical persons. Regarding Elijah, the 7^th USCT was an actual regiment that was raised in Baltimore in late 1863 and its exploits were real.

3. I could not help but think about elements of the miniseries North and South as I read this story. What literary works and/or television and films on the war influenced you and shaped the writing of this work?

A. The miniseries “North and South” is fairly true to the period, as are novels by Michael Shaara, Jeff Shaara, Howard Bahr, and others. The work of David McCullough proves that accurate history can be brought-to-life and that inspired me to shape a novel closely based on real people and events; one that would hopefully both entertain and educate.

4. One of my minor criticisms of your book was the heavy focus on William’s service in the war. Could you explain why you did not devote part of the book to presenting Clifton’s service in the Union army?

A. There’s a good reason for this imbalance. The Confederate 1^st Maryland Battalion was formed in time to fight at First Manassas (First Bull Run) in July of 1861. Conversely, the 6^th Maryland Infantry was not mustered into service until late August of 1862 and saw little field service until June of 1863. Thus, there was more “story material” about William than there was about Clifton. To compensate for this, I swung the focus from the Confederate side to the Union side as the story approached its climax at the Breakthrough Battle at Petersburg on April 2, 1865.  My overall intent was to treat the brothers and their experiences in an even-handed manner.

5. Given that this was a novel, there would be no notes or bibliography, but historians like to know about sources in a work. Could you tell us a bit about some of the sources you researched that contributed to the writing of the book?

A. I did provide a small appendix in “Two Brothers” with quotes from books, memoirs and newspaper accounts of the period to demonstrate to the reader that the story of Prentiss brothers is essentially true. I researched service and pension records, Official Records, the Grayson Eichelberger papers (6^th Maryland), the Southern Historical Society Papers, books and articles written by prominent historians, and books written by actual participants and observers. The list of published references is extensive, so I will provide just a sampling to indicate the nature of these sources: The Final Battles of the Petersburg Campaign-Breaking the Backbone of the Rebellion (A. Wilson Greene); I Rode With Stonewall (Henry Kyd Douglas); Maryland’s Blue & Gray (Kevin Conley Ruffner); A Maryland Boy in Lee’s Army (George W. Booth); First and Second Maryland Infantry, CSA (Robert J. Driver, Jr.); A Soldiers Recollections (Randolph McKim); Recollections of a Maryland Confederate Soldier, 1861-1865 (McHenry Howard); The Maryland Line in the Confederate Army (W.W. Goldsborough); Manly Deeds-Womanly Words-History of the 6^th regiment of Maryland Infantry (James Fisher); Recollections Grave and Gay (Mrs. Burton Harrison (Constance Cary)); Mary Chesnut’s Civil War (C. Vann Woodward); Belles, Beaux and Brains of the 60’s (T.C. DeLeon); Walt Whitman’s Civil War (Walter Lowenfels); Richmond-The Story of a City (Virginius Dabney); Baltimore During The Civil War (Scott Sumpter Sheads & Daniel Carroll Toomey); A Matter of Allegiances-Maryland from 1850 to 1861 (William J. Evitts); and many, many others.

6. As someone with an inclination towards the Union, I often found myself viewing the Cary sisters and Laura with anger and suspicion. Was it your intent for readers to see these ladies in that light, and did you ever find yourself feeling that way towards them while writing the story?

A. No, that was not my intent and I never felt anger or suspicion toward the Cary girls.  My two Civil War ancestors fought for the Union, but I view the participants of both sides as equally honorable in their devotion to their cause. They were the children and grandchildren of Revolutionary War patriots, but they saw the political, economic, and social issues of the period in a very different light. Within the context of those times, they believed they were doing the right thing. We rightly deplore slavery today as an evil institution, but generally speaking, people in the mid nineteenth were very local in viewpoint and accepted, for a variety of reasons, conditions that we find totally unacceptable today. Many references provide evidence that white women in the South were strong advocates of the Confederacy and the Cary’s were no exception.

7. Walt Whitman feared, according to your book, that the real nature of the war would be lost. With so many books written by historians on the war, do you think he was correct in his fear?

A. While much has been written about all aspects of the war, today’s readers aren’t often presented with stories that focus on the sacrifices and devotion of the common soldier, particularly the ones who were wounded, languished, and died in hospitals. That, to Whitman’s way of thinking, was what should be remembered; I think that he was correct in his fear.

8. What do you hope that readers will come away with from reading your book?

A. The realization that all of the soldiers, both North and South, were American patriots. Our nation is what it is today because the American Civil War was fought and we should celebrate our history by developing a better understanding of those people and times.

9. Do you have any plans to write an academic work on the war, like a history of one of the units in the story?

A. Three journals written by an officer of the 6^th Maryland in 1866 have come to light since the publication of “Two Brothers” and contain a wealth of first-hand information and observations about the regiment for the entirety of the war. I am working to get permission to publish the information from these journals and, if achieved, the book will be written as a non-fiction.

10. What advice would you offer to those who would like to write a book like Two Brothers, or any work of history?

A. I would tell them that writing the book is only half the task. Despite whether or not your book is published by a traditional publisher, is self-published, or published by a vanity press, all marketing and promotion is the responsibility of the author. You must promote the book and create “buzz” in the marketplace . . . or it won’t sell. An author must understand that this is a business, and a very competitive one at that.

Reinventing the Army-Part I

My son, Daniel, informed me of something he read regarding the latest “transformation” of the US Army.  When he explained what he found I immediately wondered just how many times must we “reinvent the wheel?”  Following this conversation the only information I found on the Internet concerning this subject seemed somewhat like “old news.”  I read all the “expert” rhetoric of the thirty-two page document and it did not really solve the Army’s two problems:  personnel and transportation.  Nor did it address the political-military problems that shape our military strategy, normally for the worst.  It barely covered the biggest “variable” of any military “experiment,” the enemy, who rarely follows the plan.  Instead, it creates a military force based on domestic budgetary constraints and not on real global threats.

The document did deride the “Cold War mentality” and those who champion the Cold War military, people like me.  Although I lack the “academic credentials” of these “experts,” I fought the Cold War throughout most of my Army career.  Additionally I attended every level of military education culminating in my graduation from the US Army Sergeants Major Academy.  I believe this gives me the “credentials” for offering my opinion, and makes my opinion equally relevant.

This information appeared in Wikipedia, a questionable source at best, however “where there is smoke, there is fire.”  I do know that many “experts” advocated this theory for at least a decade, as if they suddenly discovered something new.  Like many theories, especially those advanced during the 1990’s regarding the military, they work well “on paper.”  However, the reality often falls short, and one often finds the military tried these theories before.

Furthermore, these “transformations” usually create more problems than they solve and often lead the Army back where it started.  I searched the US Army’s website for information regarding my son’s information and found nothing confirming it.  The site mentioned the scheduled Iraq rotation of four brigades under the Multi-National Division-Baghdad.  From the website of this organization I found that an American Army division currently “headquarters” this division.

The prominent document I found discussing this proposed “transformation” came from the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress.  Coded at RL32476, titled “U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign:  Issues for Congress,” and authored by Andrew Feickert, it described a glowing program for “saving the Army.”  Feickert described himself as a “Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division,” and does not mention any military experience.  I searched the Internet in hope of finding a biography of the author, but without any success.  If Mr. Fieckert possesses military experience he must mention it for building any credibility for his document.

I do not know if Feickert’s document represents the source of information provided by my son, however it covers the theory.  Since the document contains thirty-two pages of rhetoric, a response probably requires at least an equal number of pages.  Hopefully, my response serves as a rebuttal for this policy that does little for alleviating the Army’s long-term problems.  The document explains that the Army plans on “transforming” its ten combat divisions into a forty-three brigade force.  By eliminating, or reducing, the division headquarters the plan assumes that these personnel become available for these additional brigades.

The document proclaims that these “modular” brigades suddenly become a, “more responsive, deployable, joint, and expeditionary force.”  It further cites “experts” that state that these “additional deployable units” provide more “stability to soldiers and their families.”  However, it comes with a caveat, provided that no “additional significant long-term troop commitments arise.”

During my Army career I endured three “transformations,” with only one achieving positive results for the Army.  All of these transformations promised great things, using key phrases, such as: “streamlining, more efficient,” and other “buzz words” meant for “dazzling with brilliance.”  As someone who studies military history I found similar phrases used when the Army demobilized following World War I.  World War II veteran and military historian Charles MacDonald wrote, The Mighty Endeavor, and described this era as “twenty years of neglect.”  The National Defense Act of 1920, glowing promised the future Army as a “hard, lean force of 280,000.”  Unfortunately it created “a neglected, spavined, meager force of only 135,000,” an Army ranked seventeenth in the world.

The problem remains that once an “expert” creates one of these programs, influential politicians adopts it.  Subsequently the Army must exert the blood, sweat and sacrifice for implementing the policy, often with substandard results.  Meanwhile most of these “experts,” most of whom never served in the military, never suffer the results of their “genius.”

As stated previously, I found no biography of Mr. Feickert, or any other mention of military service.  In fairness, after reading the document I believe that Feickert compiled information provided by other “experts” and offered his observations.  The document cites many military professionals supporting this “transformation,” however that does not alter my opinion.

Too often senior officers become “dazzled with brilliance” by these theories and disregard the problems they create for junior leaders.  Since Congress controls the careers of these officers, they often bend with the political winds, and break the Army.  Furthermore, I believe these men found themselves in a losing situation today, and made the best decision possible.  They adapted their doctrine for meeting the restrictions imposed by our civilian leadership, who continue waging war under peacetime conditions.

I face no such distractions and believe our civilian leadership disregards the requirements of a military superpower at war.  That includes the “experts” who believe themselves smarter than military professionals, and who “pontificate” in the media.  What further irritates me, many “experts” obtained their experience by “studying” military affairs in a classroom.  In other words, they never lived where “the rubber meets the road,” or face the dangers their policies impose.  Their theories sound good and work well, in the classroom, and their Ph. D.’s impress those who hire them.

If I sound angry about the influence wielded by these “experts,” good, I resent their influence based on no experience.  I researched the websites of our prominent civilian leaders and perused their biographies, and the results disturbed me.  Of the thirteen highest civilians in the Defense Department only six mentioned military service in their biography.

The results grow worse when examining the congressional armed services committees; the pompous “experts” who scold military professionals.  The House Armed Services Committee possesses 62 members, with 15 mentioning personal military service.  The Senate Armed Services Committee possesses 25 members with nine mentioning their military service. Powerful politicians often reward loyal “political hacks” with these positions, disregarding any personal military experience.  These “hacks” then confirm the civilian appointees and senior military leaders, often with military experience a minor concern.

Personal military experience does not necessarily qualify one for leadership at this level; particularly given the predominant venal “Washington” environment.  However, military experience certainly helps and at least gives one a basic understanding of military affairs.  Would the president recommend a federal judge with no legal experience, or a surgeon general with no medical degree?  Unfortunately, legions of “experts” with no military service eagerly seek these positions for enhancing their resumes.  Others seek these positions for “showing” the “Neanderthals” in the Pentagon “how to do business.”

I do not know when this phenomenon started; however, I do know when it gained significant momentum.  H.R. McMaster wrote the book, Dereliction of Duty, and sharply criticized the leadership of then-Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara.  McNamara, once called the “smartest man I ever knew,” by then-President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ), filled the Pentagon with civilian “experts.”

Derisively called “McNamara’s whiz kids,” McNamara gave these people wide latitude of authority over the military service chiefs.  They believed in McNamara’s theories regarding statistics, quantitative analysis, centralization of authority and arrogance regarding the military professionals.  Most of them possessed advanced degrees from the most prestigious universities in the country, but little military experience.  They further believed that military experience proved a “disadvantage” when determining strategy because it ignores the “bigger picture.”

These “whiz kids” soon alienated most of the senior military leadership, and the mutual contempt resulted in the “Viet Nam quagmire.”  McMaster states that Alain Enthoven of the System Analysis Division found “little” that made a military officer a “better strategic planner” than a “graduate of Harvard Business School.”  Then-Air Force Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay stated that the “whiz kids” believed themselves “better than the rest of us; otherwise they wouldn’t have gotten their superior education.”

Again, military experience does not guarantee competent military leadership, or determine a sound military strategy.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) during the Viet Nam War proved this when they did not forcefully challenge McNamara.  While this seems obvious in hindsight, the events as they occurred might not prove so conclusive.  The U.S. Constitution codifies civilian control over the military under a civilian Commander-in-Chief.  Congress declares war and holds the responsibility for maintaining the funding for the nation’s military forces.  The JCS serves as the primary military advisers for the President and the Congress, a role with many “double-edged swords.”

The JCS serve under civilian service secretaries and the secretary of defense, all appointed by the President.  McMaster states what I must summarize as the deliberate policy of the civilian leadership for appointing the most submissive of military chiefs.  This began under then-President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who felt that his military experience made him more qualified than anyone else.  It continued under then-President John F. Kennedy (JFK), who “retired” any JCS member who disagreed with him.  He nominated General Maxwell Taylor, with whom he enjoyed a special relationship, as JCS Chairman.  McNamara began micro-managing the military and denied the JCS presidential access without his permission.

This provides a dilemma for the JCS, establishing just where their loyalties and responsibilities lay.  The Constitution subordinates them under civilian authority and the chain of command requires obedience of the accepted policies.  If they publicly challenge this authority it sets the example for the questioning of orders at all levels of the military.  The Armed Forces potentially degenerate into a mob, obeying what orders suit them, with disastrous results.

Ample evidence exists that during the Viet Nam War the JCS stated their disagreements with accepted policies.  However, these disagreements occurred in closed meetings, and both LBJ and McNamara chastised them for this.  Under such circumstances the JCS face two choices, resign or try changing the system from within.  At one time then-Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson considered resigning; however he felt that this abandoned his responsibilities.  If the JCS resigns en masse, it implies mutiny, and the possibility of the “mob” described above.

During the Viet Nam War we often heard the statement, “War is too important to trust to the generals.”  However, the results of the Viet Nam War prove war “too important” for trusting amateurs in developing military strategy.  Enough blame resulted from the Viet Nam War for spreading around for all those who shaped the policy: military professionals, politicians, “experts,” diplomats, journalists, “anti-war activists” and ordinary citizens.

The post-Viet Nam era provided the first “transformation” that I experienced as a young non-commissioned officer (NCO).  This gave us the first iteration of the “All-Volunteer Army” (VOLAR), for ending the unpopular draft.  However, the unpopularity of the Viet Nam War caused a reduction in the number of recruits for filling the ranks.  Unfortunately, global events did not allow for disbanding the “hated” military, we must still confront global threats.

Forced into an untenable situation the Army tried a series of policies for achieving the personnel needed for its missions.  First came this ludicrous policy of “civilianizing” the Army with the relaxation of disciplinary standards and eroding the authority of military leaders.  However, when the standards and combat readiness eroded, the senior leadership and the “experts” wondered what happened. Subsequently, they blamed the junior officers and NCO’s for not enforcing the standards, standards that did not exist.

This period of neglect also saw a drastic reduction in the pay and benefits for military personnel.  Subsequently, the number of enlistments declined, resulting in under strength units, particularly combat units.  Potential recruits enlisted for the less-stressful combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) military occupational specialties (MOS).  This severely strained the personnel serving in the combat MOS’es: infantry, armor, artillery and combat engineers.

During this time I never served in a combat unit with above 75% of its authorized strength.  However, doctrine demanded that we still execute our missions as if we possessed full-strength units.  The Army prioritized the “forward deployed” units, those serving overseas (OCONUS) keeping them at the highest levels of readiness.  With limited men and materiel remaining, the stateside (CONUS) units suffered, and many fell below acceptable readiness levels.  Soldiers often returned from one OCONUS tour and received orders for another within one year.  Mid-career NCO’s left the Army in steadily increasing numbers, creating that “hollow force.”

In 1980 while assigned with the 2^nd Infantry Division (2^nd ID) at Camp Greaves, Korea I participated in a panel for Charles Moskos.  Moskos, a sociology professor at Northwestern University, displayed an uncanny interest in military affairs, probably based on his service.  The panel consisted of men like me, junior and mid-grade NCO’s, serving as small unit leaders.

This period marked the lowest point in the “hollow force,” and American impotence because of the Iran hostage crisis.  We immediately told Moskos of the problems we experienced as junior leaders, many of them previously mentioned.  Because of manpower needs we found ridding our units of disciplinary problems and substandard performers almost impossible.

Within fifteen minutes of our “opening barrage” all of the brigade’s command sergeants major, who monitored this panel, shut us down.  They dominated the conversation, minimized our problems, stated that no problems really existed and accused us of “routine bitching.”  In effect, they treated us as McNamara treated his JCS, and “good order and discipline” harnessed our responses.  The bottom line of this tactic, reveal no shortcomings and present the same rosy picture of an Army at its best.

This brilliant “transformation,” that promised so much almost broke the Army, despite the erroneous statistics presented in public.  The dedicated NCO corps, painstakingly rebuilt following the Viet Nam War, kept the Army intact.  We did this often without the help of our senior leaders, politicians and the “experts” populating the military bureaucracies.

For the record, the majority of the soldiers I served with during this period performed their duties well.  Good leadership often overcomes many disadvantages; however it does not alter official policies.  Every organization possesses between 5 and 10% of its numbers as “substandard performers,” the Army included.  Unfortunately during the “hollow force” this number increased because of a lowering of standards across the board. The “system” required that we retain in service disciplinary problems, substance abusers and those mentally incapable of achieving the standards.

The leaders spent so much time with the substandard soldiers that sometimes the good soldiers felt neglected.  Reduced personnel strength meant that the soldier’s name appeared on the duty roster far more frequently.  It also meant that fewer people existed for carrying all of the squad’s equipment in the field.  The infantry squad doctrine for this time authorized eleven men; however, I never led a squad with over eight men.

While the Army deteriorated during this time, so did the US decline as a superpower.  Following the Viet Nam War the Soviet Union began an expansionist policy that took advantage of America’s weakness.  Liberal Democrats increased their control in both houses of Congress in 1972, promising an end of American “military adventurism.”

Many of these politicians began their careers as “anti-war activists” and continued this trend in Congress.  Under their policies the Congress made the US Armed Forces the “aggressor” in the world.  They subsequently reduced the American military budgets, thinking that this prevented our military leaders from “fomenting aggression.”  Furthermore, they passed the War Powers Resolution in 1973 that restricted the president’s commander-in-chief powers.  Then-President Richard M. Nixon faced the “Watergate” problem that eventually terminated his presidency, and offered no veto threat.  Nixon’s successor, Gerald R. Ford, faced enormous opposition from Congress and American impotence on the global stage continued.

While the US idly watched, Southeast Asia, where we lost over 58,000 troops, fell under North Vietnamese aggression.  Using surrogate Cuban troops, the Soviet Union launched military interventions throughout Africa in support of “revolutions.”  Central America erupted into communist-led insurrections and communist “revolutionaries” toppled the government of a long-time ally in Nicaragua.  We may debate the “usefulness” of Anastasio Somoza; however the results of his demise proved disastrous for the US.  The Soviet Union openly invaded Afghanistan, at the “request” of the local communist dictator.  They further threatened our Western European allies by positioning nuclear-armed missiles in Eastern Europe.

Then-President Jimmy Carter did nothing, the Congress continued reducing the military budget and our military readiness steadily eroded.  Our Western European allies questioned our reliability and cracks appeared in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  Intelligence discovered the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, deemed not a threat by Carter’s “experts.”  Today most revisionists call this period a “thawing of the Cold War,” implying a warm relationship with the Soviet Union.  Truthfully, the Soviet Union aggressively expanded around the world and the US did nothing for preventing this threat.

All of these problems, a bad economy and the crisis in Iran proved the impotence Carter.  When Carter became president Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran served as our strongest ally in the Persian Gulf.  At the time the US lacked the capabilities for projecting power in this region, and Iran filled that “dead space.”  Carter’s naiveté in foreign affairs resulted in the toppling of Pahlavi for the radical Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.  “Radicals” seized the American embassy in Teheran and held our citizens for over one year.  Carter’s public appearances showed a lack of resolve and Ronald Reagan won the election in a landslide.

Then-President Reagan came into office promising a reversal of these policies, and for a time the Democrat-controlled Congress helped him.  The American people gave Reagan a significant landslide, and this made the “loyal opposition” fearful for their political futures.  He vowed not just the “containment” of Soviet aggression, but “rolling it back” where possible.  This began the second “transformation” of the Armed Forces that I experienced, and the only one that delivered.

Reagan began the largest peacetime military build-up since World War II, and revitalized America’s leadership.  First, he emphasized patriotism and made us, military personnel, feel proud of our service.  He provided a significant increase in pay and benefits, which helped recruit and retain quality people in a competitive job market.  Combat units achieved combat readiness standards in both personnel and equipment, and the number of combat units increased.  Second, he launched a program for providing the most high-tech equipment, the most comprehensive doctrine and the time and money for training.  It resulted in the unprecedented 1991 victory of Operation Desert Storm, and the collapse of the Soviet Union one year later.

Then came the third “transformation,” the irresponsible “downsizing” of the 1990’s, which really meant demobilizing our forces.  I watched the Army that I helped build, for which myself and others like me sacrificed, erode into another “hollow force.”  Of course the “experts” who championed this demobilization used all the right “buzz words” for justifying the policy.  Phrases like “more bang for the buck” and “we can do more with less” dominated the media regarding this “downsizing.”  Furthermore, any senior officer that cautioned against this policy found their “services no longer needed.”  I retired from active duty in 1994 rather than serve in this developing farce of an army.

A new crowd of civilian “experts” entered the Pentagon bent on creating a new, “politically correct army.”  They engaged in “social engineering,” with the first priority of then-President Bill Clinton, homosexuals in the military.  These “experts” further surrendered American leadership in the world, making the United Nations (UN) secretary-general the de facto commander-in-chief.  The US military then engaged in a series of “humanitarian” missions that spread our rapidly diminishing forces around the world.

One of these “humanitarian” missions went awry in Somalia, one that most Americans know from the movie, “Blackhawk Down.”  I highly recommend reading Mark Bowden’s book of the same title, it delves into far more detail.  The ground commander, Major General William F. Garrison, requested a “heavy force” for backup for executing his missions.  “Washington” denied this support for “political reasons,” and ordered that the missions proceed.  No one knows for sure whether “Washington” meant Clinton, or his defense secretary, former Representative Les Aspin (D-WI).  Aspin, a long-time critic of the Pentagon, previously served on the House Armed Services Committee.  He criticized every military program, except those benefiting Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, and made few friends among military professionals.

The denial of heavy forces for “political reasons” supposed that the insurgents in Somalia proved unworthy of a heavy force.  Everyone knows the consequences of this military action, and the heroism demonstrated by American troops when faced with insurmountable circumstances.  For carrying out his mission without proper support, “Washington” relieved Garrison of command, although “Washington” denied this support.  The only suffering done by the “experts,” Clinton fired Aspin as defense secretary, and Congress forced our retreat from Somalia.  This retreat helped create the circumstances we find ourselves in today.

For the record, after this debacle the Army deployed a heavy force in Somalia and prepared for the offensive.  However, our civilian leadership lacked the will and these forces merely covered our withdrawal.  Our enemies learned that if you want the retreat of American forces, you inflict casualties.  A policy championed today by many major American politicians as they all believe themselves “military experts.”

While the active duty forces, particularly the Army, steadily decreased in size, the deployments significantly increased.  The Army lost 40% of its strength, 286,000 personnel and 8 combat divisions, while its deployments increased by 300%.  These deployments proved very “personnel intensive,” meaning they taxed the Army’s units beyond their capabilities.

This initiated an increased use of the National Guard and Reserve forces, the largest since World War II.  A policy embraced by most of the leaders of the National Guard and Reserve components at the time.  I remember reading the late Colonel David Hackworth’s Internet publication, now known as DefenseWatch, during this time.  Guardsmen and Reservists complained of deploying almost as frequently as the Regulars; and how this threatened their civilian occupations.  People from all the Army’s components left the service for the same reason they left during the post-Viet Nam era.

Cracks appeared in the Army’s force structure in 1996, as I read in the Army Times newspaper at the time.  Unfortunately my lack of storage space forced the disposal of these issues, meaning that I cannot cite specific articles.  I do remember that Army leaders warned of their decreasing ability at providing the adequate forces for meeting global missions.  However, when Congress, now controlled by Republicans, called hearings, the Army’s leaders changed their stories.  It seems the JCS suffered the same dilemma as it did during the Viet Nam War; support policy or resign.

This reveals another reason why I retired from active duty, the Army’s senior leadership “transformed” into politicians.  Before this “downsizing” began I remember serving under officers who exhibited all the qualities required for engaging the Soviet armies.  Now I watched as these “warriors” competed for the ever-shrinking number of command positions, and turned into “ticket-punchers.”  These officers saved their careers, continued up the ladder for promotion and achieved political acumen.  They led the Army through this “transformation,” but at what cost for the nation, the Army and the soldiers they commanded?

Coincidently, Feickert’s document cites one of the combat operations of this era as a reason for justifying the “modular” brigades.  This occurred following the 1999 aerial war in the Balkans regarding Kosovo, then part of Serbia.  It states, “the Army deployed a unit consisting of units from different divisions that had never trained together,” for promoting this idea.  However, the whole concept of “modular” brigades embraces the example it criticized.  Unless somehow the “experts” envisioning this new policy corrected every deficiency, human and mechanical, and fixed the transportation shortfalls.

One problem with Task Force Hawk, the unit cited in the report, it suffered from the “cracks” revealed in 1996.  Anecdotal evidence from DefenseWatch at the time, provided by military personnel, revealed a system broken by years of abuse.  By this time reduced personnel strength forced that deploying units receive “fillers” from other units for meeting “ramp strength.”  It further required the “cannibalization” of parts and equipment from other units for achieving operational readiness for the deploying unit.  Maintaining readiness in both personnel and equipment requires funding, that steadily decreased through the 1990’s, severely harming combat readiness.

Another problem encountered by Task Force Hawk, as documented at www.d-n-i.net/fces/comments/c288.htm, mentions other critical shortcomings associated with the above-mentioned problems.  Budget cuts reduced the flight time for the pilots at below 500 hours during a three-year period.  None of the co-pilot gunners (CPG) possessed qualification for night flying with night vision goggles (NVG).  The ad hoc unit never executed any pre-deployment mission rehearsal exercises and they deployed with questionable aircraft survivability equipment (ASE).  Nor did the task force receive updated intelligence regarding the air defense threat posed by the enemy.

The AH-64 Apache attack helicopter achieved legendary status during Operation Desert Storm, and deservedly so.  It arose from the investment in technology from the Reagan build-up, as did most of the systems used during this war.  However, the Apache functions as part of a combined arms team, a “ground asset,” and the “experts” deployed it alone.

NATO also deployed an ad hoc ground force for “peacekeeping” after hostilities, called Kosovo Force (KFOR).  Commanded by a British lieutenant general, it consisted of American, British, French, German, Greek and Italian brigades.  The American brigade consisted of an airborne battalion, a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), a mechanized infantry task force and a cavalry troop.  Thankfully this conglomerate command did not engage in combat, because the potential for disaster existed.

I remember news stories of the time highlighting the problems with deploying this small American force.  Problems caused by the aforementioned budget constraints that harmed military readiness and raised doubts about American military dominance.  During the three days required for off-loading the equipment for the Americans, Russian peacekeepers beat us into Kosovo.  Few people know of these problems since the media often covers up problems with military operations that they champion.  Fewer people know that then-NATO commander, General Wesley Clark, risked starting a war with Russia.

NATO launched this air war supposedly for punishing the Serbs for “ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo.  This allied them with the Albanian Kosovars, and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) operating with US Special Forces.

Russia, the traditional protectors of the Serbs, sent its forces into Kosovo without prior coordination with NATO.  They moved swiftly into Kosovo while NATO forces awaited the still-deploying American brigade.  Crowds of Serbs cheered the Russians as they entered, believing them as their protectors.  They occupied an area reserved for NATO “peacekeepers,” operated outside NATO command, and jeopardized the fragile peace.

Feickert erroneously uses historical examples for justifying the “transformation,” as if the “experts” just discovered something new.  He begins with World War II describing divisions as “permanent organizations” composed of “three smaller units,” a reasonably accurate description.  However, he does not acknowledge the flexibility these units demonstrated during World War II and in wars thereafter.

Describing the subordinate units of a division as initially “regiments, but since the early 1960’s, known as brigades,” missed the major point.  First, the subordinate maneuver elements of these regiments consisted of units from the same combat arm: (i.e., 16^th Infantry, 34^th Armor, 5^th Artillery).  However, this does not explain the entire situation, these regiments developed into regimental combat teams (RCT).  Each regiment contained combat elements and organic CS and CSS elements that supported it in battle.

The brigades evolved from the increased need for combined arms teams that emerged during World War I.  During World War II most infantry divisions received attached tank battalions and tank destroyer battalions for achieving this concept.  The true birth of modern combined arms teams arose with the World War II armored divisions.  These units used combat commands instead of traditional regiments for achieving combined arms teams.

Regimental combat teams evolved into the flawed battle groups (another “expert” idea) of the late 1950’s, and the “pentomic” divisions.  Ironically this arose from many of the problems faced by the Army today: seeming irrelevance in “modern” warfare, budgetary constraints and advanced technology.  McMaster describes Eisenhower, a famous “Army man,” as someone who placed domestic policies above military strategy.  I found a document, “The Pentomic Era (1956-1960),” at website www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1211, describing then-Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor as designing these “pentomic” divisions almost out of desperation.

This document outlines Eisenhower’s belief that our nuclear technology effectively counterbalanced the Warsaw Pact numerical superiority.  It further spared the American economy the burden of maintaining large ground forces during peacetime.  The Army focused on using tactical nuclear weapons as artillery for defeating the superior numbers of our enemies.  The document describes this division as emphasizing the concepts of, “dispersion, flexibility, and mobility.”  Reading the entire document seems almost like reading Feickert’s document today.

I strongly urge that the “experts” championing the “modular” brigades read this document, particularly the last two pages.  The division did not meet expectations for several reasons, including our failure at understanding the damage from nuclear weapons.  Most importantly, admitting failure did not result from a battlefield disaster, it resulted from reality on the ground.

As knowledge increased regarding the long-term damage from nuclear warfare, and our superiority over the Soviets decreased we refocused on conventional warfare.  This required rebuilding the Army and the European scenario, and the Army developed combined arms brigades.  Heavy brigades (armor and mechanized infantry) contained battalions of both armor and mechanized infantry and a “support slice.” This “slice” task organized other combat elements with the brigade: field artillery, combat engineers and air defense artillery.  It further provides other CS and CSS elements: signal, medical, maintenance, quartermaster and other essential personnel.  Under the AirLand Battle Doctrine this CS and CSS “slice” formed the forward support battalion (FSB) task organized with each maneuver brigade.

The Cold War era brigade called itself a brigade combat team (BCT) and functions as the “modular” force envisioned by those cited by Feickert.  I know, I deployed with these type of commands for both CONUS and OCONUS training exercises and combat.  The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California focuses on combined arms training as it trains brigades and smaller units.  Probably some “expert” somewhere decided against deploying divisions because of the nightmare of providing all the needs.

Feickert first asks, “Is this redesign necessary or desirable?”  No, since the “redesigned force” demonstrates no significant change as it already exists within the current command structures.  Feickert’s document proposes “transforming” the division and higher echelon headquarters into units of deployment, capable of commanding at least six modular brigades.  The divisions I served in already possessed that capability, as did higher echelon headquarters.  For example, I served with the 1^st Infantry Division (Mechanized) , or 1^st ID(M), at Fort Riley, Kansas twice during my career.  At Fort Riley, the 1^st ID(M) served under the command of III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas.  Coincidently, III Corps commanded five divisions and the required supporting units in CONUS, spread across several states.  When the 1^st ID(M) deployed for its NATO mission it came under the command of VII Corps at Stuttgart, Germany.  Ironically this occurred during Operation Desert Shield with no significant problems, except those imposed by the desert.

Within the BCT’s, the subordinate battalions task organized by cross-attaching armor and infantry companies, creating task forces.  Within the companies they task organized armor and infantry platoons through similar cross-attachment, creating teams.  When this occurred each affected subordinate element took its “support slice” with it.  I experienced these task organizations throughout my career and found the experiences rewarding for the most part.

Most of the problems encountered proved administrative and logistical, based on inflexible high-tech systems designed by higher echelon “experts.”  Most of these I experienced as an infantry company first sergeant when I conducted company resupply operations.  For example, if the observer/controller/evaluator (OCE) assessed casualties the “system” prevented me from requesting replacements outside the MOS’es of my company.  If a tank experienced maintenance problems, my vehicle, tracked, recovery (VTR) proved incapable of towing it.  Eventually the Army eliminated this vehicle giving mechanized infantry units the same recovery vehicle as armor units.  The “system” prevented me from ordering parts for tanks, since my table of organization and equipment (TO & E) did not list them.  I solved these problems by contacting the first sergeant of the organic armor company of my attached platoon.

The military professionals cited by Feickert know of these BCT’s, or at least they should, which puzzles me.  Why make such an ordeal out of something that already exists, except if one desires recognition, and possible future “rewards.”  If I sound cynical, I am, for I know officers that weakened when offered such “rewards.”  Politics affects the careers of these officers, both active and retired, and developing these “dynamic” strategies gets noticed.  It seems that the document plans on the significant reduction in division-level and higher-level CS and CSS troops.  Since the establishment of the support MOS’es following the Spanish-American War the Army’s leadership debated the “tooth-to-tail” ratio.

MacDonald describes the military planning before the US entered World War II and the projected number of troops needed.  It seems that the Army severely under estimated the number of CSS troops needed for sustained combat operations.  Army planners further under estimated the length of the logistical “tail,” that lay between CONUS and the front lines.  Unfortunately Army planners did not learn this lesson very well, since they make the same mistakes today.

Regarding the number of CSS troops, budget constraints and personnel ceilings forced a major change during the post-Viet Nam era.  The Army transferred most of its highly specialized CSS MOS’es into the reserve components.  At most garrison installations civilian employees performed these duties, providing jobs for constituents, therefore the policy made sense.  A good example, military postal units, since each CONUS military installation possesses a post office manned by the US Postal Service.  It further included many medical, transportation, quartermaster, military police and other such units at corps and higher echelons.  The theory stated that many of these people held civilian jobs in these areas and required minimal post-mobilization training.

The theory worked haphazardly during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm for a variety of reasons.  Primarily I know of no extensive training, such as NTC rotations, that paired these units with the corps they supposedly supported.  As previously stated no CONUS command exercised division and higher echelon maneuvers except on OCONUS deployments.  However, these deployments decreased in number as funding decreased for these exercises.

Unfortunately the circumstances in the Middle East proved strikingly different from that experienced on previous deployments.  Pentagon planners directed all training toward NATO or Korea where American forces stationed there maintained the required infrastructure.  Prior OCONUS deployments outside these areas seemed short-term events for relatively small numbers of American forces, and no logistical challenge.

Operation Desert Shield became the largest short-notice deployment of the time, outside planned areas of operation.  Primarily no infrastructure existed in the desert, forcing a change in the equipment needed by these CSS units.  With no established support depots for drawing supplies, commands must deploy with a six-month supply.  This severely limited the maneuverability of the combat units, and strained relations with the CSS units.  Once in theater no one seemingly controlled the distribution of these CSS units and what corps they supported.  Fortunately the American soldier “adapted, overcame and persevered,” in the words of Clint Eastwood’s character, Gunny Highway.

Feickert’s document implies that the reduction of CSS personnel immediately translates into combat personnel.  Unfortunately many civilians with no military experience assume that we may interchange soldiers into any unit, and easily change their MOS.  Such an interchange requires a significant amount of time and funding for retraining the affected soldiers.  It requires even more time if this requires the retraining of officers and NCO’s.  Then we must address the issue of female soldiers, currently prohibited from serving in combat arms units.

Of course we may “downsize” all of these “excess” support troops, just as we “downsized” during the 1990’s.  We may transfer their positions into the reserve components, increasing the number of active duty positions for combat arms.  However, training the new combat personnel takes additional time and money for fielding these new brigades.  Then we must consider the benefit packages for these people “downsized” out of their jobs.

Unfortunately when we eliminate these CSS units we do not eliminate the requirement for their duties.  Maintaining ever-increasingly high tech equipment requires an ever-increasingly skilled CSS force.  As stated previously, we may transfer these units into the reserve components; however this does not solve the deployment issue.  Mobilized reservists require post-mobilization training, jeopardizing the sustainment of a combat unit rapidly deployed into theater.  When the Defense Department embraced the increased emphasis on reserve components in 1993, the “experts” estimated post-mobilization training at 60 days minimum.

This situation grows worse when one considers the theory of “civilianizing” these headquarters and CSS functions.  Do these civilians deploy into combat theaters when the brigade deploys, or does the brigade deploy at a disadvantage?  How about weapons and combat training for these civilians, and coverage under the Geneva Convention?  When attacked, do these civilians fight back, or sit idly by as civilian employees?  We already know that the terrorists torture and murder civilians just as they do military personnel.  Civilian employees provide valuable services at garrison installations; however, in combat units we need our “brothers-in-arms” in these positions.

To be continued

D-DAY REMEMBERED?-Part III

Continued from Part II

The distorted rhetoric of the Left demonizes our soldiers, reminiscent of the Viet Nam era, yet claims that they support them. In the next sentence these “intellectually superior” leftists benevolently call our troops “victims” of military recruiters “exploiting” them. Acts considered treasonous during World War II the Left calls “patriotic,” and they call people who support their country “traitors.” Professor Ward Churchill called those people murdered on 9/11 “little Eichmanns,” and receives the treatment of a dignitary. Former Presidents Jimmie Carter and Bill Clinton, two presidents who helped create our current mess, travel the world demonizing their country. Gold Star mother, Cindy Sheehan, received icon status, while the media ignored other Gold Star mothers, who support the war. These represent merely a few examples of the distorted “pop culture” that thrives in our nation.

Unfortunately those with the opposing views, commonly called the “Extreme Right Wing,” remain silent, often afraid of receiving a personal attack. The Left, and their “fellow travelers,” only “tolerate” those who agree with them. However, the Left tells us that we must “respect” their views and never “question their patriotism.” Like trained seals, the so-called conservative “leaders” follow their instructions from the Left, and call them “patriots.”

One may ask how all of this ties in with remembering D-Day, and the sacrifices of World War II. We face a threat just as serious as that we faced during World War II, maybe worse. Immediately after Pearl Harbor most Americans understood the threat and “rolled up their sleeves” for victory. As America’s sons and daughters sacrificed so much overseas, Americans at home spared no effort at supporting them. After 9/11, that attitude lasted three weeks, as I stated previously, and our “leaders” did not generate a war effort. Instead of calling for victory today, many of our “leaders” call for our withdrawal and defeat.

In great detail I described the blood, sweat and sacrifice endured by all Americans between Pearl Harbor and D-Day. These hardships occurred in combat across the globe and on the home front by laboring in the war industries. I further revealed some of the problems encountered, both at home and abroad, that potentially threatened the final victory. However, these Americans overcame these problems, focused on the victory and defeated the most serious threat of their generation.

After the Allies secured the Normandy beachhead it took another eleven months of brutal combat for defeating Germany. With the secure beachhead, the Allies poured in men and materiel for winning the victory and occupying Germany. Victory in the Pacific required an additional three months of the most bloody combat faced by Americans since the Civil War.

Most Americans understood that liberating France, or occupied American territory in the Pacific, did not end the war. Victory meant invading the Axis nations, defeating their armed forces and changing their governments. Leaving the dictatorial regimes in power did not solve the problem, it merely postponed them.

When President Bush made his first post-9/11 State of the Union address he mentioned three nations as the “Axis of Evil.” He correctly called these nations, Iran, Iraq and North Korea threats for a variety of reasons. Almost immediately the Left around the world chastised him and called him a “cowboy.” The Democrat Party, looking for a political wedge for eroding Bush’s soaring popularity, joined this clamor. This clamor also included the left-leaning media and Hollywood elites, who immediately began a propaganda campaign against Bush.

The Islamofascists, and their “rogue nations” supporters, face no such internal dissensions, particularly since they embrace no democratic principles. Iran became our enemy in 1979 with the revolution that toppled Shah Reza Pahlavi, one of our best regional allies (thank you President Carter). Since that time Iran openly supported terrorist organizations that cause conflicts in the region, and killed over two hundred US Marines. Currently they arm, train and join the terrorists in Iraq, killing our soldiers. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, seeks nuclear power, threatens Israel and creates regional instability through his speeches and actions.

Since Bush named the “Axis of Evil” we must add another nation, Syria, which also threatens regional stability. It supports terrorist organizations, promotes instability in Lebanon, threatens Israel and, like Iran, supports our enemies in Iraq. Former Iraqi Air Force General Georges Sada, in his book, Saddam’s Secrets, believes that Saddam Hussein sent his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) into Syria.

North Korea remains at a disadvantage, despite its possession of nuclear weapons and the means for delivering them. Geographically situated on a peninsula, with a hostile relationship with its neighbor, South Korea, it possesses little room for expansion. However, as long as it continues developing WMD’s, and the means for delivering them, it increases its threat level. As long as it exports these weapons and other technology, it increases the threat posed by these “rogue nations.”

However, in the Middle East, the US possesses no useful alternative except eliminating the threats posed by Iran and Syria. Both export terror through organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah that attack Israel, giving Israel a 9/11 equivalent almost daily. Diplomacy continues failing regarding these nations, as our European “allies” openly trade with them. The UN balks at any serious actions, and our “partners,” Russia and China, veto any strong resolution.

The US, as the “lone superpower,” faces the threat almost alone, yet ignores it. Even the surviving members of the “Greatest Generation,” whose experiences offer so much, do not acknowledge the threat. History teaches us that America, however reluctantly, began preparing for war in June, 1940, eighteen months before Pearl Harbor. Today, almost seven years after 9/11, we barely acknowledge that a war exists.

We stood almost alone in 1940, with a poorly prepared military force, and prepared for the worst. Part of this military preparation included the first peacetime draft in our nation’s history. Many pundits today call peacetime draftees “reluctant soldiers at best,” and that situation prevailed in 1940. MacDonald reveals one of the restrictions on draftees included one year’s service, ending their service in September, 1941. The world situation, and military organizational problems, prompted legislation for extending that service by one year. This deeply angered the drafted men, and the acronym OHIO (Over the Hill In October) became prominently displayed on military property. For the unknowing, “over the hill” means Absent Without Official Leave (AWOL), and I found no figures revealing AWOL statistics for this time. However, after Pearl Harbor, these “reluctant soldiers” became the force that immediately confronted the Axis armies.

Following 9/11 America faced a similar military situation as it did following the Allied defeat in June, 1940. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 America began demobilizing the superb military force that guaranteed that collapse. For the next ten years the US “downsized” about forty per cent of its personnel strength. Meanwhile the world situation required the increase of deployments by about three hundred per cent. These forces proved inadequate for these “peacetime” requirements, despite the unprecedented mobilization of reserve components. We began the war against terrorism with this worn down force, and did not increase the number of personnel. Today we hear stories of the “over extending” of these forces, yet no one advocates increasing the number of troops.

At several times during this piece I mentioned casualties from certain campaigns of the war. I further mentioned that on one day, June 6, 1944, the Allies suffered almost 10,000 casualties. At least 2,500 of these occurred among the American forces involved in the Omaha Beach landings. Today the Left and the media maintains a “casualty watch,” almost gleefully reporting every American casualty. As a combat veteran I understand the value of everyone killed or wounded, and the gash it tears in the families effected. However, the casualties we suffered in almost seven years of combat, pale when considered against those suffered during World War II.

American families then mourned their losses and continued on for victory, much like the Sullivan Family. The Sullivan Family of Waterloo, Iowa lost all five of their sons during one naval battle near Guadalcanal in November, 1942. Thomas and Alleta Sullivan received an outpouring of condolences from the American public, and Americans honored their sons as the “Fighting Sullivan Brothers.” Despite the sorrow from their loss, Thomas and Alleta made several appearances at war plants and shipyards for supporting the war effort. Unfortunately I experienced a difficult time finding a website, www.arlingtoncemetery.net/sullivan-brothers.html, that told their story. As stated previously, today the media honors Cindy Sheehan, and I found her website at the top of my search.

The beachhead at D-Day represented a significant strategic advantage for the Allies; however German counterattacks tried breaching it. Victory remained elusive even following this invasion as Allied forces in Europe entered the bloody hedgerow campaign. In Italy the Allied troops continued the costly campaign in the mountains. The Soviets suffered horrendous casualties as they advanced on the Eastern Front, finally ejecting the enemy from Soviet territory.

In the Pacific Allied forces continued their bloody island-hopping campaign, drawing the noose tighter around Japan. Allied troops on the Asian mainland struggled against stiff Japanese resistance, slowly gaining ground. Achieving these gains caused severe strains on the Allied resources, and deepened strains within the alliance as well.

Despite all of the public relations efforts and “photo-ops” at the various conferences, deep divisions threatened the Allies. Most people know of the distrust between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. Almost everyone knows of the rivalry between the British and Americans, particularly between the British senior field commander, General Bernard Montgomery, and Patton. De Gaulle and his Free French often proved more of a hindrance, particularly when the “Big Three,” FDR, Churchill and Stalin, snubbed him. The Chinese Nationalists and Communists continued fighting each other, which hindered operations against the Japanese. However, this “coalition of the willing” continued and ultimately defeated their enemies and brought down the enemy governments.

My fellow Americans, we faced our D-Day when we invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, and secured our “beachheads.” Unfortunately victory remains elusive as we seem stalemated by the irresponsible internal squabbles of our “leaders.” No easy answers exist for solving the problem of victory in this war against terrorism, despite our politicians’ rhetoric. Retreat and withdrawal, as envisioned by the Democrats, turns our D-Day into our Dunkirk, when British troops evacuated continental Europe. However, “staying the course” invokes images of the Viet Nam War and “quagmire,” and the political divisions we currently face.

In either case we appear weak and indecisive, a superpower paralyzed by a seemingly small number of people. We further enshrined this paralysis from our internal problems as well, comfortable in our arrogance and complacency. This attitude makes us believe ourselves invincible because of our limitless power versus the limitations of our enemies. We possess all of the technological advantages; therefore these enemies, lacking in modern amenities, cannot overcome this power.

Furthermore, we do not believe that our “political discourse” affects the tenacity of our enemy on the battlefield. Politics no longer stops “at the water’s edge” as it did during World War II. Thomas Fleming, in his book, The New Dealers’ War, describes the internal struggles FDR faced during the war. During the first few months of the war many Republicans criticized FDR regarding how we entered the war. However, none of them called for impeachment, accused him of treason or directly challenged his role as commander-in-chief. Nor did any “shadow government” of angry Republicans exist in our government agencies, disrupting the President’s policies.

Fleming further describes the “dark side” of FDR, who ruthlessly stifled his opposition, sometimes using questionable authority. Unlike FDR, Bush embraced his opposition with his “new tone,” and neither he nor other Republicans respond when attacked. FDR paid a price for his ruthlessness; the Democrats suffered losses in the 1942 mid-term election. Although Democrats still controlled both houses of Congress, they lacked veto-proof majorities. Unlike the Democrats today, no Republicans challenged FDR as commander-in-chief, or undermined the war effort.

Fleming mentions a good example of not undermining the commander-in-chief occurred during the 1944 presidential election cycle. The Republican candidate, New York Governor Thomas Dewey, learned that the US broke the Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor. Angry at the destruction at Pearl Harbor given this knowledge, Dewey threatened disclosing it. However, General Marshall informed Dewey of the American victories because of this, and urged his silence. Dewey placed national security and soldiers’ lives above politics and remained silent on this issue.

Instead the 1944 presidential election cycle centered on FDR’s declining health and ability for continuing his leadership of the war. I found no evidence of highlighting “war weariness,” continuing casualties or blunders concerning military operations. Nor did Dewey state his willingness in meeting enemy leaders for negotiating an end of hostilities.

Today the “loyal opposition” discloses everything they know, and their media accomplices report it. It does not matter how it affects the war effort, or the safety of our military personnel. They only care about how this information damages Bush and their other political opponents. Tragically, when these “leaks” happen neither Bush nor other Republicans express outrage at these breaches of national security.

FDR further tried building support for the war before the US entered it, warning of the dangers of the Axis Powers. Fleming cites the creation of the Office of War Information (OWI) in June, 1942 (what is it with these June anniversaries?) for managing public support of the war. Today we call these people “spin meisters,” for their ability at twisting facts for meeting their agendas.

Unfortunately agencies like the OWI prove necessary, particularly during wartime as we faced enemy propaganda masters. The most famous, Joseph Goebbels of Germany, successfully “spun” battlefield defeats into propaganda victory for maintaining public support. Such programs work best in totalitarian nations, such as the Axis nations and the Soviet Union, with no freedom of the press. In democratic societies one might liken the OWI with the commercials aired by private companies selling their products.

Our Constitution outlines the necessity of freedom of the press in our society for informing the public. The censorship of World War II did not drastically affect First Amendment rights, particularly since we still enjoy these rights today. However, the “free and independent press” today often acts as a propaganda organ for our enemies. While they routinely discredit all information from our government, they faithfully accept every word uttered by our enemies. Before the invasion of Iraq, journalist Dan Rather interviewed Saddam Hussein, treating him with more deference than his own president. Unfortunately nothing like the OWI exists today for even balancing out this negative reporting, let alone promoting “our side.”

Although I often ponder over how I would do things since 9/11, we cannot go back in time. For transforming our D-Day into victory we can only discuss where we go from our present place in time. Primarily, we need national leadership, from the President, the Congress and in those federal agencies involved in national security. Currently it seems that Bush lacks the fortitude for bringing this leadership about, even in his Cabinet. Particularly during this time of war, we cannot tolerate any “shadow government,” and the President must fire them.

The President runs the Executive Branch of government through his Cabinet and other advisors, meaning all the federal agencies. Besides the “shadow government” these federal agencies seem overflowing with those concerned mainly with their advancement. Those agencies concerned with our national security must employ only the best of people, and those with the most experience. The stakes prove too high for tolerating gross mistakes, incompetence and the bane of all government employees, careerism. Regarding the war against terrorism I believe Bush received some bad advice from complacent advisors, partly from “Clinton hold-overs.”

A good example, when the Soviet Union collapsed Iraq became the primary threat for which the Army trained. I know; I participated in this training from 1992 until I retired from active duty in 1994. Every time Saddam “rattled his sabers” we deployed a combat brigade immediately into Kuwait. Despite this fact, and our control over northern Iraq, we did not aggressively execute human intelligence missions inside Iraq. For eleven years our intelligence agencies did not emplace agents inside Iraq, or recruit sources inside Saddam’s regime.

Likewise in Afghanistan after we learned that Usama bin Laden executed his attacks against us from there during the 1990’s. The Northern Alliance, under the legendary Ahmad Shah Massoud, fought the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Richard Miniter, in his book, Losing Bin Laden, describes the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) incompetent use of Massoud. Infiltrating al Qaeda required money and other assistance; the CIA did not provide it. The Northern Alliance provided regular information regarding bin Laden’s movements; the CIA did not act. Massoud determined that the CIA possessed “no interest” in getting bin Laden. Al Qaeda assassinated Massoud on September 9, 2001.

Before D-Day the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), forerunner of the CIA, emplaced agents throughout France. These agents worked with the Maquis, and waged an active campaign gathering intelligence and disrupting German defenses. Despite their best efforts accurate intelligence still proved a challenge, such as the German 352^nd Infantry Division at Omaha Beach. We often forget that the enemy works just as hard at deceiving us as we do at deceiving them.

By the time of D-Day the Armed Forces purged themselves of most of their incompetent field commanders, often after costly disasters. Patton, arguably our best field commander in Europe, almost purged himself from command. Eisenhower gave him his assignment in England as “probation,” however it proved its worth against the Germans. Unfortunately, during the 1990’s we purged the Armed Forces of anyone remotely resembling Patton, creating a “politically correct” Army.

Even if we possess the best warriors as our field commanders, our military still operates under civilian control. Our military strategy originates in the White House, the Pentagon advises, and then carries out this strategy. A trend began under Defense Secretary Robert McNamara when he employed legions of computer analysts, statisticians and business managers. Most of these men lacked military experience, and even thought military experience a “disadvantage” in determining strategy. H.R. McMaster, in his book, Dereliction of Duty, describes the condescending attitude these “experts” displayed toward professional military officers. They further believed that their “superior education” made them better decision-makers than professional officers with combat experience. We lost the war managed by these people, and micro-managed by the ultimate statistician, McNamara.

Unfortunately such trends continue today regarding the civilians that run the Pentagon. I researched the Defense Department’s websites and found of the thirteen highest civilians only six mentioned military experience in their biographies. Historically many of our service secretaries lacked military experience such as President Abraham Lincoln’s two secretaries of war, Simon Cameron and Edwin Stanton. However, I believe military experience proves essential for someone serving as a service secretary, given the serious nature of the job. Would a president appoint a federal judge with no legal experience, or a surgeon general with no medical experience?

I hoped for the appointment of former General H. Norman Schwarzkopf as Secretary of Defense, the commander of Operation Desert Storm. Maybe Bush offered him the job and he declined it, I do not know. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld did not impress me, nor did he when he served in the position previously. He seemed more interested in his “transformation” program than with winning the war, proposing more cuts for a drastically reduced military force.

Of course I do not know what advice Rumsfeld received from the bureaucrats who really run the Pentagon. Bureaucrats often do things based on how it affects their careers, and improves their “power base.” If someone changes the plans it might reduce their influence, or even eliminate their job. Besides, with all of the statistics and “Power Point” briefings, their plans seem infallible.

Certainly even someone with no military experience realizes we need a dramatic increase in our personnel strength. This proves particularly true for the Army, which suffered the most under “downsizing,” losing about 286,000 personnel. The Army primarily wages the nation’s ground wars, which requires the largest number of people, for both combat and support troops. Despite today’s rhetoric the war against terrorism remains primarily a ground war, where our forces engage the terrorists in ground combat.

When the Allies defeated Germany the US alone possessed over one million troops in Europe. Today the US possesses 1.4 million personnel on active duty and 1.3 million in the reserve components. While this seems a large number it proved insufficient for meeting all of its global missions. Current military doctrine states that victory requires a three-to-one ratio of attacker-to-defender, at the front line. Defeating a guerrilla force, such as terrorists, requires a ten-to-one ratio of us-to-them. Sustained warfare requires a substantial depth of operations that extend far behind the battlefront.

During World War II the records reveal that it took seven support soldiers for supporting every combat soldier. MacDonald states that this proved one of the flaws in pre-war planning, under estimating the number of support units needed. This support begins stateside with the recruiting and training base for producing qualified and trained personnel. It then extends across the globe in lines of communication for providing a steady supply of men and materiel. Defending this line of communication requires significant numbers of troops, particularly air and naval forces.

Traditionally, once soldiers deployed overseas during World War II they remained overseas for the “duration plus six months.” This did not mean that the troops remained in constant combat operations; everyone understood that they needed periodic rest. Particularly after a bloody operation like D-Day, the assault units needed time for rest and refit.

The Allies assaulted the beaches of Normandy with about 170,000 troops; however, this represented just the “tip” of the “spearhead.” As stated previously, follow-on forces began landing once the assault units secured the beaches. These fresh troops “relieved in place” the troops on the front and continued the momentum of operations. Unlike today, no D-Day planners believed these 170,000 troops capable of securing the beachhead and liberating France. When the D-Day plan went awry Eisenhower did not appear before a partisan congressional committee in Washington, DC.

During World War II Republicans in Congress did criticize FDR’s “home front” policies regarding the war. This involved the growing bureaucracies for managing the war, graft and corruption within these agencies and the political use of the OWI. However, I found no evidence of delaying war funding, partisan electioneering in foreign countries or “shadow governments.”

Congress, as the representatives of the people, plays a vital role in the military operations of the country. This includes authorizing operations, such as formal declaration of war, or “conditional” declarations, such as the resolutions since World War II. In the aftermath of 9/11 Congress overwhelmingly passed a joint resolution (S.J. Res. 23) authorizing the use of force:

That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determined planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.

While most members of Congress supported this effort at defeating those who attacked us, others cynically postured for political gain. Following the unanticipated victory in Afghanistan some of this “war fever” died out as the Democrats lamented the rising popularity of Bush. Many of them, responsible for the “downsizing” of our military and intelligence capabilities in the 1990’s, tried blaming Bush for military shortfalls.

The Congress further approved military action against the continuing threat of Iraq with S.J. Res. 45, on October 2, 2002. This document cited Saddam’s violations of UN resolutions beginning with the first Gulf War in 1990-1. It further stipulated the violations of seventeen separate resolutions since the first war ended, including continuing Iraqi hostility. Cynically, many Democrats tried delaying the vote until after the mid-term elections that November. I believe they hoped that the security of employment for another two years allowed them a “safety net” for criticizing Bush. For once the Republicans stood up and demanded a vote, forcing a hard choice for the Democrats, and the resolution passed.

Congress further possesses the constitutional power for raising and supporting our armed forces and appropriating the necessary funding. Since the war against terrorism began Democrats in Congress almost continuously berate Bush for military shortages. Ironically, they initiated most of those shortages through the irresponsible “downsizing” of the 1990’s, and offer no solutions. Tragically, the “Bush Administration” does very little for reversing these shortages and maintains the inadequate structures of the 1990’s.

Since Congress controls the military “purse strings” why not increase the funding if they feel the current amount inadequate. Divert funding from their “earmarks,” or their “pet” domestic programs for ensuring that our troops receive the proper support. Truthfully, Congress does not take money from these programs because that does not translate into constituent votes, and ensure reelection.

The Republican leaders in Congress do not confront their Democrat “colleagues” regarding their demagoguery, particularly regarding military funding. Neither does Bush “hold their feet to the fire,” making them perform their duty of providing for the common defense.” Our Constitution tasks the federal government with the primary responsibility for providing for the nation’s defense. However, the federal government seems more interested in prioritizing health care, education and other things not mentioned in the Constitution.

Congress maintains oversight of the Armed Forces through the armed services committees of both houses. However, the majority of the people on these committees lack military experience themselves, and use it as a political “stepping stone.” I researched the websites of all members of Congress sitting on these committees and grew disappointed with the results. Of 62 members on the House committee only 15 mentioned military service in their biographies. Two others mentioned spouses with military experience and one member posted no biography on his site. The Senate committee boasted 25 members with only 9 mentioning military service in their biographies and one mentioned a spouse with military experience.

Neither committee chairman mentioned military service, while both ranking members served during the Viet Nam War. While military service does not guarantee expertise in military affairs, neither does serving as a “political hack.” When I watch these “distinguished members” grilling military commanders I grow increasingly agitated. These “hacks” sit in judgment of these officers with smug looks on their faces and condescending words spoken from their mouths. Maybe if more of these people served in the military, and experienced the hardships, they might better execute their responsibilities.

Political ramifications dominate so much of today’s society that it often paralyzes our nation. No one ever mentions that D-Day occurred in a presidential election year, nor did the “loyal opposition” use it for seeking advantage. Many opportunities existed for using it, if any candidate proved eager for exploiting it, and possibly affecting public morale. The blunders, the high casualties and the irresponsibility of launching it under marginal weather conditions provided ample “political fodder.”

As stated previously, in World War II politics stopped “at the water’s edge,” and FDR won an unprecedented fourth term. While Democrats and Republicans bickered over domestic issues, they differed very little regarding foreign policy and conduct of the war. Individual Americans vehemently differed over many issues, such as racial policies, but they united for defeating the enemy. No sacrifice proved too great for supporting “our boys,” who gave their lives in defense of their country.

Today it seems that nothing transcends politics, personal aggrandizement or takes priority over our creature comforts. We further sacrifice our history, revising it for fitting in with our “politically correct” society. As June turned into July, and we celebrate our independence as a nation, must we also sacrifice that history? Past generations paid a high price for the freedoms and opportunities we take for granted today. None of them sought these hardships, however they met the challenges of their generation, and we must meet ours today.

American troops fought their way ashore on Omaha Beach at a very high price. Behind them millions of Americans, both military and civilian, applauded them and sustained them until they won victory. Today American forces toppled the oppressive regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, liberating millions of people. Behind them millions of Americans applaud them and support them, although you rarely hear of it.

The Islamofascists present a threat of at least equal proportions with the Axis nations of World War II. Almost every source that speaks of this threat states the goal of enforcing a caliphate on the Western democracies. One need only look at the media footage from Afghanistan where the Taliban publicly executed those who violated their Islamic laws. Look at the footage of terrorists detonating bombs against mostly innocent civilians as they seek dominance over these people.

The Americans today who feel their Constitutional rights violated by the “Patriot Act” do not understand true oppression. Those who denounce our soldiers for “atrocities” against the captured terrorists never witnessed true atrocity. Others who claim that the “Bush Administration” concocted the war against terrorism do not comprehend the threat. “Experts” who claim that we must appease the terrorists never faced the threat, or suffered at their hands. Unfortunately we give too many Americans with too little knowledge and experience too much power in our society.

That power immobilized our response against the enemies that threaten our existence as a nation. Transforming our D-Day into victory requires that we replace the current governments in Iran and Syria. How we accomplish this remains the problem, as our internal political squabbles effectively paralyzed our actions. We receive no leadership from Washington, DC, who we pay quite handsomely for leading us. Disturbingly, we seem rooted in a flawed plan for using “minimal force” and making the “smallest footprint” on our enemies.

As World War II confirmed, defeating our enemies requires the application of our full national effort. Victory requires that we “pay any price” and “bear any burden,” as President John F. Kennedy stated in his inaugural address. Unfortunately today, we face the real possibility of defeat and the demise of our civilization.

Waiting for permission from the UN and our European “allies” allows more time for Iran’s nuclear development. Not building sufficient military strength for this inevitable war demonstrates insanity on the part of the US and other Western democracies. The complacency of our leaders in ignoring the threat represents a total dereliction of duty. Their deliberate campaign in blaming their own nation and demonizing their soldiers borders on treason.

D-Day represents a significant victory for American and Allied troops during World War II. Remembering it, and the blood, sweat and sacrifice that made it possible remain important for today’s Americans. The Axis Powers did not make victory easy, they mobilized their nations’ resources as well. They employed every strategy for avoiding defeat, and discouraging the Allies into negotiations, such as the famed “Battle of the Bulge.” The Japanese employed kamikaze, or suicide pilots, against American forces beginning with the Philippine liberation in early 1945. However, nothing deterred those Americans from final victory, and the defeat of their enemies.

We proved many times since 9/11 that we forgot the sacrifices made by the “Greatest Generation,” and the lessons they learned. Those responsible for reminding us of those past lessons and enlightening us regarding today’s threat willfully shirk their responsibilities. Instead they support our defeat, champion our enemies and demonize those who defend us. I only hope that our mistakes today do not squander the freedoms and opportunities for future generations of Americans. Because if the Islamofascists defeat us, no benevolent nation awaits for rescuing us from their terror.