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D-DAY REMEMBERED?-Part I

Posted by William F. Sauerwein on July 5, 2008

This past June 6th commemorated the sixty-fourth anniversary of D-Day, the invasion that began the liberation of Europe. Unfortunately, most news media outlets ignored this anniversary, or merely gave it cursory coverage, mostly at the end of their broadcasts. None of the television networks, not even the American Movie Classics (AMC) channel, broadcast any “special programming.” Fortunately, the History Channel broadcast several hours of programming which covered almost all aspects of the invasion. Libraries contain massive volumes that describe the blood, sweat and sacrifice required for making this invasion successful. Unfortunately, our “progressive” education system largely ignores this part of our national experience, meaning that this knowledge may soon disappear. Because we ignore the lessons learned from our past wars, we risk losing our current war, and our civilization as well.

The D-Day invasion launched the liberation of continental Europe from Germany during World War II. It required almost two years of the most extensive planning conducted by the Allied command in Europe. The odds of success for this invasion seem impossible by today’s standards: marginal weather conditions, well-defended beaches held by well-trained troops, inadequate intelligence and conducted by largely inexperienced troops. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Allied supreme commander even composed a letter acknowledging failure, in case the invasion failed. Against these odds the Allied soldiers landed, suffered heavy casualties and persevered, and for this they deserve our eternal gratitude.

As I watched the morning news on June 6th, I noticed the only mention of D-Day on the Fox News Channel. Maybe I missed the commemorations on the other channels as I “surfed” them for any relevant coverage. Even on the Fox News Channel the coverage mostly consisted of less than five minutes. The commentators that I watched cover it did publicly thank the D-Day veterans, and all veterans as well.

That evening when I watched the local news on the major networks I saw no mention of D-Day. In the past these networks interviewed local veterans who participated in the invasion, but not this time. Again, maybe in my effort at viewing all the channels I missed the coverage, which means any coverage proved brief. Perhaps with the advancing age, and mortality rate, of these veterans the networks found no one capable of relating their experiences.

Hollywood, which broadcasts “special programming” for almost any event, particularly if it reflects their political views, ignored D-Day. Particularly given today’s circumstances, Hollywood avoids any military related films, unless they openly portray our soldiers as the “bad guys.” In the past AMC broadcast movies that portrayed the D-Day invasion, such as: The Longest Day, D-Day, the 6th of June or Saving Private Ryan. Instead, AMC entertained us with a montage of the “Planet of the Apes” movies. It appears that these Hollywood “big shots” conveniently forgot those whose sacrifices secured their “artistic license.”

I watched the commemoration of D-Day on the History Channel, which covered all phases of the invasion. Perhaps I missed the media coverage because of my overwhelming interest in the programming provided by the History Channel. If so, I offer my sincere apology; however, I believe my earlier assessment remains correct regarding the media and Hollywood. I thank the History Channel for their extensive programming, programming that our education system desperately needs.

As I stated above, libraries contain volumes of historical information regarding D-Day, as well as military historical repositories. Coincidentally I am reading Blood and Sacrifice, a book about the history of the 16th Infantry Regiment. The 16th Infantry landed in the first assault on Omaha Beach at Normandy, and suffered heavy casualties. Lieutenant Colonel Steven Clay (USA) produced this book for the Cantigny Military History Series, sponsored by the Cantigny First Infantry Division Foundation. During my Army career I proudly served with that unit, and Omaha Beach holds a special place in that unit’s history. Coincidentally, I read about the sacrifices of the 16th Infantry on D-Day during the period of June 5, 2008. Eagerly I awaited the next day’s commemoration of D-Day, and found little outside the History Channel.

D-Day became necessary for the liberation of continental Europe from German occupation, and the defeat of Nazi Germany. It also soothed the Soviet Union’s dictator, Josef Stalin, in opening his demanded “second front.” Even the German dictator, Adolph Hitler, understood the uneasy alliance between the Western democracies and Soviet communism. At various times Germany tried negotiating a separate peace with both the West and the Soviets.

Most people cover up the alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union when World War II began. An alliance brokered in 1939, which resulted in their joint occupation of Poland and Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries. When Germany launched its blitzkrieg in May, 1940 against Western Europe, the Soviet Union did nothing. Only the unexpected invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany in June, 1941 (another June anniversary) broke this alliance.

The defeat of the Western Allies brought other nations into Axis alliance, believing they joined the winning side. Albania became a de facto member after Italy conquered and annexed it in April, 1939. Japan entered the alliance in September, 1940 for obtaining concessions from Vichy France, and its future plans against the US. Hungary, and Romania joined in November, 1940 and Bulgaria in March, 1941 because they feared Stalin more than Hitler. The German puppet states of Slovakia and Croatia joined in November, 1940 and June, 1941, respectively. Finland, defeated by the Soviets in 1940, fought with Germany against the Soviet Union, but did not join the alliance.

When planning for D-Day began Axis forces occupied all of continental Europe, except for neutral Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Axis armies plunged deep into the Soviet Union, with fighting raging in the suburbs of Moscow. They further held much of North Africa, largely through the collaboration of the Vichy government of France. German and Italian forces steadily advanced on the Suez Canal in Egypt from the Italian colony of Libya. This threatened communications between England and its Commonwealth nations, India, Australia and New Zealand.

German U-boats (submarines) attacked American shipping off the East Coast of the United States, within sight and sound of the beaches. One History Channel program about this part of the war stated that the German submariners called this the “happy time.” The bottom line, the United States entered World War II on the losing side, and continued losing for six months.

The United States possessed the manpower and industrial base for winning the war, however it must harness this power. We began mobilizing this power with the shocking defeat of France in June of 1940 (June again) amidst vocal political opposition. Following its withdrawal at Dunkirk, England seemed on the verge of defeat, leaving nothing between Germany and us.

Unfortunately we found ourselves grossly unprepared for modern war and “isolationism” dominated the American public’s attitude. Historian Charles MacDonald wrote The Mighty Endeavor about the war effort in Europe, and detailed our frantic preparations for war. Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall described the American Army as “that of a third-rate power.” President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) declared a national emergency, which mobilized the National Guard and Reserve forces. Of importance for us today, once mobilized those guardsmen and reservists served for the duration, at least five years.

The American high command possessed several ambitious military plans, called RAINBOW for their different color codes. Unfortunately we lacked the means for carrying out these plans even if forced into war. For twenty years both the White House and Congress neglected the Armed Forces, leaving them under-strength and with obsolete equipment.

Congress soon appropriated more funds than our military leaders requested for overcoming this neglect. In August of 1940 Congress legislated the nation’s first peacetime draft, however with severe restrictions on using the draftees. Unfortunately, appropriating the funds does not immediately provide the equipment or construct the facilities for the enlarged forces. The 16th Infantry conducted its first amphibious warfare training in December, 1940 using rowboats borrowed from an ocean liner.

In January, 1941 after bitter debate Congress passed the bill that made the US, the “Arsenal of Democracy.” This arsenal provided equipment not only for our military, but also for the British Empire, China, and our South American allies. With the German invasion of the Soviet Union we provided them with “lend-lease” equipment. The mobilization of American industry ranks as one of the major achievements of the war effort. However, this success did not occur immediately, and did not achieve full mobilization until late 1943 or early 1944. While American industrial workers struggled at meeting all of their demands American troops trained with broomstick rifles.

MacDonald states that even after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor our military leaders decided that we must defeat Germany first. Keeping England in the war meant keeping the Commonwealth nations in the war, nations needed for fighting Japan. The British Royal Navy successfully kept the German Kriegsmarine (Navy) from dominating the Atlantic Ocean, and invading the US. Most importantly, England served as a strategic base for striking at the European continent. Defeating Germany and Italy first required an invasion of continental Europe, and the heavily defended beaches.

However, dissension in the Allied high command, and the inadequate resources available, hindered early efforts. Many battle-hardened British senior officers resented the selection of the inexperienced Eisenhower as supreme commander. Stalin clamored for a “second front,” and FDR tried pressuring British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, for an early invasion.

FDR and the American high command pressured the British for one very good reason. The American public demanded action against Japan, the nation that attacked us and killed our troops. Furthermore, Japan began conquering American possessions: the Philippine Islands, Guam, Wake Island and the Alaskan islands of Attu and Kiska. In the process the Japanese killed or captured thousands of American troops; and their families demanded revenge. MacDonald further states that the British feared abandonment in Europe by the Americans if they continued balking at an invasion.

Churchill and the British high command also faced problems with the rapid Japanese advance. They suffered the loss of many of their territories: Hong Kong, Malaya and their prominent naval base at Singapore. British and Commonwealth forces lost about 100,000 troops in the fall of Singapore alone. The Japanese advance pushed toward India and Australia, and launched bombing raids on Port Moresby and Darwin in Australia. India, Australia and New Zealand withdrew substantial numbers of their forces from North Africa for defending their homelands. This jeopardized the British defense of the Suez Canal, and threatened Allied fortunes in the Middle East.

The Japanese advance into Burma jeopardized China’s continuance in the war with the closure of the famous Burma Road. China possessed a large military force, although it proved poorly armed, equipped and led. With Japan in control of most of China’s coastline, the Burma Road provided the only line of communication for Chinese forces. If Japan defeated China this subsequently released hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops for other operations.

Ambitiously, the Allies launched a large-scale amphibious raid on the French coast at Dieppe in August, 1942. This raid later became synonymous with disaster, and a source of resentment among the Canadians, who made up the bulk of the forces. Of the 5,000 troops landed the Allied naval forces only rescued about 1,500. Consequently, a successful invasion needed more planning and more resources for any hope of success.

During this time the 16th Infantry and its parent 1st Infantry Division trained in England for the invasion of Europe. With the failure of Dieppe, the Allies must find another place for launching its “second front.” Furthermore, the bulk of American forces remained in the US and must traverse the hostile waters of the Atlantic. At Churchill’s urging FDR decided for an invasion of French North Africa, under the control of the Vichy government.

Although in open collaboration with the Axis Powers, Vichy France remained technically a neutral country. In today’s terms it did not threaten the United States and did not participate in the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, the Allies faced desperate times at the end of 1942 and faced the possibility of losing the war. Allied leaders further hoped that French citizens still resented their humiliation by the Germans in 1940.

A Free French organization gradually formed under General Charles De Gaulle, and the Allies hoped he might find converts in North Africa. If the French in North Africa joined the Allies it potentially gave the Allies a reinforcement of 120,000 troops. Once the Allies secured French North Africa they would strike eastward for relieving the pressure on British forces defending the Suez Canal. Besides, North Africa possessed more space for marshalling the American men and materiel for ultimately invading Europe.

While planning for D-Day continued in London, Allied soldiers engaged in almost two years of bloody campaigns. First, the Allied naval forces must win the “Battle of the Atlantic” against the German U-boats. Allied air forces began a costly bombing campaign of Europe for softening German defenses and damaging German industrial power. The Allies launched invasions on the periphery of Europe spreading out Axis defenses and gaining a strategic advantage.

More importantly, the inexperienced American troops gained valuable combat experience, and American commanders learned the lessons of modern warfare. This “baptism of fire” proved costly, particularly in the deserts of French North Africa. They suffered a bloody defeat from the veteran Afrika Korps, which cost 6,000 casualties of the 30,000 committed. Allied commanders painfully learned about conducting coalition warfare, communications security and the importance of logistical operations. Despite heavy casualties, American and British forces liberated French North Africa and captured over 250,000 Axis troops.

The Allies next invaded the island of Sicily, described by Churchill as the “soft underbelly of Europe.” Allied leaders received intelligence describing Italy as the “weak” Axis nation, and resentful of their dominance by Germany. However, the invasion of Sicily proved that intelligence under estimated Italian resistance when defending their homeland. The hard-fought victory cost the Allies 22,000 casualties, considered an “acceptable” number at the time.

Meanwhile, Allied commanders and troops gained more experience in amphibious warfare and coordinating air, ground and naval operations. American officers and men continued maturing into the professional army needed for ultimately defeating the Axis Powers. The Soviet Union began counterattacking the over-extended Axis forces, capturing an entire army at Stalingrad. Although at a tremendous cost, the Allies slowly gained the upper hand over the Axis Powers in 1943.

The conquest of Sicily and invasion of the Italian mainland forced the surrender of Italy. German forces now assumed the entire responsibility for defending Italy, since abandoning it opened the southern flank of Germany. Unfortunately for Allied soldiers in Italy, the mountainous terrain favored the defending German Army. Italy’s surrender and the deteriorating situation against the Soviets forced a weakening of Germany’s defenses along the Western Front.

During this time the dramatic national mobilization of American resources made the invasion of Europe a possibility. The “Arsenal of Democracy” made the US military the most potent force in the world. American factories operated twenty-four hours per day producing the armaments for the Allied nations, and the ships for transporting them. Gradually the Allied navies began winning the “Battle for the Atlantic” against the German U-boats. This allowed for the massive movement of men and materiel into the British Isles, and other theaters of war.

This too came at a high price for the Allies: 2,828 merchant ships, 187 warships, an unknown number of aircraft and about 40,000 personnel. Few know that the US Merchant Marine suffered proportionately the highest casualty rate of all the services. Almost every source describes the “Murmansk Run,” for supplying the Soviets, as the most hazardous duty.

Across the English Channel, the Germans saw the build-up of Allied forces and understood the threat of invasion. Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, the famed “Desert Fox” of Afrika Korps fame, commanded the troops that manned the beach defenses. He began a program of constructing obstacles, field fortifications and planting minefields for defeating Allied soldiers as they landed. Unfortunately, Rommel and the other German commanders labored under severe restrictions that hindered their efforts.

MacDonald states that the German forces in France largely served as a replacement pool for the Russian front. This policy increased in March, 1944 when Hungary surrendered, taking its forces out of the war against the Soviet Union. Most of the troops in France consisted of those burned out from fighting in the East, training divisions and so-called static divisions.

The quality of the soldiers declined since the conquering days of 1940 as events forced a lowering of recruiting standards. Most of the soldiers in the static divisions suffered from wounds, which rendered them unsuitable for combat divisions. All the units received “ethnic German” soldiers from conquered countries that bordered Germany, and “volunteers” from occupied countries. A significant number came from Soviet prisoners of war, including numbers of anti-communists from non-Russian Soviet states. As the situation further deteriorated for the Germans they fielded old men and young boys from the Hitler Jugend.

Units in France supposedly enjoyed the priority for receiving tanks and other equipment, however this soon changed. The needs of units in combat both in Italy and in the East required a significant number merely for replacing combat losses. Nevertheless, a significant number of panzer units remained in a mobile reserve well behind the beaches.

Most historians cite the Germans for military precision and efficiency; however the command structure in France contradicts that stereotype. First, Hitler thought himself a “military genius,” and interfered with his commanders often with ruthless consequences. Although Rommel commanded the troops manning the beach defenses, he served under Field Marshall Gerd von Rundstedt. The two men disagreed on the best way of defeating the Allied invasion, and Hitler did little for resolving this issue. Rommel wanted the initial landings defeated, while Rundstedt wanted a mobile counterattack after he determined the main Allied landing’s location. As field marshals, both men possessed open access with Hitler, subverting the normal chain of command.

Hitler tried adopting both plans, however by this time Germany lacked both the men and materiel for strengthening defenses in France. Rommel did not receive the requested amount of concrete for strengthening his emplacements, or the number of land mines. However, he improvised and the number of beach obstacles forced a change in Allied plans.

More significantly, Hitler placed most of the panzer divisions under the direct control of the Army high command (OKW), meaning himself. When the invasion occurred, the OKW operations officer, General Albert Jodl, did not awaken Hitler. This delayed any movement by these divisions until the morning of June 7th, when Allied air forces attacked them.

Intelligence remains the major priority for any military operation; which includes enemy forces, weather and terrain. The Allies received significant assistance in this from the French Maquis (Resistance), often aided by Allied agents. These unsung heroes took enormous risks and paid a heavy price for providing this information. Additionally, they engaged in a critical campaign of sabotage against the German transportation and communications systems before the invasion.

The many deception plans, code-named Operation Bodyguard, proved the most crucial of pre-invasion intelligence. Churchill described this as the “bodyguard of lies” necessary for protecting the truth, and they succeeded tremendously. The most famous of these plans, Operation Fortitude South, entailed the fictitious army group assembled around Lieutenant General George S. Patton. Patton’s ruse kept the German Fifteenth Army concentrated at the Pas de Calais, and away from Normandy. Operation Fortitude North created a fictitious British army assembled in Scotland for invading Norway, tying down about 400,000 German troops.

Two other major deception plans concentrated on deceiving the Germans in the Mediterranean Theater. This prevented the Germans from transferring troops into France once the invasion began. Churchill actually favored launching one of these plans, Operation Zeppelin, for invading the Balkans and relieving pressure in Italy.

These plans relied on false radio transmissions, establishing false headquarters and installations using “dummy” equipment and “leaking” false information. First, Allied counterintelligence neutralized all fifty of the German agents working in England, with several becoming “double agents.” Allied air supremacy minimized German aerial reconnaissance over England, while Allied reconnaissance aircraft flew virtually unmolested.

Weather proved the biggest factor regarding the invasion, and effected the plans of the Germans as well as the Allies. Allied commanders faced either attacking under marginal conditions, or waiting three weeks for favorable conditions. Based on past experience, German commanders believed Eisenhower too cautious, believing he would not invade in such weather.

Rommel too believed the weather prevented any invasion and scheduled a leave for surprising his wife on her birthday, June 6th. The historynet website states that the German Seventh Army, responsible for the Normandy defenses, scheduled a “war game.” This placed all of its senior commanders in the southern Norman town of Rennes, far from the landing. The Kriegsmarine cancelled all patrols in the English Channel because of the danger posed by the high seas.

The weather further cancelled the invasion, set for June the 5th, and Allied leaders feared for the worst. Eisenhower faced a heavy decision, a decision that rested on his shoulders alone, and making the wrong decision risked failure. If this invasion failed, it probably delayed another attempt for at least one year, possibly two. Furthermore, a failure possibly ended Eisenhower’s military career, placing him in the history books as a failure.

Fortunately, the Allies possessed better meteorological technology than the Germans, and the staff weather officer detected a break on June 6th. The enormity of the invasion forces and the diversity of their missions required a prompt decision. Spread across southern England, these units must depart at different times for arriving at Normandy at the same time. Waiting three weeks for good weather required the off-loading of troops and equipment from transport ships. This off-loading and other delays threatened troop morale and potentially dulled their “fighting edge.”

The crowding of the British Isles became an increasing concern as Eisenhower anticipated the doubling of American troops within weeks. British citizens found themselves restricted from movement in southern England and travel between England and Ireland forbidden. Even the most inept intelligence service would deduce the purpose of this, providing ample warning.

When Eisenhower gave the “GO” he set in motion the largest amphibious operation in history, to that date. It further executed an operation that required almost two years of planning and preparation, bloody supporting campaigns and international cooperation. However, nothing guaranteed success, and in an operation of this magnitude much could go wrong.

One axiom of military operations states that no plan survives past the first bullet fired, or words to that effect. Almost everyone in the military knows “Murphy’s Law,” which states, “what can go wrong, will go wrong.” The American soldier’s dark humor created an acronym for this called SNAFU, Situation Normal, All F***ed Up. It seemed that almost everything went wrong on D-Day, however, the Allied soldiers overcame these situations and persevered.

The bad weather and rough seas created havoc among the aircraft and ships transporting the soldiers. Late in the evening of June 5th the airborne troops began landing behind the beaches for disrupting German defenses. In Steven Ambrose’s book, Band of Brothers, he describes the aircraft, first buffeted by the weather and then by German anti-aircraft fire. Subsequently, these disruptions scattered the paratroopers over the Norman landscape, intermixing the units and making organized operations difficult.

MacDonald states that hundreds fell into stretches of lowland, previously flooded by the Germans, and many drowned. Everyone who watched the movie, The Longest Day, remembers the tragic landing in Ste. Mere-Eglise. MacDonald confirms that twenty men did land here, where the Germans either killed or captured them. Glider-borne troops often crashed into hedgerows or suffered from the German-emplaced obstacles known as Rommelsspargel (Rommel’s asparagus).

Despite these problems the airborne soldiers succeeded in their mission beyond all belief. Small groups of men, often led by non-commissioned officers, struck the Germans where they found them. Their broad dispersal created more confusion among the German defenders and prevented organized resistance. The use of dummy paratroopers helped deceive German commanders into believing that this signified a diversionary attack.

Twelve miles off the coast the American assault troops descended into their landing craft using dangerous cargo nets. Unfortunately many of these men subsequently fell into the English Channel and drowned because of the rough seas. The majority who made it down the nets soon became soaked with seawater, with a majority becoming seasick and vomiting.

Of the six American infantry divisions participating in the assault, only two possessed combat experience. The 1st Infantry Division fought through the North African and Sicily campaigns, including the amphibious assaults. The 82nd Airborne Division conducted combat jumps in Sicily and Italy, and some combat in Italy as regular infantry. However, both divisions suffered heavy casualties during these operations, meaning that both possessed a significant number of inexperienced replacements. Fortunately, most of the non-commissioned officers of these units previously faced combat, which later made the difference.

As they approached the beaches landing craft, disoriented by the dark and rough seas, headed for the wrong beaches. Some swamped and sank, taking most of their human cargoes down with them. Special “duplex drive” (DD) tanks fitted with floatation devices sank one-by-one, with 27 of 29 destined for Omaha Beach sinking.

The landings occurred with mixed results, depending on the circumstances they endured, particularly for the Americans. At Utah Beach the 4th and 90th Infantry Divisions found the weak spot in the German defenses. The 4th landed over one mile from its designated beach, however, Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., made a fateful decision. Furthermore, the gently sloping terrain presented no obstacle as the troops consolidated their positions and advanced. In less than three hours the 4th Infantry Division controlled the beach and moved inland toward the paratroopers.

The British and Canadians who landed at Gold, Juno and Sword Beaches also fared fairly well. These beaches also gently sloped upward with no towering bluffs presenting a formidable obstacle. They further faced a German static division made up mostly of Eastern European “volunteers,” with one battalion breaking early in the fighting.

Omaha Beach proved the most difficult of the beaches, and the most hotly defended by the Germans. The 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions landed on this beach against the German 352nd Infantry Division. Although a static division it ranked as one of the best at Normandy, full of veterans from the Russian front. Coincidentally this division engaged in a defensive exercise at the time when the Americans landed. Sources differ whether Allied intelligence detected the presence of this division, but most say it went undetected. Fortunately the division commander disobeyed Rommel’s orders and only posted two infantry battalions and one artillery battalion on the beach.

This proved enough as the Americans landed amidst a heavy volume of fire that destroyed many approaching landing craft. Other craft dropped their ramp and the disembarking men immediately became casualties. Those men not immediately hit must now wade chest-deep water bearing all of their equipment. Men who made it ashore stepped on the bodies of their comrades as they sought cover.

The infantry battalions landed without their traditional artillery support, receiving support only from naval gunfire. German fire wiped out at least one of the naval gunfire support teams, rendering communications ineffective. Other communications gear damaged from the seawater and other causes further hindered any coordination between units and naval support.

One half hour after the initial landing eight tanks of the 741st Tank Battalion came ashore from landing craft. Some stalled out from seawater in their engines and the Germans knocked most of them out. Also in this second wave came engineers of the 5th Engineer Special Brigade for removing beach obstacles. These courageous men suffered fifty per cent casualties as they performed their duty under intense fire.

Continue to Part II

Posted in 20th Century Military History, American Military History, Other military history, US Army, US military, World War II | Tagged: | 1 Comment »

A couple of interesting exhibits with a military history connection

Posted by Daniel Sauerwein on January 22, 2008

I received two emails today asking me to mention two events, one exhibit and a symposium, both dealing with the Dreyfus Affair.

An Exhibition ~

The Power of Prejudice: The Dreyfus Affair

Who: Presented by the Florence and Chafetz Hillel House at Boston University, The New Center for Arts and Culture, and Boston University

What: Exhibition

The Power of Prejudice: The Dreyfus Affair

Documents, photos, cartoons and film on the case with accompanying videos describing
the history, legal aspects, media reactions, and the role of Jews and power, as well
as a symposium and films.


When: February 27 – April 6, 2008
11 a.m.-5 p.m., Tuesdays through Fridays
1 p.m.-5 p.m., Saturdays and Sundays


Where: Gallery 808, Boston University
808 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston


Why:

The Dreyfus Affair, as it was known, was a seminal event in French history of the
late nineteenth century, which still resonates today. Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a Jew
in the French army, was accused and then convicted of being a traitor. It was later
proven that he was innocent. This exhibit is based on Dreyfus – The Fight for
Justice, an exhibition of the Musée d’art et d’histoire du Judaïsme, Paris, with
original objects from the Lorraine Beitler Collection at the University of
Pennsylvania. It explores how the case led to the idea of separation of church and
state in France; issues of national security, military vs civilian justice; how it
was the first “trial in the press” with Emile Zola’s famous editorial “J’accuse”;
and how its impact inspired a journalist covering the trial, Theodor Herzl, to
initiate plans for the formation of the State of Israel.

Admission: The event is open and free to the public

About Florence and Chafetz Hillel House at Boston University

The new Florence & Chafetz Hillel House opened in the spring of 2005. This
beautiful facility is a vastly flexible space with many resources, and is open to
everyone. The physical space of BU Hillel is more than just beautiful; it reflects
an essential philosophy, informed by tradition and open to change. The Jewish
community at BU prides itself on being pluralistic and fluid; its different
communities and interest groups overlap and enrich each other. Students come from a
variety of backgrounds, both ideologically and in their Jewish experience.


About the New Center for Arts and Culture


The New Center for Arts and Culture connects the people of Boston and the world
through exploration of the creative arts, diverse cultures and contemporary ideas,
to foster mutual understanding and appreciation among people of all backgrounds and
ages.

For more information, please visit
http://www.ncacboston.org

Here is information on the symposium:

The New Center for Arts and Culture is organizing a symposium called Catalyst to History:
Why Dreyfus Matters
to discuss how the issues of military justice, anti-Semitism,
separation of church and state, and trial by media which were part of the 19th
century French trial of Captain Alfred Dreyfus still reverberate today.

The panelists are:

Alan M. Dershowitz, Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at Harvard Law
School


Jeffrey Mehlman, University Professor and Professor of French Literature at
Boston University


Robert Zelnick, Journalism Professor of National Security
Studies and Journalism Department Chair at Boston University.


Dan Abrams, NBC News Chief Legal Affairs correspondent, will moderate.

The event will be on Sunday, March 2, 2008, 2 to 5 p.m. at the Jacob Sleeper Auditorium, Boston University, 871Commonwealth Avenue, Boston.

Admission is free and open to the public.

About The Dreyfus Affair:

The Dreyfus Affair, as it was known, was a seminal event in French history of the
late nineteenth century, which still resonates today. Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a Jew
in the French army, was accused and then convicted of being a traitor. It was later
proven that he was innocent. The Dreyfus Affair was one of the most notorious cases
of criminal injustice in history, marked by anti-Jewish riots in every major city in
France. It was the world’s first trial by media and became known as “a dress
rehearsal for the Holocaust”. It also led to the formal separation of church and
state in France, and the movement to establish a sovereign Jewish state.

The symposium is being held in conjunction with the exhibition The Power of
Prejudice: The Dreyfus Affair.
Presented by The Florence and Chafetz Hillel House
Boston University, the New Center for Arts and Culture and Boston University, the
exhibit is being held at 808 Commonwealth Gallery at Boston University. This
compelling exhibition featuring documents, cartoons, film, video, and other
artifacts, begins February 27 and runs through April 6. The hours are Tuesdays
through Fridays from 11 a.m. to 5 p.m.; Saturdays and Sundays from 1 p.m. to 5 p.m.

I would encourage anyone interested in this subject to consider attending these events.

Posted in Other military history, World Military History (1700-1900) | Leave a Comment »

Why Teach Military History?

Posted by T. Kunikov on November 8, 2007

This was recently posted (about three weeks ago) on the discussion group “H-War,” thought it was worth reading.

WHY TEACH MILITARY HISTORY?

by Jeremy Black

The usual criticism against the teaching of military history
is that  it in  some way  encourages bellicosity, that it is
somehow morally questionable and actually undesirable in the
academy at  any level.  However, war,  though undesirable in
many of its attributes, and while it involves people killing
and being  willing or  prepared to  be killed,  can in  fact
serve purposes  which we  regard as  necessary–for example,
liberty, civic  patriotism, and international order. Indeed,
nobody, including  the UN,  doubts that  just  war  properly
conceived is  an appropriate  recourse in  international law
and the  maintenance of  international order.  War cannot be
wished away.  It has played a major role in the formation of
individual  states   and  societies   and   in   maintaining
international order.

HISTORICAL UNDETERMINISM
Too often  history is  taught as  if it  were a clear linear
process in  which we  know what  is going to happen, we know
the way  the world  was going  to be,  and in  some respects
there is  an inevitability  about it. But people at the time
had no  sense of inevitability about it. The Allies who went
out in  1917-18 were  unsure what  the consequences would be
for  them   of  the   collapse  of   Russia,  the  communist
revolution, Russia’s  leaving the  war, and  the  Treaty  of
Brest-Litovsk between  Russia and  the Central  Powers  that
permitted the  Germans to  move all their divisions from the
eastern front  back to  the western  front. When  two powers
start a war, generally both sides think they can win, and at
least one  of  them  is  usually  wrong.  Understanding  the
conditionality of  it is very important, that the activities
of those  who take part in war–civilians on the home front,
the troops themselves, commanders trying to plan options and
strategies-are all  important, because  the future  is in no
way predictable  and  determined.  A  very  important  moral
aspect of  education is  that all  of us  in any  scenario–
military or  civil society–are  part of  a process in which
what happens  is not  determined. All  of us  have a role to
play.

HISTORICAL MEMORY
One frequently  hears observations  such  as,  for  example,
“counterinsurgency struggles  are bound to fail.” Well, some
of  them   do  fail.  Equally,  since  1945,  many  of  them
succeeded. There  is no  deterministic viewpoint  that tells
you that  any given  stage is bound to happen. It is good to
introduce students  to the  uncertainty of the past, because
it helps  them begin  to think about the uncertainty of both
the present  and the  future, an  uncertainty  that  demands
their  attention,   which  suggests  that  history,  present
politics, the  future, are  not things  one  sits  back  and
watches like  a spectator, but in which one’s own actions or
choices not to act can influence the process.

Of course,  one can  pull out  analogies from  the past that
help people  think but  also ones  that  are  not  carefully
thought through.  But it  is nonetheless  important for  any
society to  have some sense of focus on the past. If one has
no sense  of focus on the past for judgment, then from where
are people  to get  their ideas?  The argument could be made
that one  responds to  every circumstance  in the  immediate
present by  judging one’s  interests and  concerns  at  that
moment, that  there’s nothing  from the  past one  needs  to
conceive of  because the  past is  in some way dead, history
cannot be  repeated. In  terms of war, one might argue that,
because all  of the  weaponry of earlier wars is as outdated
as the mammoth or the catapult.

In  practical   terms,  however,   no  matter  how  strongly
societies believe  that they  can reject  the past, the only
way they  can do  so is  by a quasi-genocidal destruction of
every attribute  of it.  In modern  times, the  only society
that has sought to completely reject the past is the Pol Pot
regime in  Cambodia, and  it  did  not  work.  It  was  also
astonishingly vicious.  But the  general postulate  is  more
important, that  people look to the past when they’re trying
to understand  the present.  They have  a  group  of  common
memories that  in part  frame national  identity, a sense of
patriotism. So  the way people use remarks about issues from
the past in order to discuss policy today may be flawed–for
example, the  Munich analogy  of appeasement of dictators in
1938 applied subsequently in other contexts–but it reflects
the sense  that there  is a  possibility, a need, to explain
things with reference to a common memory.

In the  case of  war, this is even more acutely the need. In
waging  war,   one  is   asking  people   to  do  what  they
understandably do  not want  to do, which is to endure great
sacrifices and even death. It is therefore important to look
to some  sense of  continuity in order to draw on historical
memories  that   help  to  make  people  feel  that  however
difficult this is, it is in some way a necessary purpose.

All of  us can  justifiably deplore the rather crude sort of
blood-and-earth patriotism  that was seen in, say, Europe in
1914, which  was naive, foolish, and atavistic. But in order
to exist  in a  community, you have to have some willingness
to give  up things  for the  greater whole.  Ordinarily, the
social civility  and order  required for  membership in  the
community does not involve terrible constraints upon people.
But of  course, military  confrontation  and  war  are  very
different.

HOW TO TEACH MILITARY HISTORY
There is  an extensive  body of  material  one  can  use  in
teaching students  of every  age about military affairs, the
conduct of  war, the  nature of  military institutions,  and
what war  means for  individual participants,  both soldiers
and civilians.  Museums such  as the  First Division’s  have
enormous collections of the material culture of war, and for
the  last   150  years   there  are  extensive  photographic
archives. We  now also  have extensive  film archives  going
back for  nearly a  century of war and extensive interviews,
both filmed and taped, more recently. Students can also meet
and interview  people who  lived through  World War  II,  to
record living  history. All  these sources  can interact  to
give the student a vivid sense of what war means.

It is  more difficult to look at the other side of the hill,
but still  a worthwhile  exercise for  students in the upper
high school grades. This means that if you are, for example,
talking about  the Civil  War, look  at both the Confederate
and Union  viewpoints of  the  war.  If  you’re  looking  at
international conflicts, try to understand the experience of
war from  the other  side, without  necessarily sympathizing
with  that   viewpoint.  This  is  particularly  useful  for
students who  might end  up serving in the military, because
one can  only know how best to wage war by understanding how
one’s opponents are likely to perceive one’s actions.

Military history  encompasses a  wide range of sub-subjects.
There is  the operational  history that  is understood to be
military history  on the  History Channel,  the  doings  and
campaigns and  battles of  military formation,  but there is
much more than that. Let’s look at a few.

First,  there  is  the  relationship  between  war  and  the
development of  states. After  all, it  is through  war that
states developed.  The U.S. bears the origins it has because
it arose  as a  result of  a successful war of independence.
Through war  again, the  U.S. expanded  from the Atlantic to
the Pacific:  conflicts with  Native Americans, war with the
Mexicans, the  occupation of Florida. The development of the
American state,  finally and  most  traumatically  with  the
Civil War, would have been totally different without war.

A second  major aspect  of military  history is  war and the
international  order.   It   is   through   war   that   the
relationships among  states have been molded and influenced.
States that  do well  economically tend to demand a role and
place in  the international  order that  accords with  their
views, and  until  very  recently  they  have  pursued  this
through violence.  It is  entirely  possible  that  military
preparedness will  also play a role in how they pursue it in
the future.  Some have  argued on  the obsolescence  of war,
which may be true at the level of great powers, since no one
wants to  engage in  a nuclear  conflict. But  it is equally
possible that military confrontation short of war will be an
important aspect  of the military history of the future, and
we need  to understand  what will  and will  not be achieved
through such processes.

A third  aspect is  what is known as “war and society,” what
used to  be called  “new military  history.” War and society
covers an  enormous range  of topics, such as the experience
of women  in war  and war and environment. One can also look
at the  military itself  as a  society.  If  you  think  for
example of  the First  Division in World War I, the world it
came from,  you’re talking  about large numbers of men taken
away or  volunteering to  leave their  home communities  and
forming a  new social  order in  which one  had  to  rapidly
introduce ways  of behavior  that fulfilled the tasks of the
military. All  of those  are important  aspects of  war  and
society, and  in order to understand military effectiveness,
you have  to understand  how armies  work as societies–what
hierarchy, deference, order, independence, and autonomy mean
in a military context.

A fourth concerns war and culture. War has had an enormously
important impact on culture. The triumphant display of power
through conflict  was long a major theme of cultural output,
and more  recently one sees criticism of the horrors of war.
Both cultural  themes can  be seen  in  the  arts.  One  can
juxtapose to  upper-level high school students images of the
triumphalist account  of the culture of war and the critical
account. One  can contrast Beethoven’s Wellington’s Victory,
an astonishing  piece written  to  commemorate  Wellington’s
victory at  the Battle  of Victoria  over the  French,  with
perhaps   Benjamin   Britten’s   War   Requiem   (1962)   or
Penderecki’s Threnody to the Victims of Hiroshima (1960); or
Picasso’s Guernica  (1937) with an account from the Times of
the bombing,  then a  German propaganda  piece claiming that
Guernica was never bombed. Doing so makes for an interesting
lesson in  how war  is open  to different  accounts, and how
those different accounts are sometimes heavily propagandist.

As one  moves into looking at the experience since World War
II, there  are some  wars of course of which the records are
relatively dim.  For the  war in which the largest number of
people–over 5  million–were killed  in  the  last  fifteen
years, the  Congo war, we have very few reliable sources and
very little  by way  of good  film material suitable to show
students. But  for other  wars there  is a  great amount  of
material from  which teachers  can  draw  to  help  students
understand (a)  the experience  of war,  (b) the  purpose of
war, and (c) the fact that war means different things around
the world.  It’s tremendously  valuable for Western students
to understand  that most war in the world is not a matter of
Western powers;  much of  the war  in the  world is in South
Asia or  subsaharan Africa,  and it  is often  an aspect  of
conflict that  responds to and reflects the natures of those
societies. Students  need  to  understand  what  terms  like
tribalism and ethnic conflict mean if they are to understand
the world in which they live. Through looking at recent war,
one is  helping to  unlock students  to understand  that the
world in which they live involves complex issues, that these
issues are  divisive, that  the divisions  involve  enormous
sacrifices on  the part  of many of the people involved, and
that these  pose real  questions for  the U.S., as for other
powers, as  to how  to respond and whether or not a response
will be successful.

CONCLUSION
Teaching  military   history  is  a  key  element  of  civic
education, which is an important dimension of society. It is
a  key   element  of   patriotism,  encouraging   people  to
understand their  own country  in the  context of a world in
which they have their own values, in which their own country
is important  and central,  but  their  country  is  not  in
isolation, it  interacts with  others. Any  healthy  society
must encourage  a mature  debate about values and rights and
responsibility, especially  that responsibility  covered  by
military history–namely, those occasions when citizens must
risk their lives for their beliefs.

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