Looking Back: An exciting blog by the 34th ID

I was contacted earlier today by a member of the 34th ID serving in Iraq (I will not release their name unless requested by the person, as I do not want to unintentionally place them in danger), who asked me to consider linking to their blog Looking Back. I will happily do so and will seek to place a link in the sidebar somewhere and on the Links page as well. Though it is a relatively new blog, I sense great things from it and encourage you all to check it out.

Review of Two Brothers, One North, One South for TLC Tours

Jones, David H. Two Brothers, One North, One South. Encino, CA: Staghorn Press, 2008. 320pp, ISBN 13: 978-0-9796898-5-7, $24.95.

David H. Jones has provided one of the latest additions to the genre of historical fiction on the Civil War, a genre that includes such works as Killer Angels, Gods and Generals, and the Civil War trilogy written by Newt Gingrich and William Forstchen to name a few. The novel intertwines real individuals, including Walt Whitman, and members of the Prentiss family, into a story that illustrated the brother against brother nature of the war.

The story began at a Union hospital, where Whitman befriends a young Confederate soldier from Maryland, who is dying from wounds suffered at Petersburg. When the young man, William Prentiss passes, Whitman meets his older brothers, including Clifton, who was also wounded and served in the Union army. Whitman began to tell the brothers what he learned from his conversations with William, in an attempt to help them learn about their brother and his experience during the war, as they had become estranged due to different opinions on the war.

Together, Whitman and the Prentiss brothers presented a story of the war that is rich and lively. The reader shifts from Armory Square Hospital in Washington, in 1865, back to pre-war Baltimore and countless other places in the Eastern Theater of the war. William Prentiss, the youngest son of a staunch Union abolitionist father and educator, owing to strong influence of pro-Southern peers, especially the Cary sisters, decides to join Confederate forces when hostilities commence. His brother Clifton, who attempted to dissuade William, takes up arms for the Union. William’s father, John, takes his son’s decision to fight for the Confederacy especially hard, calling William a “damned traitor”.(81) Throughout the war, the brothers experienced such battles as Bull Run, Gettysburg, and Petersburg. The chapters weave a wonderful tale that discusses daily life in the army, as well as the involvement of women in the war.

The goal of Jones’ book was to present the war in the manner that Whitman hoped, as he (Whitman) feared that the real war would be lost to succeeding generations. While this is a noble ideal, given the vast number of books on the war from a non-fiction standpoint, the real nature of the war has not been lost, as Whitman feared. However, Jones does provide, through his story, a good example of the nature of the war.

While the story was good, there were some problems. First, the book has an air of Confederate bias. While the story is attempting to help the brothers understand William’s service in the war, there is too much focus on characters, like the Cary sisters and other Southern sympathizers. This focus on Southerners, coupled with some dialogue that seems haughty for normal conversation, even for the nineteenth century, could turn off some readers too early. The back story surrounding them added intrigue to the story, but detracted from understanding the experience of the men in battle. Further, more focus on Clifton’s service in the Federal army would have better illustrated the brother against brother nature of the conflict. The back and forth shift in time of the story is a good concept, but more detail on the Prentiss family would have helped. While the immediate pre-war events in Baltimore are discussed and others hinted at, a fuller explanation of how the family, especially with adult children in other locales, reacted to events like John Brown’s raid, the election of Lincoln, and secession would have better explained the split that occurred between the family members.

David Jones crafted a unique piece of Civil War historical fiction. Intertwining real people and real places with fictional characters provides a great story about the war that, hopefully, will lead readers to explore the vast non-fiction literature on the conflict. Though there are some issues with the book, readers should delight in Jones masterful storytelling.

Author’s Note: I would like to encourage you all that have read the book to pose questions and comments, as David Jones will be visiting here as part of the TLC Book Tour.

Reinventing the Army-Part I

My son, Daniel, informed me of something he read regarding the latest “transformation” of the US Army.  When he explained what he found I immediately wondered just how many times must we “reinvent the wheel?”  Following this conversation the only information I found on the Internet concerning this subject seemed somewhat like “old news.”  I read all the “expert” rhetoric of the thirty-two page document and it did not really solve the Army’s two problems:  personnel and transportation.  Nor did it address the political-military problems that shape our military strategy, normally for the worst.  It barely covered the biggest “variable” of any military “experiment,” the enemy, who rarely follows the plan.  Instead, it creates a military force based on domestic budgetary constraints and not on real global threats.

The document did deride the “Cold War mentality” and those who champion the Cold War military, people like me.  Although I lack the “academic credentials” of these “experts,” I fought the Cold War throughout most of my Army career.  Additionally I attended every level of military education culminating in my graduation from the US Army Sergeants Major Academy.  I believe this gives me the “credentials” for offering my opinion, and makes my opinion equally relevant.

This information appeared in Wikipedia, a questionable source at best, however “where there is smoke, there is fire.”  I do know that many “experts” advocated this theory for at least a decade, as if they suddenly discovered something new.  Like many theories, especially those advanced during the 1990’s regarding the military, they work well “on paper.”  However, the reality often falls short, and one often finds the military tried these theories before.

Furthermore, these “transformations” usually create more problems than they solve and often lead the Army back where it started.  I searched the US Army’s website for information regarding my son’s information and found nothing confirming it.  The site mentioned the scheduled Iraq rotation of four brigades under the Multi-National Division-Baghdad.  From the website of this organization I found that an American Army division currently “headquarters” this division.

The prominent document I found discussing this proposed “transformation” came from the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress.  Coded at RL32476, titled “U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign:  Issues for Congress,” and authored by Andrew Feickert, it described a glowing program for “saving the Army.”  Feickert described himself as a “Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division,” and does not mention any military experience.  I searched the Internet in hope of finding a biography of the author, but without any success.  If Mr. Fieckert possesses military experience he must mention it for building any credibility for his document.

I do not know if Feickert’s document represents the source of information provided by my son, however it covers the theory.  Since the document contains thirty-two pages of rhetoric, a response probably requires at least an equal number of pages.  Hopefully, my response serves as a rebuttal for this policy that does little for alleviating the Army’s long-term problems.  The document explains that the Army plans on “transforming” its ten combat divisions into a forty-three brigade force.  By eliminating, or reducing, the division headquarters the plan assumes that these personnel become available for these additional brigades.

The document proclaims that these “modular” brigades suddenly become a, “more responsive, deployable, joint, and expeditionary force.”  It further cites “experts” that state that these “additional deployable units” provide more “stability to soldiers and their families.”  However, it comes with a caveat, provided that no “additional significant long-term troop commitments arise.”

During my Army career I endured three “transformations,” with only one achieving positive results for the Army.  All of these transformations promised great things, using key phrases, such as: “streamlining, more efficient,” and other “buzz words” meant for “dazzling with brilliance.”  As someone who studies military history I found similar phrases used when the Army demobilized following World War I.  World War II veteran and military historian Charles MacDonald wrote, The Mighty Endeavor, and described this era as “twenty years of neglect.”  The National Defense Act of 1920, glowing promised the future Army as a “hard, lean force of 280,000.”  Unfortunately it created “a neglected, spavined, meager force of only 135,000,” an Army ranked seventeenth in the world.

The problem remains that once an “expert” creates one of these programs, influential politicians adopts it.  Subsequently the Army must exert the blood, sweat and sacrifice for implementing the policy, often with substandard results.  Meanwhile most of these “experts,” most of whom never served in the military, never suffer the results of their “genius.”

As stated previously, I found no biography of Mr. Feickert, or any other mention of military service.  In fairness, after reading the document I believe that Feickert compiled information provided by other “experts” and offered his observations.  The document cites many military professionals supporting this “transformation,” however that does not alter my opinion.

Too often senior officers become “dazzled with brilliance” by these theories and disregard the problems they create for junior leaders.  Since Congress controls the careers of these officers, they often bend with the political winds, and break the Army.  Furthermore, I believe these men found themselves in a losing situation today, and made the best decision possible.  They adapted their doctrine for meeting the restrictions imposed by our civilian leadership, who continue waging war under peacetime conditions.

I face no such distractions and believe our civilian leadership disregards the requirements of a military superpower at war.  That includes the “experts” who believe themselves smarter than military professionals, and who “pontificate” in the media.  What further irritates me, many “experts” obtained their experience by “studying” military affairs in a classroom.  In other words, they never lived where “the rubber meets the road,” or face the dangers their policies impose.  Their theories sound good and work well, in the classroom, and their Ph. D.’s impress those who hire them.

If I sound angry about the influence wielded by these “experts,” good, I resent their influence based on no experience.  I researched the websites of our prominent civilian leaders and perused their biographies, and the results disturbed me.  Of the thirteen highest civilians in the Defense Department only six mentioned military service in their biography.

The results grow worse when examining the congressional armed services committees; the pompous “experts” who scold military professionals.  The House Armed Services Committee possesses 62 members, with 15 mentioning personal military service.  The Senate Armed Services Committee possesses 25 members with nine mentioning their military service. Powerful politicians often reward loyal “political hacks” with these positions, disregarding any personal military experience.  These “hacks” then confirm the civilian appointees and senior military leaders, often with military experience a minor concern.

Personal military experience does not necessarily qualify one for leadership at this level; particularly given the predominant venal “Washington” environment.  However, military experience certainly helps and at least gives one a basic understanding of military affairs.  Would the president recommend a federal judge with no legal experience, or a surgeon general with no medical degree?  Unfortunately, legions of “experts” with no military service eagerly seek these positions for enhancing their resumes.  Others seek these positions for “showing” the “Neanderthals” in the Pentagon “how to do business.”

I do not know when this phenomenon started; however, I do know when it gained significant momentum.  H.R. McMaster wrote the book, Dereliction of Duty, and sharply criticized the leadership of then-Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara.  McNamara, once called the “smartest man I ever knew,” by then-President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ), filled the Pentagon with civilian “experts.”

Derisively called “McNamara’s whiz kids,” McNamara gave these people wide latitude of authority over the military service chiefs.  They believed in McNamara’s theories regarding statistics, quantitative analysis, centralization of authority and arrogance regarding the military professionals.  Most of them possessed advanced degrees from the most prestigious universities in the country, but little military experience.  They further believed that military experience proved a “disadvantage” when determining strategy because it ignores the “bigger picture.”

These “whiz kids” soon alienated most of the senior military leadership, and the mutual contempt resulted in the “Viet Nam quagmire.”  McMaster states that Alain Enthoven of the System Analysis Division found “little” that made a military officer a “better strategic planner” than a “graduate of Harvard Business School.”  Then-Air Force Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay stated that the “whiz kids” believed themselves “better than the rest of us; otherwise they wouldn’t have gotten their superior education.”

Again, military experience does not guarantee competent military leadership, or determine a sound military strategy.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) during the Viet Nam War proved this when they did not forcefully challenge McNamara.  While this seems obvious in hindsight, the events as they occurred might not prove so conclusive.  The U.S. Constitution codifies civilian control over the military under a civilian Commander-in-Chief.  Congress declares war and holds the responsibility for maintaining the funding for the nation’s military forces.  The JCS serves as the primary military advisers for the President and the Congress, a role with many “double-edged swords.”

The JCS serve under civilian service secretaries and the secretary of defense, all appointed by the President.  McMaster states what I must summarize as the deliberate policy of the civilian leadership for appointing the most submissive of military chiefs.  This began under then-President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who felt that his military experience made him more qualified than anyone else.  It continued under then-President John F. Kennedy (JFK), who “retired” any JCS member who disagreed with him.  He nominated General Maxwell Taylor, with whom he enjoyed a special relationship, as JCS Chairman.  McNamara began micro-managing the military and denied the JCS presidential access without his permission.

This provides a dilemma for the JCS, establishing just where their loyalties and responsibilities lay.  The Constitution subordinates them under civilian authority and the chain of command requires obedience of the accepted policies.  If they publicly challenge this authority it sets the example for the questioning of orders at all levels of the military.  The Armed Forces potentially degenerate into a mob, obeying what orders suit them, with disastrous results.

Ample evidence exists that during the Viet Nam War the JCS stated their disagreements with accepted policies.  However, these disagreements occurred in closed meetings, and both LBJ and McNamara chastised them for this.  Under such circumstances the JCS face two choices, resign or try changing the system from within.  At one time then-Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson considered resigning; however he felt that this abandoned his responsibilities.  If the JCS resigns en masse, it implies mutiny, and the possibility of the “mob” described above.

During the Viet Nam War we often heard the statement, “War is too important to trust to the generals.”  However, the results of the Viet Nam War prove war “too important” for trusting amateurs in developing military strategy.  Enough blame resulted from the Viet Nam War for spreading around for all those who shaped the policy: military professionals, politicians, “experts,” diplomats, journalists, “anti-war activists” and ordinary citizens.

The post-Viet Nam era provided the first “transformation” that I experienced as a young non-commissioned officer (NCO).  This gave us the first iteration of the “All-Volunteer Army” (VOLAR), for ending the unpopular draft.  However, the unpopularity of the Viet Nam War caused a reduction in the number of recruits for filling the ranks.  Unfortunately, global events did not allow for disbanding the “hated” military, we must still confront global threats.

Forced into an untenable situation the Army tried a series of policies for achieving the personnel needed for its missions.  First came this ludicrous policy of “civilianizing” the Army with the relaxation of disciplinary standards and eroding the authority of military leaders.  However, when the standards and combat readiness eroded, the senior leadership and the “experts” wondered what happened. Subsequently, they blamed the junior officers and NCO’s for not enforcing the standards, standards that did not exist.

This period of neglect also saw a drastic reduction in the pay and benefits for military personnel.  Subsequently, the number of enlistments declined, resulting in under strength units, particularly combat units.  Potential recruits enlisted for the less-stressful combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) military occupational specialties (MOS).  This severely strained the personnel serving in the combat MOS’es: infantry, armor, artillery and combat engineers.

During this time I never served in a combat unit with above 75% of its authorized strength.  However, doctrine demanded that we still execute our missions as if we possessed full-strength units.  The Army prioritized the “forward deployed” units, those serving overseas (OCONUS) keeping them at the highest levels of readiness.  With limited men and materiel remaining, the stateside (CONUS) units suffered, and many fell below acceptable readiness levels.  Soldiers often returned from one OCONUS tour and received orders for another within one year.  Mid-career NCO’s left the Army in steadily increasing numbers, creating that “hollow force.”

In 1980 while assigned with the 2^nd Infantry Division (2^nd ID) at Camp Greaves, Korea I participated in a panel for Charles Moskos.  Moskos, a sociology professor at Northwestern University, displayed an uncanny interest in military affairs, probably based on his service.  The panel consisted of men like me, junior and mid-grade NCO’s, serving as small unit leaders.

This period marked the lowest point in the “hollow force,” and American impotence because of the Iran hostage crisis.  We immediately told Moskos of the problems we experienced as junior leaders, many of them previously mentioned.  Because of manpower needs we found ridding our units of disciplinary problems and substandard performers almost impossible.

Within fifteen minutes of our “opening barrage” all of the brigade’s command sergeants major, who monitored this panel, shut us down.  They dominated the conversation, minimized our problems, stated that no problems really existed and accused us of “routine bitching.”  In effect, they treated us as McNamara treated his JCS, and “good order and discipline” harnessed our responses.  The bottom line of this tactic, reveal no shortcomings and present the same rosy picture of an Army at its best.

This brilliant “transformation,” that promised so much almost broke the Army, despite the erroneous statistics presented in public.  The dedicated NCO corps, painstakingly rebuilt following the Viet Nam War, kept the Army intact.  We did this often without the help of our senior leaders, politicians and the “experts” populating the military bureaucracies.

For the record, the majority of the soldiers I served with during this period performed their duties well.  Good leadership often overcomes many disadvantages; however it does not alter official policies.  Every organization possesses between 5 and 10% of its numbers as “substandard performers,” the Army included.  Unfortunately during the “hollow force” this number increased because of a lowering of standards across the board. The “system” required that we retain in service disciplinary problems, substance abusers and those mentally incapable of achieving the standards.

The leaders spent so much time with the substandard soldiers that sometimes the good soldiers felt neglected.  Reduced personnel strength meant that the soldier’s name appeared on the duty roster far more frequently.  It also meant that fewer people existed for carrying all of the squad’s equipment in the field.  The infantry squad doctrine for this time authorized eleven men; however, I never led a squad with over eight men.

While the Army deteriorated during this time, so did the US decline as a superpower.  Following the Viet Nam War the Soviet Union began an expansionist policy that took advantage of America’s weakness.  Liberal Democrats increased their control in both houses of Congress in 1972, promising an end of American “military adventurism.”

Many of these politicians began their careers as “anti-war activists” and continued this trend in Congress.  Under their policies the Congress made the US Armed Forces the “aggressor” in the world.  They subsequently reduced the American military budgets, thinking that this prevented our military leaders from “fomenting aggression.”  Furthermore, they passed the War Powers Resolution in 1973 that restricted the president’s commander-in-chief powers.  Then-President Richard M. Nixon faced the “Watergate” problem that eventually terminated his presidency, and offered no veto threat.  Nixon’s successor, Gerald R. Ford, faced enormous opposition from Congress and American impotence on the global stage continued.

While the US idly watched, Southeast Asia, where we lost over 58,000 troops, fell under North Vietnamese aggression.  Using surrogate Cuban troops, the Soviet Union launched military interventions throughout Africa in support of “revolutions.”  Central America erupted into communist-led insurrections and communist “revolutionaries” toppled the government of a long-time ally in Nicaragua.  We may debate the “usefulness” of Anastasio Somoza; however the results of his demise proved disastrous for the US.  The Soviet Union openly invaded Afghanistan, at the “request” of the local communist dictator.  They further threatened our Western European allies by positioning nuclear-armed missiles in Eastern Europe.

Then-President Jimmy Carter did nothing, the Congress continued reducing the military budget and our military readiness steadily eroded.  Our Western European allies questioned our reliability and cracks appeared in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  Intelligence discovered the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, deemed not a threat by Carter’s “experts.”  Today most revisionists call this period a “thawing of the Cold War,” implying a warm relationship with the Soviet Union.  Truthfully, the Soviet Union aggressively expanded around the world and the US did nothing for preventing this threat.

All of these problems, a bad economy and the crisis in Iran proved the impotence Carter.  When Carter became president Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran served as our strongest ally in the Persian Gulf.  At the time the US lacked the capabilities for projecting power in this region, and Iran filled that “dead space.”  Carter’s naiveté in foreign affairs resulted in the toppling of Pahlavi for the radical Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.  “Radicals” seized the American embassy in Teheran and held our citizens for over one year.  Carter’s public appearances showed a lack of resolve and Ronald Reagan won the election in a landslide.

Then-President Reagan came into office promising a reversal of these policies, and for a time the Democrat-controlled Congress helped him.  The American people gave Reagan a significant landslide, and this made the “loyal opposition” fearful for their political futures.  He vowed not just the “containment” of Soviet aggression, but “rolling it back” where possible.  This began the second “transformation” of the Armed Forces that I experienced, and the only one that delivered.

Reagan began the largest peacetime military build-up since World War II, and revitalized America’s leadership.  First, he emphasized patriotism and made us, military personnel, feel proud of our service.  He provided a significant increase in pay and benefits, which helped recruit and retain quality people in a competitive job market.  Combat units achieved combat readiness standards in both personnel and equipment, and the number of combat units increased.  Second, he launched a program for providing the most high-tech equipment, the most comprehensive doctrine and the time and money for training.  It resulted in the unprecedented 1991 victory of Operation Desert Storm, and the collapse of the Soviet Union one year later.

Then came the third “transformation,” the irresponsible “downsizing” of the 1990’s, which really meant demobilizing our forces.  I watched the Army that I helped build, for which myself and others like me sacrificed, erode into another “hollow force.”  Of course the “experts” who championed this demobilization used all the right “buzz words” for justifying the policy.  Phrases like “more bang for the buck” and “we can do more with less” dominated the media regarding this “downsizing.”  Furthermore, any senior officer that cautioned against this policy found their “services no longer needed.”  I retired from active duty in 1994 rather than serve in this developing farce of an army.

A new crowd of civilian “experts” entered the Pentagon bent on creating a new, “politically correct army.”  They engaged in “social engineering,” with the first priority of then-President Bill Clinton, homosexuals in the military.  These “experts” further surrendered American leadership in the world, making the United Nations (UN) secretary-general the de facto commander-in-chief.  The US military then engaged in a series of “humanitarian” missions that spread our rapidly diminishing forces around the world.

One of these “humanitarian” missions went awry in Somalia, one that most Americans know from the movie, “Blackhawk Down.”  I highly recommend reading Mark Bowden’s book of the same title, it delves into far more detail.  The ground commander, Major General William F. Garrison, requested a “heavy force” for backup for executing his missions.  “Washington” denied this support for “political reasons,” and ordered that the missions proceed.  No one knows for sure whether “Washington” meant Clinton, or his defense secretary, former Representative Les Aspin (D-WI).  Aspin, a long-time critic of the Pentagon, previously served on the House Armed Services Committee.  He criticized every military program, except those benefiting Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, and made few friends among military professionals.

The denial of heavy forces for “political reasons” supposed that the insurgents in Somalia proved unworthy of a heavy force.  Everyone knows the consequences of this military action, and the heroism demonstrated by American troops when faced with insurmountable circumstances.  For carrying out his mission without proper support, “Washington” relieved Garrison of command, although “Washington” denied this support.  The only suffering done by the “experts,” Clinton fired Aspin as defense secretary, and Congress forced our retreat from Somalia.  This retreat helped create the circumstances we find ourselves in today.

For the record, after this debacle the Army deployed a heavy force in Somalia and prepared for the offensive.  However, our civilian leadership lacked the will and these forces merely covered our withdrawal.  Our enemies learned that if you want the retreat of American forces, you inflict casualties.  A policy championed today by many major American politicians as they all believe themselves “military experts.”

While the active duty forces, particularly the Army, steadily decreased in size, the deployments significantly increased.  The Army lost 40% of its strength, 286,000 personnel and 8 combat divisions, while its deployments increased by 300%.  These deployments proved very “personnel intensive,” meaning they taxed the Army’s units beyond their capabilities.

This initiated an increased use of the National Guard and Reserve forces, the largest since World War II.  A policy embraced by most of the leaders of the National Guard and Reserve components at the time.  I remember reading the late Colonel David Hackworth’s Internet publication, now known as DefenseWatch, during this time.  Guardsmen and Reservists complained of deploying almost as frequently as the Regulars; and how this threatened their civilian occupations.  People from all the Army’s components left the service for the same reason they left during the post-Viet Nam era.

Cracks appeared in the Army’s force structure in 1996, as I read in the Army Times newspaper at the time.  Unfortunately my lack of storage space forced the disposal of these issues, meaning that I cannot cite specific articles.  I do remember that Army leaders warned of their decreasing ability at providing the adequate forces for meeting global missions.  However, when Congress, now controlled by Republicans, called hearings, the Army’s leaders changed their stories.  It seems the JCS suffered the same dilemma as it did during the Viet Nam War; support policy or resign.

This reveals another reason why I retired from active duty, the Army’s senior leadership “transformed” into politicians.  Before this “downsizing” began I remember serving under officers who exhibited all the qualities required for engaging the Soviet armies.  Now I watched as these “warriors” competed for the ever-shrinking number of command positions, and turned into “ticket-punchers.”  These officers saved their careers, continued up the ladder for promotion and achieved political acumen.  They led the Army through this “transformation,” but at what cost for the nation, the Army and the soldiers they commanded?

Coincidently, Feickert’s document cites one of the combat operations of this era as a reason for justifying the “modular” brigades.  This occurred following the 1999 aerial war in the Balkans regarding Kosovo, then part of Serbia.  It states, “the Army deployed a unit consisting of units from different divisions that had never trained together,” for promoting this idea.  However, the whole concept of “modular” brigades embraces the example it criticized.  Unless somehow the “experts” envisioning this new policy corrected every deficiency, human and mechanical, and fixed the transportation shortfalls.

One problem with Task Force Hawk, the unit cited in the report, it suffered from the “cracks” revealed in 1996.  Anecdotal evidence from DefenseWatch at the time, provided by military personnel, revealed a system broken by years of abuse.  By this time reduced personnel strength forced that deploying units receive “fillers” from other units for meeting “ramp strength.”  It further required the “cannibalization” of parts and equipment from other units for achieving operational readiness for the deploying unit.  Maintaining readiness in both personnel and equipment requires funding, that steadily decreased through the 1990’s, severely harming combat readiness.

Another problem encountered by Task Force Hawk, as documented at www.d-n-i.net/fces/comments/c288.htm, mentions other critical shortcomings associated with the above-mentioned problems.  Budget cuts reduced the flight time for the pilots at below 500 hours during a three-year period.  None of the co-pilot gunners (CPG) possessed qualification for night flying with night vision goggles (NVG).  The ad hoc unit never executed any pre-deployment mission rehearsal exercises and they deployed with questionable aircraft survivability equipment (ASE).  Nor did the task force receive updated intelligence regarding the air defense threat posed by the enemy.

The AH-64 Apache attack helicopter achieved legendary status during Operation Desert Storm, and deservedly so.  It arose from the investment in technology from the Reagan build-up, as did most of the systems used during this war.  However, the Apache functions as part of a combined arms team, a “ground asset,” and the “experts” deployed it alone.

NATO also deployed an ad hoc ground force for “peacekeeping” after hostilities, called Kosovo Force (KFOR).  Commanded by a British lieutenant general, it consisted of American, British, French, German, Greek and Italian brigades.  The American brigade consisted of an airborne battalion, a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), a mechanized infantry task force and a cavalry troop.  Thankfully this conglomerate command did not engage in combat, because the potential for disaster existed.

I remember news stories of the time highlighting the problems with deploying this small American force.  Problems caused by the aforementioned budget constraints that harmed military readiness and raised doubts about American military dominance.  During the three days required for off-loading the equipment for the Americans, Russian peacekeepers beat us into Kosovo.  Few people know of these problems since the media often covers up problems with military operations that they champion.  Fewer people know that then-NATO commander, General Wesley Clark, risked starting a war with Russia.

NATO launched this air war supposedly for punishing the Serbs for “ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo.  This allied them with the Albanian Kosovars, and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) operating with US Special Forces.

Russia, the traditional protectors of the Serbs, sent its forces into Kosovo without prior coordination with NATO.  They moved swiftly into Kosovo while NATO forces awaited the still-deploying American brigade.  Crowds of Serbs cheered the Russians as they entered, believing them as their protectors.  They occupied an area reserved for NATO “peacekeepers,” operated outside NATO command, and jeopardized the fragile peace.

Feickert erroneously uses historical examples for justifying the “transformation,” as if the “experts” just discovered something new.  He begins with World War II describing divisions as “permanent organizations” composed of “three smaller units,” a reasonably accurate description.  However, he does not acknowledge the flexibility these units demonstrated during World War II and in wars thereafter.

Describing the subordinate units of a division as initially “regiments, but since the early 1960’s, known as brigades,” missed the major point.  First, the subordinate maneuver elements of these regiments consisted of units from the same combat arm: (i.e., 16^th Infantry, 34^th Armor, 5^th Artillery).  However, this does not explain the entire situation, these regiments developed into regimental combat teams (RCT).  Each regiment contained combat elements and organic CS and CSS elements that supported it in battle.

The brigades evolved from the increased need for combined arms teams that emerged during World War I.  During World War II most infantry divisions received attached tank battalions and tank destroyer battalions for achieving this concept.  The true birth of modern combined arms teams arose with the World War II armored divisions.  These units used combat commands instead of traditional regiments for achieving combined arms teams.

Regimental combat teams evolved into the flawed battle groups (another “expert” idea) of the late 1950’s, and the “pentomic” divisions.  Ironically this arose from many of the problems faced by the Army today: seeming irrelevance in “modern” warfare, budgetary constraints and advanced technology.  McMaster describes Eisenhower, a famous “Army man,” as someone who placed domestic policies above military strategy.  I found a document, “The Pentomic Era (1956-1960),” at website www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1211, describing then-Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor as designing these “pentomic” divisions almost out of desperation.

This document outlines Eisenhower’s belief that our nuclear technology effectively counterbalanced the Warsaw Pact numerical superiority.  It further spared the American economy the burden of maintaining large ground forces during peacetime.  The Army focused on using tactical nuclear weapons as artillery for defeating the superior numbers of our enemies.  The document describes this division as emphasizing the concepts of, “dispersion, flexibility, and mobility.”  Reading the entire document seems almost like reading Feickert’s document today.

I strongly urge that the “experts” championing the “modular” brigades read this document, particularly the last two pages.  The division did not meet expectations for several reasons, including our failure at understanding the damage from nuclear weapons.  Most importantly, admitting failure did not result from a battlefield disaster, it resulted from reality on the ground.

As knowledge increased regarding the long-term damage from nuclear warfare, and our superiority over the Soviets decreased we refocused on conventional warfare.  This required rebuilding the Army and the European scenario, and the Army developed combined arms brigades.  Heavy brigades (armor and mechanized infantry) contained battalions of both armor and mechanized infantry and a “support slice.” This “slice” task organized other combat elements with the brigade: field artillery, combat engineers and air defense artillery.  It further provides other CS and CSS elements: signal, medical, maintenance, quartermaster and other essential personnel.  Under the AirLand Battle Doctrine this CS and CSS “slice” formed the forward support battalion (FSB) task organized with each maneuver brigade.

The Cold War era brigade called itself a brigade combat team (BCT) and functions as the “modular” force envisioned by those cited by Feickert.  I know, I deployed with these type of commands for both CONUS and OCONUS training exercises and combat.  The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California focuses on combined arms training as it trains brigades and smaller units.  Probably some “expert” somewhere decided against deploying divisions because of the nightmare of providing all the needs.

Feickert first asks, “Is this redesign necessary or desirable?”  No, since the “redesigned force” demonstrates no significant change as it already exists within the current command structures.  Feickert’s document proposes “transforming” the division and higher echelon headquarters into units of deployment, capable of commanding at least six modular brigades.  The divisions I served in already possessed that capability, as did higher echelon headquarters.  For example, I served with the 1^st Infantry Division (Mechanized) , or 1^st ID(M), at Fort Riley, Kansas twice during my career.  At Fort Riley, the 1^st ID(M) served under the command of III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas.  Coincidently, III Corps commanded five divisions and the required supporting units in CONUS, spread across several states.  When the 1^st ID(M) deployed for its NATO mission it came under the command of VII Corps at Stuttgart, Germany.  Ironically this occurred during Operation Desert Shield with no significant problems, except those imposed by the desert.

Within the BCT’s, the subordinate battalions task organized by cross-attaching armor and infantry companies, creating task forces.  Within the companies they task organized armor and infantry platoons through similar cross-attachment, creating teams.  When this occurred each affected subordinate element took its “support slice” with it.  I experienced these task organizations throughout my career and found the experiences rewarding for the most part.

Most of the problems encountered proved administrative and logistical, based on inflexible high-tech systems designed by higher echelon “experts.”  Most of these I experienced as an infantry company first sergeant when I conducted company resupply operations.  For example, if the observer/controller/evaluator (OCE) assessed casualties the “system” prevented me from requesting replacements outside the MOS’es of my company.  If a tank experienced maintenance problems, my vehicle, tracked, recovery (VTR) proved incapable of towing it.  Eventually the Army eliminated this vehicle giving mechanized infantry units the same recovery vehicle as armor units.  The “system” prevented me from ordering parts for tanks, since my table of organization and equipment (TO & E) did not list them.  I solved these problems by contacting the first sergeant of the organic armor company of my attached platoon.

The military professionals cited by Feickert know of these BCT’s, or at least they should, which puzzles me.  Why make such an ordeal out of something that already exists, except if one desires recognition, and possible future “rewards.”  If I sound cynical, I am, for I know officers that weakened when offered such “rewards.”  Politics affects the careers of these officers, both active and retired, and developing these “dynamic” strategies gets noticed.  It seems that the document plans on the significant reduction in division-level and higher-level CS and CSS troops.  Since the establishment of the support MOS’es following the Spanish-American War the Army’s leadership debated the “tooth-to-tail” ratio.

MacDonald describes the military planning before the US entered World War II and the projected number of troops needed.  It seems that the Army severely under estimated the number of CSS troops needed for sustained combat operations.  Army planners further under estimated the length of the logistical “tail,” that lay between CONUS and the front lines.  Unfortunately Army planners did not learn this lesson very well, since they make the same mistakes today.

Regarding the number of CSS troops, budget constraints and personnel ceilings forced a major change during the post-Viet Nam era.  The Army transferred most of its highly specialized CSS MOS’es into the reserve components.  At most garrison installations civilian employees performed these duties, providing jobs for constituents, therefore the policy made sense.  A good example, military postal units, since each CONUS military installation possesses a post office manned by the US Postal Service.  It further included many medical, transportation, quartermaster, military police and other such units at corps and higher echelons.  The theory stated that many of these people held civilian jobs in these areas and required minimal post-mobilization training.

The theory worked haphazardly during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm for a variety of reasons.  Primarily I know of no extensive training, such as NTC rotations, that paired these units with the corps they supposedly supported.  As previously stated no CONUS command exercised division and higher echelon maneuvers except on OCONUS deployments.  However, these deployments decreased in number as funding decreased for these exercises.

Unfortunately the circumstances in the Middle East proved strikingly different from that experienced on previous deployments.  Pentagon planners directed all training toward NATO or Korea where American forces stationed there maintained the required infrastructure.  Prior OCONUS deployments outside these areas seemed short-term events for relatively small numbers of American forces, and no logistical challenge.

Operation Desert Shield became the largest short-notice deployment of the time, outside planned areas of operation.  Primarily no infrastructure existed in the desert, forcing a change in the equipment needed by these CSS units.  With no established support depots for drawing supplies, commands must deploy with a six-month supply.  This severely limited the maneuverability of the combat units, and strained relations with the CSS units.  Once in theater no one seemingly controlled the distribution of these CSS units and what corps they supported.  Fortunately the American soldier “adapted, overcame and persevered,” in the words of Clint Eastwood’s character, Gunny Highway.

Feickert’s document implies that the reduction of CSS personnel immediately translates into combat personnel.  Unfortunately many civilians with no military experience assume that we may interchange soldiers into any unit, and easily change their MOS.  Such an interchange requires a significant amount of time and funding for retraining the affected soldiers.  It requires even more time if this requires the retraining of officers and NCO’s.  Then we must address the issue of female soldiers, currently prohibited from serving in combat arms units.

Of course we may “downsize” all of these “excess” support troops, just as we “downsized” during the 1990’s.  We may transfer their positions into the reserve components, increasing the number of active duty positions for combat arms.  However, training the new combat personnel takes additional time and money for fielding these new brigades.  Then we must consider the benefit packages for these people “downsized” out of their jobs.

Unfortunately when we eliminate these CSS units we do not eliminate the requirement for their duties.  Maintaining ever-increasingly high tech equipment requires an ever-increasingly skilled CSS force.  As stated previously, we may transfer these units into the reserve components; however this does not solve the deployment issue.  Mobilized reservists require post-mobilization training, jeopardizing the sustainment of a combat unit rapidly deployed into theater.  When the Defense Department embraced the increased emphasis on reserve components in 1993, the “experts” estimated post-mobilization training at 60 days minimum.

This situation grows worse when one considers the theory of “civilianizing” these headquarters and CSS functions.  Do these civilians deploy into combat theaters when the brigade deploys, or does the brigade deploy at a disadvantage?  How about weapons and combat training for these civilians, and coverage under the Geneva Convention?  When attacked, do these civilians fight back, or sit idly by as civilian employees?  We already know that the terrorists torture and murder civilians just as they do military personnel.  Civilian employees provide valuable services at garrison installations; however, in combat units we need our “brothers-in-arms” in these positions.

To be continued

D-DAY REMEMBERED?-Part III

Continued from Part II

The distorted rhetoric of the Left demonizes our soldiers, reminiscent of the Viet Nam era, yet claims that they support them. In the next sentence these “intellectually superior” leftists benevolently call our troops “victims” of military recruiters “exploiting” them. Acts considered treasonous during World War II the Left calls “patriotic,” and they call people who support their country “traitors.” Professor Ward Churchill called those people murdered on 9/11 “little Eichmanns,” and receives the treatment of a dignitary. Former Presidents Jimmie Carter and Bill Clinton, two presidents who helped create our current mess, travel the world demonizing their country. Gold Star mother, Cindy Sheehan, received icon status, while the media ignored other Gold Star mothers, who support the war. These represent merely a few examples of the distorted “pop culture” that thrives in our nation.

Unfortunately those with the opposing views, commonly called the “Extreme Right Wing,” remain silent, often afraid of receiving a personal attack. The Left, and their “fellow travelers,” only “tolerate” those who agree with them. However, the Left tells us that we must “respect” their views and never “question their patriotism.” Like trained seals, the so-called conservative “leaders” follow their instructions from the Left, and call them “patriots.”

One may ask how all of this ties in with remembering D-Day, and the sacrifices of World War II. We face a threat just as serious as that we faced during World War II, maybe worse. Immediately after Pearl Harbor most Americans understood the threat and “rolled up their sleeves” for victory. As America’s sons and daughters sacrificed so much overseas, Americans at home spared no effort at supporting them. After 9/11, that attitude lasted three weeks, as I stated previously, and our “leaders” did not generate a war effort. Instead of calling for victory today, many of our “leaders” call for our withdrawal and defeat.

In great detail I described the blood, sweat and sacrifice endured by all Americans between Pearl Harbor and D-Day. These hardships occurred in combat across the globe and on the home front by laboring in the war industries. I further revealed some of the problems encountered, both at home and abroad, that potentially threatened the final victory. However, these Americans overcame these problems, focused on the victory and defeated the most serious threat of their generation.

After the Allies secured the Normandy beachhead it took another eleven months of brutal combat for defeating Germany. With the secure beachhead, the Allies poured in men and materiel for winning the victory and occupying Germany. Victory in the Pacific required an additional three months of the most bloody combat faced by Americans since the Civil War.

Most Americans understood that liberating France, or occupied American territory in the Pacific, did not end the war. Victory meant invading the Axis nations, defeating their armed forces and changing their governments. Leaving the dictatorial regimes in power did not solve the problem, it merely postponed them.

When President Bush made his first post-9/11 State of the Union address he mentioned three nations as the “Axis of Evil.” He correctly called these nations, Iran, Iraq and North Korea threats for a variety of reasons. Almost immediately the Left around the world chastised him and called him a “cowboy.” The Democrat Party, looking for a political wedge for eroding Bush’s soaring popularity, joined this clamor. This clamor also included the left-leaning media and Hollywood elites, who immediately began a propaganda campaign against Bush.

The Islamofascists, and their “rogue nations” supporters, face no such internal dissensions, particularly since they embrace no democratic principles. Iran became our enemy in 1979 with the revolution that toppled Shah Reza Pahlavi, one of our best regional allies (thank you President Carter). Since that time Iran openly supported terrorist organizations that cause conflicts in the region, and killed over two hundred US Marines. Currently they arm, train and join the terrorists in Iraq, killing our soldiers. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, seeks nuclear power, threatens Israel and creates regional instability through his speeches and actions.

Since Bush named the “Axis of Evil” we must add another nation, Syria, which also threatens regional stability. It supports terrorist organizations, promotes instability in Lebanon, threatens Israel and, like Iran, supports our enemies in Iraq. Former Iraqi Air Force General Georges Sada, in his book, Saddam’s Secrets, believes that Saddam Hussein sent his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) into Syria.

North Korea remains at a disadvantage, despite its possession of nuclear weapons and the means for delivering them. Geographically situated on a peninsula, with a hostile relationship with its neighbor, South Korea, it possesses little room for expansion. However, as long as it continues developing WMD’s, and the means for delivering them, it increases its threat level. As long as it exports these weapons and other technology, it increases the threat posed by these “rogue nations.”

However, in the Middle East, the US possesses no useful alternative except eliminating the threats posed by Iran and Syria. Both export terror through organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah that attack Israel, giving Israel a 9/11 equivalent almost daily. Diplomacy continues failing regarding these nations, as our European “allies” openly trade with them. The UN balks at any serious actions, and our “partners,” Russia and China, veto any strong resolution.

The US, as the “lone superpower,” faces the threat almost alone, yet ignores it. Even the surviving members of the “Greatest Generation,” whose experiences offer so much, do not acknowledge the threat. History teaches us that America, however reluctantly, began preparing for war in June, 1940, eighteen months before Pearl Harbor. Today, almost seven years after 9/11, we barely acknowledge that a war exists.

We stood almost alone in 1940, with a poorly prepared military force, and prepared for the worst. Part of this military preparation included the first peacetime draft in our nation’s history. Many pundits today call peacetime draftees “reluctant soldiers at best,” and that situation prevailed in 1940. MacDonald reveals one of the restrictions on draftees included one year’s service, ending their service in September, 1941. The world situation, and military organizational problems, prompted legislation for extending that service by one year. This deeply angered the drafted men, and the acronym OHIO (Over the Hill In October) became prominently displayed on military property. For the unknowing, “over the hill” means Absent Without Official Leave (AWOL), and I found no figures revealing AWOL statistics for this time. However, after Pearl Harbor, these “reluctant soldiers” became the force that immediately confronted the Axis armies.

Following 9/11 America faced a similar military situation as it did following the Allied defeat in June, 1940. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 America began demobilizing the superb military force that guaranteed that collapse. For the next ten years the US “downsized” about forty per cent of its personnel strength. Meanwhile the world situation required the increase of deployments by about three hundred per cent. These forces proved inadequate for these “peacetime” requirements, despite the unprecedented mobilization of reserve components. We began the war against terrorism with this worn down force, and did not increase the number of personnel. Today we hear stories of the “over extending” of these forces, yet no one advocates increasing the number of troops.

At several times during this piece I mentioned casualties from certain campaigns of the war. I further mentioned that on one day, June 6, 1944, the Allies suffered almost 10,000 casualties. At least 2,500 of these occurred among the American forces involved in the Omaha Beach landings. Today the Left and the media maintains a “casualty watch,” almost gleefully reporting every American casualty. As a combat veteran I understand the value of everyone killed or wounded, and the gash it tears in the families effected. However, the casualties we suffered in almost seven years of combat, pale when considered against those suffered during World War II.

American families then mourned their losses and continued on for victory, much like the Sullivan Family. The Sullivan Family of Waterloo, Iowa lost all five of their sons during one naval battle near Guadalcanal in November, 1942. Thomas and Alleta Sullivan received an outpouring of condolences from the American public, and Americans honored their sons as the “Fighting Sullivan Brothers.” Despite the sorrow from their loss, Thomas and Alleta made several appearances at war plants and shipyards for supporting the war effort. Unfortunately I experienced a difficult time finding a website, www.arlingtoncemetery.net/sullivan-brothers.html, that told their story. As stated previously, today the media honors Cindy Sheehan, and I found her website at the top of my search.

The beachhead at D-Day represented a significant strategic advantage for the Allies; however German counterattacks tried breaching it. Victory remained elusive even following this invasion as Allied forces in Europe entered the bloody hedgerow campaign. In Italy the Allied troops continued the costly campaign in the mountains. The Soviets suffered horrendous casualties as they advanced on the Eastern Front, finally ejecting the enemy from Soviet territory.

In the Pacific Allied forces continued their bloody island-hopping campaign, drawing the noose tighter around Japan. Allied troops on the Asian mainland struggled against stiff Japanese resistance, slowly gaining ground. Achieving these gains caused severe strains on the Allied resources, and deepened strains within the alliance as well.

Despite all of the public relations efforts and “photo-ops” at the various conferences, deep divisions threatened the Allies. Most people know of the distrust between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. Almost everyone knows of the rivalry between the British and Americans, particularly between the British senior field commander, General Bernard Montgomery, and Patton. De Gaulle and his Free French often proved more of a hindrance, particularly when the “Big Three,” FDR, Churchill and Stalin, snubbed him. The Chinese Nationalists and Communists continued fighting each other, which hindered operations against the Japanese. However, this “coalition of the willing” continued and ultimately defeated their enemies and brought down the enemy governments.

My fellow Americans, we faced our D-Day when we invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, and secured our “beachheads.” Unfortunately victory remains elusive as we seem stalemated by the irresponsible internal squabbles of our “leaders.” No easy answers exist for solving the problem of victory in this war against terrorism, despite our politicians’ rhetoric. Retreat and withdrawal, as envisioned by the Democrats, turns our D-Day into our Dunkirk, when British troops evacuated continental Europe. However, “staying the course” invokes images of the Viet Nam War and “quagmire,” and the political divisions we currently face.

In either case we appear weak and indecisive, a superpower paralyzed by a seemingly small number of people. We further enshrined this paralysis from our internal problems as well, comfortable in our arrogance and complacency. This attitude makes us believe ourselves invincible because of our limitless power versus the limitations of our enemies. We possess all of the technological advantages; therefore these enemies, lacking in modern amenities, cannot overcome this power.

Furthermore, we do not believe that our “political discourse” affects the tenacity of our enemy on the battlefield. Politics no longer stops “at the water’s edge” as it did during World War II. Thomas Fleming, in his book, The New Dealers’ War, describes the internal struggles FDR faced during the war. During the first few months of the war many Republicans criticized FDR regarding how we entered the war. However, none of them called for impeachment, accused him of treason or directly challenged his role as commander-in-chief. Nor did any “shadow government” of angry Republicans exist in our government agencies, disrupting the President’s policies.

Fleming further describes the “dark side” of FDR, who ruthlessly stifled his opposition, sometimes using questionable authority. Unlike FDR, Bush embraced his opposition with his “new tone,” and neither he nor other Republicans respond when attacked. FDR paid a price for his ruthlessness; the Democrats suffered losses in the 1942 mid-term election. Although Democrats still controlled both houses of Congress, they lacked veto-proof majorities. Unlike the Democrats today, no Republicans challenged FDR as commander-in-chief, or undermined the war effort.

Fleming mentions a good example of not undermining the commander-in-chief occurred during the 1944 presidential election cycle. The Republican candidate, New York Governor Thomas Dewey, learned that the US broke the Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor. Angry at the destruction at Pearl Harbor given this knowledge, Dewey threatened disclosing it. However, General Marshall informed Dewey of the American victories because of this, and urged his silence. Dewey placed national security and soldiers’ lives above politics and remained silent on this issue.

Instead the 1944 presidential election cycle centered on FDR’s declining health and ability for continuing his leadership of the war. I found no evidence of highlighting “war weariness,” continuing casualties or blunders concerning military operations. Nor did Dewey state his willingness in meeting enemy leaders for negotiating an end of hostilities.

Today the “loyal opposition” discloses everything they know, and their media accomplices report it. It does not matter how it affects the war effort, or the safety of our military personnel. They only care about how this information damages Bush and their other political opponents. Tragically, when these “leaks” happen neither Bush nor other Republicans express outrage at these breaches of national security.

FDR further tried building support for the war before the US entered it, warning of the dangers of the Axis Powers. Fleming cites the creation of the Office of War Information (OWI) in June, 1942 (what is it with these June anniversaries?) for managing public support of the war. Today we call these people “spin meisters,” for their ability at twisting facts for meeting their agendas.

Unfortunately agencies like the OWI prove necessary, particularly during wartime as we faced enemy propaganda masters. The most famous, Joseph Goebbels of Germany, successfully “spun” battlefield defeats into propaganda victory for maintaining public support. Such programs work best in totalitarian nations, such as the Axis nations and the Soviet Union, with no freedom of the press. In democratic societies one might liken the OWI with the commercials aired by private companies selling their products.

Our Constitution outlines the necessity of freedom of the press in our society for informing the public. The censorship of World War II did not drastically affect First Amendment rights, particularly since we still enjoy these rights today. However, the “free and independent press” today often acts as a propaganda organ for our enemies. While they routinely discredit all information from our government, they faithfully accept every word uttered by our enemies. Before the invasion of Iraq, journalist Dan Rather interviewed Saddam Hussein, treating him with more deference than his own president. Unfortunately nothing like the OWI exists today for even balancing out this negative reporting, let alone promoting “our side.”

Although I often ponder over how I would do things since 9/11, we cannot go back in time. For transforming our D-Day into victory we can only discuss where we go from our present place in time. Primarily, we need national leadership, from the President, the Congress and in those federal agencies involved in national security. Currently it seems that Bush lacks the fortitude for bringing this leadership about, even in his Cabinet. Particularly during this time of war, we cannot tolerate any “shadow government,” and the President must fire them.

The President runs the Executive Branch of government through his Cabinet and other advisors, meaning all the federal agencies. Besides the “shadow government” these federal agencies seem overflowing with those concerned mainly with their advancement. Those agencies concerned with our national security must employ only the best of people, and those with the most experience. The stakes prove too high for tolerating gross mistakes, incompetence and the bane of all government employees, careerism. Regarding the war against terrorism I believe Bush received some bad advice from complacent advisors, partly from “Clinton hold-overs.”

A good example, when the Soviet Union collapsed Iraq became the primary threat for which the Army trained. I know; I participated in this training from 1992 until I retired from active duty in 1994. Every time Saddam “rattled his sabers” we deployed a combat brigade immediately into Kuwait. Despite this fact, and our control over northern Iraq, we did not aggressively execute human intelligence missions inside Iraq. For eleven years our intelligence agencies did not emplace agents inside Iraq, or recruit sources inside Saddam’s regime.

Likewise in Afghanistan after we learned that Usama bin Laden executed his attacks against us from there during the 1990’s. The Northern Alliance, under the legendary Ahmad Shah Massoud, fought the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Richard Miniter, in his book, Losing Bin Laden, describes the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) incompetent use of Massoud. Infiltrating al Qaeda required money and other assistance; the CIA did not provide it. The Northern Alliance provided regular information regarding bin Laden’s movements; the CIA did not act. Massoud determined that the CIA possessed “no interest” in getting bin Laden. Al Qaeda assassinated Massoud on September 9, 2001.

Before D-Day the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), forerunner of the CIA, emplaced agents throughout France. These agents worked with the Maquis, and waged an active campaign gathering intelligence and disrupting German defenses. Despite their best efforts accurate intelligence still proved a challenge, such as the German 352^nd Infantry Division at Omaha Beach. We often forget that the enemy works just as hard at deceiving us as we do at deceiving them.

By the time of D-Day the Armed Forces purged themselves of most of their incompetent field commanders, often after costly disasters. Patton, arguably our best field commander in Europe, almost purged himself from command. Eisenhower gave him his assignment in England as “probation,” however it proved its worth against the Germans. Unfortunately, during the 1990’s we purged the Armed Forces of anyone remotely resembling Patton, creating a “politically correct” Army.

Even if we possess the best warriors as our field commanders, our military still operates under civilian control. Our military strategy originates in the White House, the Pentagon advises, and then carries out this strategy. A trend began under Defense Secretary Robert McNamara when he employed legions of computer analysts, statisticians and business managers. Most of these men lacked military experience, and even thought military experience a “disadvantage” in determining strategy. H.R. McMaster, in his book, Dereliction of Duty, describes the condescending attitude these “experts” displayed toward professional military officers. They further believed that their “superior education” made them better decision-makers than professional officers with combat experience. We lost the war managed by these people, and micro-managed by the ultimate statistician, McNamara.

Unfortunately such trends continue today regarding the civilians that run the Pentagon. I researched the Defense Department’s websites and found of the thirteen highest civilians only six mentioned military experience in their biographies. Historically many of our service secretaries lacked military experience such as President Abraham Lincoln’s two secretaries of war, Simon Cameron and Edwin Stanton. However, I believe military experience proves essential for someone serving as a service secretary, given the serious nature of the job. Would a president appoint a federal judge with no legal experience, or a surgeon general with no medical experience?

I hoped for the appointment of former General H. Norman Schwarzkopf as Secretary of Defense, the commander of Operation Desert Storm. Maybe Bush offered him the job and he declined it, I do not know. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld did not impress me, nor did he when he served in the position previously. He seemed more interested in his “transformation” program than with winning the war, proposing more cuts for a drastically reduced military force.

Of course I do not know what advice Rumsfeld received from the bureaucrats who really run the Pentagon. Bureaucrats often do things based on how it affects their careers, and improves their “power base.” If someone changes the plans it might reduce their influence, or even eliminate their job. Besides, with all of the statistics and “Power Point” briefings, their plans seem infallible.

Certainly even someone with no military experience realizes we need a dramatic increase in our personnel strength. This proves particularly true for the Army, which suffered the most under “downsizing,” losing about 286,000 personnel. The Army primarily wages the nation’s ground wars, which requires the largest number of people, for both combat and support troops. Despite today’s rhetoric the war against terrorism remains primarily a ground war, where our forces engage the terrorists in ground combat.

When the Allies defeated Germany the US alone possessed over one million troops in Europe. Today the US possesses 1.4 million personnel on active duty and 1.3 million in the reserve components. While this seems a large number it proved insufficient for meeting all of its global missions. Current military doctrine states that victory requires a three-to-one ratio of attacker-to-defender, at the front line. Defeating a guerrilla force, such as terrorists, requires a ten-to-one ratio of us-to-them. Sustained warfare requires a substantial depth of operations that extend far behind the battlefront.

During World War II the records reveal that it took seven support soldiers for supporting every combat soldier. MacDonald states that this proved one of the flaws in pre-war planning, under estimating the number of support units needed. This support begins stateside with the recruiting and training base for producing qualified and trained personnel. It then extends across the globe in lines of communication for providing a steady supply of men and materiel. Defending this line of communication requires significant numbers of troops, particularly air and naval forces.

Traditionally, once soldiers deployed overseas during World War II they remained overseas for the “duration plus six months.” This did not mean that the troops remained in constant combat operations; everyone understood that they needed periodic rest. Particularly after a bloody operation like D-Day, the assault units needed time for rest and refit.

The Allies assaulted the beaches of Normandy with about 170,000 troops; however, this represented just the “tip” of the “spearhead.” As stated previously, follow-on forces began landing once the assault units secured the beaches. These fresh troops “relieved in place” the troops on the front and continued the momentum of operations. Unlike today, no D-Day planners believed these 170,000 troops capable of securing the beachhead and liberating France. When the D-Day plan went awry Eisenhower did not appear before a partisan congressional committee in Washington, DC.

During World War II Republicans in Congress did criticize FDR’s “home front” policies regarding the war. This involved the growing bureaucracies for managing the war, graft and corruption within these agencies and the political use of the OWI. However, I found no evidence of delaying war funding, partisan electioneering in foreign countries or “shadow governments.”

Congress, as the representatives of the people, plays a vital role in the military operations of the country. This includes authorizing operations, such as formal declaration of war, or “conditional” declarations, such as the resolutions since World War II. In the aftermath of 9/11 Congress overwhelmingly passed a joint resolution (S.J. Res. 23) authorizing the use of force:

That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determined planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.

While most members of Congress supported this effort at defeating those who attacked us, others cynically postured for political gain. Following the unanticipated victory in Afghanistan some of this “war fever” died out as the Democrats lamented the rising popularity of Bush. Many of them, responsible for the “downsizing” of our military and intelligence capabilities in the 1990’s, tried blaming Bush for military shortfalls.

The Congress further approved military action against the continuing threat of Iraq with S.J. Res. 45, on October 2, 2002. This document cited Saddam’s violations of UN resolutions beginning with the first Gulf War in 1990-1. It further stipulated the violations of seventeen separate resolutions since the first war ended, including continuing Iraqi hostility. Cynically, many Democrats tried delaying the vote until after the mid-term elections that November. I believe they hoped that the security of employment for another two years allowed them a “safety net” for criticizing Bush. For once the Republicans stood up and demanded a vote, forcing a hard choice for the Democrats, and the resolution passed.

Congress further possesses the constitutional power for raising and supporting our armed forces and appropriating the necessary funding. Since the war against terrorism began Democrats in Congress almost continuously berate Bush for military shortages. Ironically, they initiated most of those shortages through the irresponsible “downsizing” of the 1990’s, and offer no solutions. Tragically, the “Bush Administration” does very little for reversing these shortages and maintains the inadequate structures of the 1990’s.

Since Congress controls the military “purse strings” why not increase the funding if they feel the current amount inadequate. Divert funding from their “earmarks,” or their “pet” domestic programs for ensuring that our troops receive the proper support. Truthfully, Congress does not take money from these programs because that does not translate into constituent votes, and ensure reelection.

The Republican leaders in Congress do not confront their Democrat “colleagues” regarding their demagoguery, particularly regarding military funding. Neither does Bush “hold their feet to the fire,” making them perform their duty of providing for the common defense.” Our Constitution tasks the federal government with the primary responsibility for providing for the nation’s defense. However, the federal government seems more interested in prioritizing health care, education and other things not mentioned in the Constitution.

Congress maintains oversight of the Armed Forces through the armed services committees of both houses. However, the majority of the people on these committees lack military experience themselves, and use it as a political “stepping stone.” I researched the websites of all members of Congress sitting on these committees and grew disappointed with the results. Of 62 members on the House committee only 15 mentioned military service in their biographies. Two others mentioned spouses with military experience and one member posted no biography on his site. The Senate committee boasted 25 members with only 9 mentioning military service in their biographies and one mentioned a spouse with military experience.

Neither committee chairman mentioned military service, while both ranking members served during the Viet Nam War. While military service does not guarantee expertise in military affairs, neither does serving as a “political hack.” When I watch these “distinguished members” grilling military commanders I grow increasingly agitated. These “hacks” sit in judgment of these officers with smug looks on their faces and condescending words spoken from their mouths. Maybe if more of these people served in the military, and experienced the hardships, they might better execute their responsibilities.

Political ramifications dominate so much of today’s society that it often paralyzes our nation. No one ever mentions that D-Day occurred in a presidential election year, nor did the “loyal opposition” use it for seeking advantage. Many opportunities existed for using it, if any candidate proved eager for exploiting it, and possibly affecting public morale. The blunders, the high casualties and the irresponsibility of launching it under marginal weather conditions provided ample “political fodder.”

As stated previously, in World War II politics stopped “at the water’s edge,” and FDR won an unprecedented fourth term. While Democrats and Republicans bickered over domestic issues, they differed very little regarding foreign policy and conduct of the war. Individual Americans vehemently differed over many issues, such as racial policies, but they united for defeating the enemy. No sacrifice proved too great for supporting “our boys,” who gave their lives in defense of their country.

Today it seems that nothing transcends politics, personal aggrandizement or takes priority over our creature comforts. We further sacrifice our history, revising it for fitting in with our “politically correct” society. As June turned into July, and we celebrate our independence as a nation, must we also sacrifice that history? Past generations paid a high price for the freedoms and opportunities we take for granted today. None of them sought these hardships, however they met the challenges of their generation, and we must meet ours today.

American troops fought their way ashore on Omaha Beach at a very high price. Behind them millions of Americans, both military and civilian, applauded them and sustained them until they won victory. Today American forces toppled the oppressive regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, liberating millions of people. Behind them millions of Americans applaud them and support them, although you rarely hear of it.

The Islamofascists present a threat of at least equal proportions with the Axis nations of World War II. Almost every source that speaks of this threat states the goal of enforcing a caliphate on the Western democracies. One need only look at the media footage from Afghanistan where the Taliban publicly executed those who violated their Islamic laws. Look at the footage of terrorists detonating bombs against mostly innocent civilians as they seek dominance over these people.

The Americans today who feel their Constitutional rights violated by the “Patriot Act” do not understand true oppression. Those who denounce our soldiers for “atrocities” against the captured terrorists never witnessed true atrocity. Others who claim that the “Bush Administration” concocted the war against terrorism do not comprehend the threat. “Experts” who claim that we must appease the terrorists never faced the threat, or suffered at their hands. Unfortunately we give too many Americans with too little knowledge and experience too much power in our society.

That power immobilized our response against the enemies that threaten our existence as a nation. Transforming our D-Day into victory requires that we replace the current governments in Iran and Syria. How we accomplish this remains the problem, as our internal political squabbles effectively paralyzed our actions. We receive no leadership from Washington, DC, who we pay quite handsomely for leading us. Disturbingly, we seem rooted in a flawed plan for using “minimal force” and making the “smallest footprint” on our enemies.

As World War II confirmed, defeating our enemies requires the application of our full national effort. Victory requires that we “pay any price” and “bear any burden,” as President John F. Kennedy stated in his inaugural address. Unfortunately today, we face the real possibility of defeat and the demise of our civilization.

Waiting for permission from the UN and our European “allies” allows more time for Iran’s nuclear development. Not building sufficient military strength for this inevitable war demonstrates insanity on the part of the US and other Western democracies. The complacency of our leaders in ignoring the threat represents a total dereliction of duty. Their deliberate campaign in blaming their own nation and demonizing their soldiers borders on treason.

D-Day represents a significant victory for American and Allied troops during World War II. Remembering it, and the blood, sweat and sacrifice that made it possible remain important for today’s Americans. The Axis Powers did not make victory easy, they mobilized their nations’ resources as well. They employed every strategy for avoiding defeat, and discouraging the Allies into negotiations, such as the famed “Battle of the Bulge.” The Japanese employed kamikaze, or suicide pilots, against American forces beginning with the Philippine liberation in early 1945. However, nothing deterred those Americans from final victory, and the defeat of their enemies.

We proved many times since 9/11 that we forgot the sacrifices made by the “Greatest Generation,” and the lessons they learned. Those responsible for reminding us of those past lessons and enlightening us regarding today’s threat willfully shirk their responsibilities. Instead they support our defeat, champion our enemies and demonize those who defend us. I only hope that our mistakes today do not squander the freedoms and opportunities for future generations of Americans. Because if the Islamofascists defeat us, no benevolent nation awaits for rescuing us from their terror.

D-DAY REMEMBERED?-Part II

Continued from Part I

The beach remained in a confused state, with most of the troops huddled beneath the sea wall. Even the veterans of the 1^st Infantry Division felt the effects of the horrendous conditions and seemed in shock. Making matters worse, the 16^th Infantry Regiment’s advance command post (CP) landed under a hail of fire. The regimental executive officer died in this fire, leaving the command group leaderless as it struggled ashore. Of the 102 men in this group 35 became casualties before they reached the shore.

When the 16^th Infantry’s 3^rd Battalion CP landed, it found itself among members of the 29^th Infantry Division. This group must traverse two thousand yards of beach, under heavy fire, before it reached its unit. Twelve men from this group arrived unscathed at their destination, leaving behind much of the equipment needed.

Officers and non-commissioned officers suffered high casualties as they tried organizing their units in the confusion. The sea wall grew crowded as follow-on waves of troops landed and mingled with the survivors of the first wave. The 16^th Infantry’s Cannon Company landed one and one-half hours after the first wave for providing fire support. Unfortunately it lost most of its guns and vehicles in the landing, therefore the company commander committed it as a rifle company.

Approximately two hours after the initial landing Colonel George Taylor, the 16^th Infantry’s commander, arrived amid the chaos. Taylor commanded the regiment during the North Africa and Sicily campaigns and he found a pending disaster. He assembled as many of his subordinate commanders as possible and ordered an advance. Taylor then walked among the frightened men and tried encouraging them with his leadership example. At one point he said, “There are only two kinds of people on this beach; the dead and those who are about to die. So let’s get the Hell out of here.”

By task organization A Company, 1^st Medical Battalion provided medical support for the 16^th Infantry. Its landing craft hit the beach at about two and one-half hours after the first wave and immediately came under fire. Although clearly marked with red crosses the Germans fired on it with machine guns and anti-tank cannon. As the medics tried struggling ashore, the Germans fired on them, killing and wounding many. The crew of the craft backed it from the shore, depriving the regiment of badly needed medical care.

In the sector of beach assaulted by the 29^th Infantry Division the situation seemed much the same as with the 1^st. The 29^th, originally a National Guard division, presented a special problem with its casualties. Most of the men served in the same companies as their friends and neighbors, much like the volunteers of the Civil War. If one company suffered heavily, it affected an entire town, such as Bedford, Virginia. On this one day the town lost nineteen of its sons, from a population of 4,000, the heaviest proportionate rate.

At one point General Omar Bradley, the commander of the 12^th Army Group, considered diverting follow-on troops to Utah Beach. The men already on the beach must survive on their own, with little chance of evacuation. Fortunately this became unnecessary as men began following the example of Taylor and other leaders.

A few Navy destroyers came so close for providing fire support that they risked grounding. More naval gunfire support teams came ashore for directing this fire and silenced many German positions. Small groups of men slowly advanced against the Germans, with many falling, but with others continuing the advance. By noon the advance took these men up the steep bluffs and astride a highway a few hundred yards inland.

Between Omaha and Utah Beaches stood the steepest bluff at a place called Pointe du Hoc. Intelligence indicated a battery of six large artillery pieces that threatened the landings on both beaches. The Allied air forces tried bombing the position, and the navies shelled it, all with no effect. The 2^nd and 5^th Ranger Battalions under the command of Lieutenant Colonel James Rudder inherited this mission. The Rangers landed, launched rocket-propelled grappling hooks and ropes up the hundred-foot cliff and began climbing. German troops fired down on them, while others tried cutting the ropes as the Rangers climbed.

Within five minutes the Rangers scaled the cliff and cleared the last German defenders from the gun emplacements. Rudder and his men found that the Germans removed the guns farther inland and replaced them with telephone poles. He then took his command inland, secured the guns, spiked them and prepared a defense. The Rangers fought off five German counterattacks for over two days before relieved by other American troops. During these two days the Rangers suffered almost 70% casualties and ran out of food.

Inaction in the German high commands greatly helped the Allies avoid disaster on D-Day. Rundstedt believed the Normandy attack merely a diversion for the main attack at the Pas de Calais. This kept the German Fifteenth Army out of the Normandy fight, and awaiting Patton’s fictitious force. Rommel did not reach his headquarters until late in the afternoon of June 6^th, too late for repelling the Allied landings. Hitler awoke at four o’clock that afternoon and released control of the mobile panzer reserve, again too late.

By four o’clock the troops from Utah Beach pushed across the narrow causeways and secured the firmer ground around Ste. Mere-Eglise. Only a pocket of determined German resistance prevented the linkup with the airborne soldiers. Behind them follow on forces and supplies landed on the secure beachhead and prepared for pushing forward the next day.

The British and Canadians moved about five miles inland and established contact with British airborne troops. Although they did not secure all of their objectives, they secured enough terrain for providing “breathing space” for future operations.

By four o’clock even Omaha Beach seemed secure, although at no place did the beachhead exceed one mile in depth. Although badly battered, the 1^st Division occupied a solid defensive line and prepared for counterattack. The 745^th Tank Battalion landed and strengthened the division’s defenses and the artillery battalions established firing positions on the beach. As the fighting died down men separated from their units in the chaos rejoined their companies.

The cost of this victory came at a high price, almost 10,000 for all Allied forces. About 2,500 of these casualties occurred in the meat-grinder of Omaha Beach. At the beginning of D-Day the 16^th Infantry possessed some 3,600 personnel and suffered 945 casualties by the end of the day.

Combat did not end with nightfall, as the Germans launched counterattacks throughout the night. Bypassed Germans fired on the beaches with machine guns and others adjusted artillery as landing craft approached. It took several days of “mop up” operations for eliminating this threat, and additional casualties.

As on the other beaches, follow on forces and supplies landed at Omaha Beach, relieving the pressure on the battered assault troops. The conditions at Omaha proved so precarious that troops scheduled for landing the next day hit the beach the evening of D-Day. These fresh troops pushed forward, expanding the depth of the beachhead and blunted the force of German counterattacks. Meanwhile the Germans still held back their Fifteenth Army at Pa de Calais awaiting the “main landing” under Patton.

General Bradley surveyed the carnage of Omaha Beach and what he saw astonished him. Many veterans of the 1^st Infantry Division believed that Bradley harbored displeasure with the division from an incident in the North African campaign. Some believe he assigned the 1^st Omaha Beach as a sort of punishment, given its forbidding terrain. Whatever animosity Bradley felt for the division, the division’s performance at Omaha wiped it away. He wrote later in his book, A Soldier’s Story, of the 1^st Infantry Division against the unexpected German resistance:

Had a less experienced division that the 1^st Infantry stumbled into this crack resistance [German 352^nd Infantry Division], it might easily have been thrown back into the Channel. Unjust though it was, my choice of the 1^st to spearhead the invasion probably saved us Omaha Beach and a catastrophe on the landing.

MacDonald states that with the continuous flow of Allied men and materiel into the secure beachheads, the high command viewed the casualties as “acceptable.” Learning of the success in England, Eisenhower released a message broadcasting the successful landing. He supposedly tore up the other message, the one announcing the failure of the landing.

MacDonald mentions the subsequent reactions on the “home front,” both in England and in the US. Most Britons learned of the invasion while at work, and felt relief at finally launching this offensive. Many spontaneously sang, “God Save the King,” others prayed and church bells rang in celebration. At noon Churchill addressed the House of Commons, feeding German fears, he announced, “the first of a series of landings.”

In the US the news arrived on the East Coast at 3:33 A.M., June the 6^th. As the news spread across the nation sleeping towns awoke, people turned on their lights, sat by their radios and knelt in prayer. Here too, church bells rang in celebration of the victory.

Despite the excellent planning and preparation, the extensive training, the landing at Omaha Beach almost failed. First, the plan proved inflexible, particularly when confronted with unexpected conditions. Air and naval bombardment failed in their mission of softening up the beaches, and no plan existed for additional supporting fires. Landing craft became disoriented, landing troops in the wrong places, and sometimes dropping them in deep water.

Intelligence did not properly track the movements of the German 352^nd Infantry Division, the best in Normandy. This placed the troops on Omaha at a severe disadvantage, particularly since this division engaged in a defensive exercise. Despite information of the low morale of the German defenders, the morale of the 352^nd proved high.

The success on Omaha Beach relied on the training, small unit leadership and individual initiative instilled in the American soldier. Colonel Taylor and his battalion commanders of the 16^th Infantry “led by example” and moved their men off the beach. Captains, lieutenants and sergeants led small groups of men forward against the Germans, often losing their lives in the process. In the absence of their leaders, private soldiers took charge and accomplished their missions, despite heavy casualties.

Most Americans today when they hear of the sacrifices of D-Day often express their gratitude for those who fought there. However, do they really mean this, or is this a conditioned response when learning of such sacrifices? In most history classes today American students only receive a cursory education regarding such events as D-Day. In the last American history course I took in college the textbook (sorry I forget the title) spent one short paragraph on D-Day.

However, the textbook spent several paragraphs covering World War II era racial policies. It further covered the women working in the defense industries in a quite lengthy column. I do not doubt the relevance of articles regarding racial policies, women and other defense workers. However, what about the soldiers, sailors, airman, marines and merchant seamen who braved combat, experiences that the textbook barely covered?

It seems that many of today’s American who lack the personal experience of such sacrifices, view these sacrifices as merely statistics. Worse yet, they view them as a “nice story,” something not relevant in the “busy” world of today. They do not understand the sacrifices made by those Americans who left their families for defending their country. Without the sacrifice of those Americans on D-Day, and all American veterans, we would not enjoy our freedoms.

These disturbing analyses make me wonder if today’s Americans would undergo similar circumstances as World War II. Particularly given our partisan divisions regarding our current war against terrorism, and the public anti-war sentiment that demonizes our soldiers. Before Pearl Harbor Americans proved deeply divided regarding entry into the war and “isolationism” dominated the American policy. These divisions included pacifists (against all war), America First (defend only the Western Hemisphere), the German-American Bund (pro-Nazis) and the Communist Party USA (pro-Soviet Union) among the most prominent. However, once news of Pearl Harbor reached the American public, the debate over entering the war ended.

I thought I saw similar stirrings among most Americans after the horror of 9/11, and a determination for striking back. The only opposition I saw came from those considered the “Far Left” that seemingly supports everything anti-American. Unfortunately this resurgence of patriotism lasted only about three weeks as politicians sought advantage from the tragedy of 9/11.

At the beginning of this piece I stated that the US entered World War II on the losing side. Furthermore, we entered the war after suffering a devastating defeat at our prominent naval base in the Pacific. This defeat hindered our performance in the initial campaigns of the war, causing a continuous string of defeats. When the Philippine Islands fell about 70,000 American and Filipino troops surrendered, the largest loss in our history.

Transposing today’s circumstances and attitudes, including that of many prominent Americans, on those Americans such a loss would prompt negotiations for peace. Instead of supporting FDR, the “loyal opposition” party would clamor for this peace, and blame the President for causing the war. The news media would join this effort, sensationalizing the oil embargo that “forced” Japan into attacking us.

During World War II the nation mobilized all of its resources for winning the war. The nation mobilized 16 million men for the Armed Forces using the draft, with very few deferments. No one year tours of duty either, once in the military everyone served for the “duration plus six months.” Normally once someone deployed overseas they remained overseas, as did their assigned unit.

National policy devoted all of our industrial capacity at war production, and the American public supported it. This meant that on the “home front” Americans rationed almost everything, including fuel, food and clothing. The auto industry did not manufacture any civilian automobiles from 1942 through 1946, something unthinkable today. Those Americans endured enormous sacrifices for “our boys,” who needed our unquestioned support for victory.

This sacrifice included censorship of the media, the mail and Hollywood production companies became military motion picture units. Several websites feature the popular “war posters” of World War II, posters produced for improving morale. One of these posters shows a sinking ship with the caption, “Loose lips sink ships.” This simple poster stated that national security and our soldiers’ lives trumped the public’s so-called “right to know.”

During World War II the media clearly understood their stake in an Allied victory. War correspondents traveled with Allied units, similar with those “embedded” with American units today. Perhaps the most famous of these reporters, Ernie Pyle, dearly loved the American soldier. He constantly reported on the sacrifice and heroism of our troops, and even the humorous aspects in his “Willie and Joe” cartoons. At no time did Pyle belittle or defame our troops, nor did he ever falsely accuse them of atrocities.

These correspondents cleared their reports through military public relations officers before publishing them for maintaining operational security. No one reported from Berlin, Rome or Tokyo on the opinions of our enemies, or interviewed Adolph Hitler. They did not seek out the “victims” of our strategic bombing campaign as a means of labeling our side as “war criminals.”

I found no examples of prominent journalists of the time separating America into a “red state/blue state” scenario. Nor did I find any evidence where they described national policies as that of the “Roosevelt Administration.” They did not seek out “whistleblowers” leaking vital information for hindering the nation’s war effort, or jeopardizing our soldiers’ lives.

Hollywood also understood its role in the war and many actors entered the Armed Forces. Popular actresses worked in the “Hollywood canteens” that provided refreshments for military personnel in transit. Actor Bob Hope worked with the United Service Organization (USO) and entertained the troops overseas. Hope continued these Christmas shows through Operation Desert Storm in 1990, entertaining three generations of American troops.

Several websites cover the military motion picture units that provided a valuable service during World War II. One of these, www.militarymuseum.org/1stmpu.html, provides insight into the 1^st Motion Picture Unit of the US Army Air Forces. Lieutenant Colonel Jack Warner commanded this unit and Captain Ronald Reagan served as the unit adjutant. The personnel of this unit completed basic training and returned to Hollywood, using their skills in their country’s service. The unit produced training films for the Army, which enhanced the training of our rapidly expanding Armed Forces. They also produced patriotic movies, clearly for maintaining the public morale during these critical years. At the end of these movies a caption appeared encouraging the buying of “Victory Bonds.” Teams of combat cameramen accompanied combat units into the field for producing documentaries, with many cameramen becoming casualties.

This unit proved so successful that the other branches of the service soon created their own units. Famous Hollywood director John Ford, who launched the career of Hollywood icon John Wayne, became a commander in the US Navy Reserves. Ford recorded the landing of the first wave on Omaha Beach and subsequently landed with his team on the beach. Government censors edited most of his footage, “Afraid to show so many American casualties on the screen.” Ford did not protest, nor “leak” this film, understanding his role for supporting his country’s war effort.

More than one World War II veteran told me of turning in their mail unsealed for perusal by unit censors. As an experienced combat veteran I know that soldiers sometimes embellish their stories, and these embellishments get better over time. I do know that we search captured prisoners and dead bodies for anything of intelligence value. This includes the mail found on enemy soldiers, which may reveal combat operations, troop morale and the morale at home.

At least two generations of Americans matured today without the “threat” of a draft for defending our country. Military service today becomes the responsibility of volunteers, often portrayed as those Americans with “economic disadvantages.” Today many American youth throw tantrums when speaking of a draft, responding with promises of running away or physically harming themselves. This phenomenon did not recently arise, I found it expressed during the Balkan wars during the 1990’s.

Unlike during World War II, succeeding generations of Americans did not endure “home front” sacrifices during times of war. Since World War II the only people directly affected by subsequent wars are those with family members serving. I heard one comment (sorry, I forget who made it) that we currently experience “a military at war and a country at peace,” or words to that effect. Given the self-centered attitudes of most Americans today I believe such “home front” sacrifices would cause riots. In this election year the politicians and other pundits blame the war for the nation’s “sagging economy.” They clamor for ending the war and “investing” the money spent on the Armed Forces on domestic programs.

Evidence exists, although our educators bury it, that the industrial mobilization of World War II finally ended the “Great Depression.” Unemployment virtually did not exist as most men found unfit for military service found jobs in defense industries. The shortage of men prompted the training and employment of large numbers of women for the first time in our history.

Several economic historians call this period an “economic boom,” as employers offered unprecedented incentives for a shrinking labor force. This included not only high wages but, for the first time, the massive increase of employer provided medical care. Fleming states that this forced a “wage cap” on industry and the elimination of overtime pay for weekend and holiday work.

Fleming further credits the “economic boom” for the exodus of rural Americans into the cities, where most defense industries existed. This included a migration of blacks and poor whites from the economically depressed South, seeking better opportunities. These people not only competed for jobs, but the insufficient housing in these cities as well.

This proves that even in the best of “economic times” problems exist, and not everyone benefits equally. For example, when the Southerners, both black and white, moved North, they took their racial attitudes with them. Fleming describes the problems this created in Detroit, a city not previously known for racial harmony. In June of 1943 (June again) the tension erupted into a full-blown riot, including sniper firing by rioters. Only the deployment of 6,000 federal troops stopped the riot, leaving 35 dead and almost 700 injured.

While news of this incident inflamed racial tensions across the nation, no evidence existed that it harmed the war effort. No one called for dodging the draft, work stoppages or withdrawal from the war. Instead, black Americans heralded their service and rightfully used it for demanding acceptance as equal American citizens.

Regarding “domestic programs,” the almost non-existent unemployment drastically reduced the numbers needing assistance, then called “relief.” FDR, the “Father of the New Deal,” reduced domestic spending by thirty per cent because he made military victory the priority. Today, the Defense Department battles for funding on an equal basis with other federal agencies. Our politicians currently buy our votes with “earmarks” and other projects for ensuring their reelection. These projects contribute little toward victory or homeland security, however they do take badly needed funding from our troops.

Suppose those Americans, sometimes called the “Greatest Generation,” held the same attitudes as many Americans today. They would deem the cost of the war too high for even striking back at the enemy that attacked us. Hemmed in on all sides by the aggressive Axis nations, we would be at their mercy economically. Instead of reaping the benefits of our independence and economic prosperity, we would be a helpless vassal state.

Many Americans, including some that possess presidential ambitions, demand that we seek United Nations (UN) authority before launching military actions. They further demand that we seek the approval of our European “allies” and only act when they join us. During World War II the “UN authority” rested with five nations at the most: the US, England, the Soviet Union, France and (Nationalist) China. Most of our European allies, including France, suffered under German occupation and held little influence over Allied strategies.

Today the UN seems as impotent as its pre-World War II predecessor, the League of Nations. It further seems that our European “allies” forgot the lessons learned from the harsh German occupation. Instead of confronting threats from Islamofascists and the “rogue nations” that support them, our “allies” ignore them. They also forgot that American troops and equipment liberated them from Axis occupation and American dollars created their post-war economies.

Again transposing today’s most publicized attitude on World War II, finds those Americans protesting FDR for acting “unilaterally.” They then demean Churchill as FDR’s “lap dog,” succumbing to the “bribe” of the “lend-lease” program. Protesters cry “unilateralism” when we invade French North Africa, the territory of a neutral country that did not attack us. The blunders and horrendous casualties suffered in this campaign would precipitate the demands for peace negotiations. Politicians of the “loyal opposition” would declare the Axis armies too powerful, and the estimated cost too high.

In the Pacific this attitude would call for negotiations for ending the bloody campaigns in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea. The Allies suffered in these bloody campaigns about 11,000 and 9,000 battle casualties, respectively. Here the troops fought the inhospitable jungle conditions as well as fanatical Japanese soldiers, suffering about 27,000 malaria cases. We obviously sent these men into combat unprepared for the conditions, and must launch a congressional investigation. Besides, no one cares about this faraway region outside our “national interest” that “posed no threat.”

Since the European “imperialist” powers claimed these territories, let them liberate them from the Japanese. Regarding the Philippine Islands, we promised them their independence anyway, this Japanese occupation provided the opportunity for granting it. Why spend American blood and treasure liberating a nation we planned to leave anyway? Let them stand on their own if they really desired independence and fight for it.

Another major difference regards the treatment of captured enemy combatants during World War II, versus today. As American and Allied forces advanced they captured hundreds of thousands of Axis prisoners of war (POW). The website, www.traces.org/germanpows.html, states that about 400,000 of them ended up in camps in the US. None of them received lawyers, nor did the US Supreme Court confer upon them the Constitutional rights of citizens. We held them until the war ended and without charging them in the criminal courts. Without “due process” we punished them by making them work on our farms, build roads and bridges and other manual labor.

Today we find almost everyone concerned with our treatment of the terrorists we captured in combat. We classified those captured as “unlawful enemy combatants,” meaning that they did not wear uniforms or serve in any military force. As terrorists deliberately targeting civilians, the Geneva Convention labels them as war criminals, outside the normal protections of the Convention. However, early in the war our leaders publicly extended Geneva Convention rights on these people. Now, between our Congress and our Supreme Court, we went beyond the Geneva Convention, granting them the rights of American common criminals. Lobbied heavily by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and other “human rights” organizations, our government gave these terrorists lawyers.

I found no record of the ACLU protesting the treatment of the POW’s captured during World War II. Nor did I find evidence of ACLU protests regarding the military tribunals of eight captured German saboteurs in June, 1942 (something else about June). German U-boats landed these men on the East Coast with explicit orders about sabotaging American industry. They damaged nothing or killed no one, not even a lone Coast Guardsman who discovered them landing. Six of these men received the death sentence and the remaining two, who voluntarily surrendered themselves, received lengthy prison terms. Coincidentally, the US Supreme Court conducted a special session for scrutinizing this case, and upheld the military tribunal.

Nor do I hear any protest from the ACLU and other “human rights” organizations when these terrorists torture and murder our POW’s. Instead they blame us for conducting an “illegal, immoral” war, or as retaliation for something we did, like the Abu Ghraib incident. The difference, we prosecuted those who conducted the Abu Ghraib abuse, unlike our terrorist enemies. Furthermore, I found no evidence that any of those “abused” by us died or suffered any physical harm from this experience.

The media that kept the Abu Ghraib story in the forefront of its stories barely covers the treatment of American POW’s. They show graphic pictures of the tortured and murdered Americans, including their names, yet never blame the terrorists. Regarding one such incident Senator Richard Durbin (R-IL) blamed the “Bush Administration,” instead of the terrorists.

What transpired between the “Greatest Generation” that won World War II and the Americans waging the war against terrorism? Truthfully, I do not know the answer and use my perceptions based on my experiences. I asked historians from several “think tanks” about this, and only one responded, stating that he did not know.

In the popular attitude of today, if something seems too difficult and too expensive, you avoid it. Do nothing that may anger aggressive “rogue nations,” and do not threaten them with military force. Instead, we must understand why these people hate us and then alter our behavior for currying their favor. Under no circumstances must we increase our military readiness; that only threatens these nations, and creates domestic problems. Continue endless, and ineffective, diplomacy and ignore it when they violate treaties and resolutions. These attitudes prevailed in the 1930’s and the world paid the price through the carnage of World War II.

As previously stated, two generations of Americans matured without experiencing the national sacrifice of World War II. Except for those directly involved in the post-World War II wars, most Americans enjoyed a very comfortable lifestyle. They only know of the US as a superpower and therefore, visualize nothing that threatens our national survival.

Unfortunately a growing number of Americans, including many with political ambitions, believe we do not deserve superpower status. Even former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, stated that, “America doesn’t want to be the lone superpower,” or words to that effect. Many radical leftists state that America is “too big and too powerful,” which implies America must suffer defeat and dismemberment.

Unfortunately, I believe many of the people who feel this way achieved too much influence over our nation. Gradually they dominated our media, Hollywood, educational system and the liberal wing of the Democrat Party. Many of these people began their anti-American attitudes during the Viet Nam War, and suffered no consequences for their actions. They declared that war “illegal” and “immoral” based on their propaganda, and bury evidence of atrocities committed by our communist enemies. Furthermore, they launch personal attacks against anyone who disclose these atrocities, or disagree with their viewpoint. Since then America became the enemy and American military power the reason for all of the world’s trouble.

Continue to the Final Part