Review of Edward IV and the Wars of the Roses

David Santiuste. Edward IV and the Wars of the Roses. Barnsley, Engl.: Pen and Sword, 2011. 978-1-84415-930-7. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xvi, 192. $39.95.

This is a solid academic study of Edward IV’s political struggles and military campaigns against Lancastrian opponents during the first half of the Wars of the Roses (1455-1485). The Wars of the Roses is a complex, confusing subject concerning civil wars in England.  However, David Santiuste, a Tutor at Edinburgh University, provides a readable, easy way to follow the ups and downs of the conflicts, skillfully using academic and contemporary sources, by focusing on the military career of Edward Plantagenet.  The author sees Edward as “a courageous and talented soldier” (p.146), and one of the great medieval warrior kings of England.

Santiuste begins by discussing the first years of the Wars of the Roses.  He then concentrates on Edward’s experiences in warfare starting with his first taste of combat at the Battle of Northampton (1460).  Soon afterwards, Edward, the Earl of March, became the Duke of York and the Yorkist claimant to the English throne following the death of his father at the Battle of Wakefield (1460).  With the support of his cousin Richard Neville, the Earl of Warwick (also known as the Kingmaker), the nineteen-year-old Edward of York defeated the Lancastrian armies of Henry VI of England at the battles of Mortimer’s Cross (1461) and Towton (1461), and then took London and claimed the English throne.  Thus ended Edward IV’s first great military campaign.

In the mid-1460s, the relationship between Edward IV and Warwick slowly disintegrated after the king’s secret marriage to Elizabeth Woodville.  The Woodvilles quickly became rivals to Warwick and his Neville relations.  Edward IV and Warwick no longer saw things eye-to-eye, especially over foreign policy with the Duchy of Burgundy and Kingdom of France.  Warwick soon began to sympathize with Lancastrian rebels.  A rebellion by Warwick and his supporters led to the defeat of a Yorkist army commanded by the Earl of Pembroke at the Battle of Edgecote Moor (1469), and the eventual capture of Edward IV.  Before long, however, Warwick and Edward IV established a fragile, short-lived peace.  The author notes the many rebel uprisings of the era, especially in northern England, and the king’s actions to put them down, including his victory at the Battle of Empingham (1470).  Even so, Warwick and the king’s brother, the Duke of Clarence, forced Edward IV to flee overseas to the Duchy of Burgundy in 1470.  This resulted in the restoration of Henry VI, under Warwick’s control, for a brief period.  Edward IV returned to England and began his second great military campaign.  He quickly gained control of London, and then defeated Warwick and the Earl of Oxford in thick fog at the Battle of Barnet (1471), and next the Duke of Somerset and the Lancastrians at the Battle of Tewkesbury (1471).  Edward IV’s victory was complete.  He would rule England for the next twelve years until his sudden death at the age of thirty-nine in 1483, leaving behind a twelve-year-old son, Edward V, to rule England.  The Wars of the Roses would continue until Henry Tudor and the Lancastrians defeated and killed Richard III (Edward IV’s brother) at the Battle of Bosworth Field in 1485.

Santiuste provides more than a depiction of the military campaigns of the civil wars in England.  He describes the recruitment of soldiers, types and employment of military equipment, motivation of the nobility and soldiers, as well as the military organization of Lancastrian and Yorkist forces.  The importance of the elite English garrison at Calais across the English Channel for both Yorkists and Lancastrians is evident.  He relates foreign influence in the conflicts with discussions of Yorkist and Lancastrian intrigues and alliances with Duke Charles I “the Bold” of Burgundy, Duke Francis II of Brittany, King Louis XI “the Universal Spider” of France, and King James III of Scotland.  Some foreign rulers sought to keep England weak and divided, while others sought English alliances to aid their own personal ambitions on the continent.  Overall, this is a fine study of the Wars of the Roses that focuses on Edward IV and military operations.

Dr William Young
University of North Dakota

Battle of Barnet (1471)

 

 

 

Battle of Tewkesbury (1471)

 

Review of Henry VIII and Francis I: The Final Conflict, 1540-1547

David Potter. Henry VIII and Francis I: The Final Conflict, 1540-1547. History in Warfare series. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011. ISBN 978-90-04-20431-7. Maps. Illustrations. Notes. Appendices. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xxix, 562. $243.00.

Dr David Potter, a Reader in History at the University of Kent, addresses the final war between Henry VIII of England (ruled 1509-1547) and Francis I of France (ruled 1515-1547) during the 1540s. The conflict was part of the later stages of the Italian Wars (1494-1559) or Habsburg-Valois Wars between the rulers of the Habsburg Holy Roman Empire and Spain against Valois France.

In the earlier conflicts, Henry VIII joined the Holy League alliance against Louis XII of France in 1511 in the War of the League of Cambrai (1508-1516). In 1513, Henry VIII personally led an invasion force into northeastern France in pursuit of glory and to expand English territory beyond the Pale of Calais. English and Imperial forces besieged Thérouanne, defeated a French relief force at the Battle of the Spurs (Guinegate), and then captured the town. The English king next besieged and took the city of Tournai in September 1513. England negotiated a separate peace with France in 1514, but kept Tournai for four more years. Then, in 1520, Henry VIII and Francis I met at the so-called Field of Cloth of Gold near Calais to increase their bond of friendship. This, however, did not last and French aggression led to England joining Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor (ruled 1519-1556) and King of Spain (1516-1556), against France in the Italian War of 1521-1526. English forces marched out of Calais and attacked the French in Picardy, burning and looting the countryside along the way, in 1522. In 1523, a massive English army under the Charles Brandon, the Duke of Suffolk, marched against France. Suffolk crossed the Somme River, but was unwilling to attack Paris, and therefore retired to Calais. England and France agreed to a peace settlement in 1526.

In the ensuing conflict, the War of the League of Cognac (1526-1530), Henry VIII allied with France, the Papacy, Venice, Milan, and Florence against Charles V in April 1527. But, in the following month, the Imperial army under the command of the Duke of Bourbon sacked the city of Rome. Henry VIII was now in no position to oppose Charles V. His foreign policy was tied to obtaining an annulment of his marriage to Catherine of Aragon (Charles V’s aunt) from the Imperial prisoner Pope Clement VII. Despite agreeing to a French alliance in 1532, the English monarch refused to provide aid to Francis I and sought to stay out of the short-lived Franco-Imperial War of 1536-1538. The conflict did not resolve the long-standing issues between the Habsburgs and Valois. But, the peace settlement left Henry VIII out in the cold, and he realized that England would have to take a side in the next conflict.

Potter calls the subject of his study, the final conflict, “the most serious and destructive war between England and France in the reigns of Henry VIII and Francis I (p.1).” In July 1542, Francis I, allied with Suleiman the Magnificent of the Ottoman Empire, declared war (the Italian War of 1542-1546) on the Holy Roman Empire. Henry VIII had tried to keep some diplomatic leverage with both Charles V and Francis I in the late 1530s and early 1540s. He prepared for the eventuality of war, using the significant boost in finances provided by the dissolution and sale of monasteries in England, by embarking on a serious program of refortification and shipbuilding. By 1542 relations between England and France were collapsing over French aid to Scotland. Henry VIII and Charles V overcame diplomatic issues and created an alliance in February 1543, with England expected to fight the auld alliance of France and Scotland. England declared war against France four months later. In December, Henry VIII and Charles V agreed to lead their armies in person in an offensive against France.

Henry VIII assembled an army of about 40,000 men at Calais, and the English forces moved slowly into France in June 1544. The English army was divided into two parts. The first part, commanded by Thomas Howard, the Duke of Norfolk, besieged Montreuil on the Canche River. Charles Brandon, the Duke of Suffolk, leading the other part of the English army began the siege of the port city of Boulogne. Charles V insisted that the English forget these sieges and march on Paris. Henry VIII refused to consider such operations until the fall of Montreuil and Boulogne. Then, in September 1544, the English, with Henry VIII in command, captured Boulogne. However, at this point, the Emperor, who was running short on finances and needing to deal with religious unrest in the Empire, signed a separate peace with France in the Treaty of Crépy. The war between England and France continued, but the English monarch left for England. Norfolk soon abandoned the siege of Montreuil and retreated to Boulogne as a large French army advanced into the region. Suffolk and Norfolk then withdrew the majority of English forces to Calais, leaving about 4,000 men to defend Boulogne against a French siege.

Peace negotiations began and quickly broke down. As a result, the French king opted for an invasion of England. Francis I assembled a large number of troops and ships in Normandy. In May 1545, a small expeditionary force sailed and landed in Scotland to aid the Scots in the Anglo-Scottish War of the Rough Wooing (1543-1550). Then, in July, the French fleet sailed and conducted small-scale raids on the Isle of Wight, and later at Seaford in Sussex. These operations failed to achieve success, so the French fleet redeployed and set up a blockade of Boulogne. By September 1545 the conflict was at a stalemate, both sides running low on men and money. Henry VIII and Francis I continued their peace talks, but the English monarch refused to give up Boulogne. The war finally ended with the Admirals’ Peace (Treaty of Ardres-Guînes) in June 1546. Boulogne would remain in English hands until the Treaty of Boulogne (1550). Both Henry VIII and Francis I would die in 1547, leaving new participants to fight with or against Charles V in the last of the Habsburg-Valois Wars, the Italian War of 1551-1559.

Potter has previously provided us important works in French politics and warfare including War and Government in the French Provinces: Picardy, 1470-1560 (1993), A History of France, 1460-1560: The Emergence of a Nation State (1995), and Renaissance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c.1480-1560 (2008). In the present study, the author discusses the international situation and diplomacy that resulted in a rapprochement and alliance between Henry VIII and Charles V in the late 1530s and early 1540s. He focuses on diplomacy and military operations throughout the conflict, providing a thorough discussion of Henry VIII’s military campaigns in northeastern France, the Anglo-French search for mercenaries, war at sea, the significant cost of the war, and peace negotiations. This outstanding study, based on archival research, is the first of three volumes that our author plans to write on Anglo-French conflicts from the last years of Henry VIII to the early reign of Elizabeth I. It is very expensive at $243, and hopefully the next two studies will not cost an arm and a leg.

Dr William Young
University of North Dakota

Siege of Boulogne by Henry VIII in 1544

Review of Marshal Vauban and the Defence of Louis XIV’s France

James Falkner. Marshal Vauban and the Defence of Louis XIV’s France. Barnsley, England: Pen and Sword Military, 2011. ISBN 978-1-84415-927-7. Maps. Illustrations. Appendices. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. viii, 226. $50.00.

James Falkner, a former British Army officer, has written a study concerning Sebastien Le Prestre, Marshal Vauban, and his contributions to fortress building and siege warfare during the reign of Louis XIV.  Falkner has previously provided us valuable studies on the Duke of Marlborough’s campaigns, battles, and sieges during the War of the Spanish Succession in Great and Glorious Days: The Duke of Marlborough’s Battles, 1704-1709 (2003), Blenheim 1704: Marlborough’s Greatest Victory (2004), Marlborough’s Wars: Eye Witness Accounts, 1702-1713 (2005), Ramillies 1706: Year of Miracles (2006), Marlborough’s Sieges (2007), and James Falkner’s Guide to Marlborough’s Battlefields (2008).  In this current study, the author examines the military career and role of Vauban in French military efforts in the later years of the Franco-Spanish War (1635-1659), War of Devolution (1667-1668), Dutch War (1672-1678/79), War of Reunions (1683-1684), Nine Years War (1688-1697), and early years of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713/14).

Falkner’s study examines both Vauban’s contribution to attack and defense in siege warfare.  Vauban was noted for his genius in the conduct of calculated offensive siege operations that included lines of circumvallation and contravallation as well as a systematic approach by the use of parallel trenches to capture enemy fortresses.  His system of siege warfare, not always adhered to by impatient French commanders, saved numerous men from the slaughter of massive assaults against well-defended positions.  Vauban’s experience grew from his first siege operation at Sainte-Menehould during the Fronde in 1652 and throughout the Wars of Louis XIV until his last effort at Alt-Breisach during the War of the Spanish Succession in 1703.  Vauban’s system would remain the standard method of attacking a fortress to the twentieth century.

Louis XIV expanded French territory, especially in northeastern France during the War of Devolution, Dutch War, and War of Reunions.  French borders, particularly in this region, were vulnerable to attacks.  As such, the Sun King sought to beef up his defense against enemy threats.  Falkner focuses on Vauban and his engineering efforts to assess and improve, or redesign and rebuild, as far as the French treasury would permit, a credible defense system for France.  As a result, Marshal Vauban built the two-line system of fortresses (from Dunkirk to Givet, and Gravelines to Stenay) to defend France in the northeast.  This system was known as the pré carré (the dueling field), or what our author calls the “Fence of Iron.”  The dual line of fortresses would save France from an allied invasion led by the Duke of Marlborough in the War of the Spanish Succession.  Falkner notes that these fortifications also played an important part in French military history for the next 250 years.

The author blends Vauban’s contributions to fortress building and siege operations with a general depiction of siege warfare in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.  This well-written study contains valuable appendices providing a chronological listing of Vauban’s siege operations; a list of more than 180 fortresses, citadels, towns, and forts under French control that the engineer designed, constructed, or improved during the reign of the Louis XIV; and a glossary of siege terms.  This work is highly recommend to anyone interested in Early Modern European Military History.  Falkner’s study is an outstanding addition to the available literature in English on Vauban and siege warfare, including Reginald Blomfield’s Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban, 1633-1707 (1938), Christopher Duffy’s Fortress Warfare in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the Great, 1680-1789 (1985), F.J. Hebbert and George A. Rothrock’s Soldier of France: Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban, 1633-1707 (1989), Paddy Griffith’s The Vauban Fortifications of France (2006), and Jean-Denis G.G. Lepage’s Vauban and the French Military under Louis XIV: An Illustrated History of Fortifications and Strategies (2009).  Vauban’s writings are also available in Rothrock’s translation of A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification (1968). 

Dr. William Young
University of North Dakota

Vauban’s System of Parallel and Approach Trenches in Offensive Operations against a Fortress or Fortified Town

 

Le Pré Carré in northeast France (The Fence of Iron)

 

The Citadel and Fortress City of Lille

Review of Cross and Crescent in the Balkans: The Ottoman Conquest of South-Eastern Europe (14th-15th Centuries)

David Nicolle. Cross and Crescent in the Balkans: The Ottoman Conquest of South-Eastern Europe (14^th-15^th Centuries). Barnsley, England: Pen and Sword Military, 2010. ISBN 978-1-84415-954-3. Maps. Chronology. Illustrations. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xvi, 256. $39.95.

Dr David Nicolle is the author of numerous books dealing with medieval European and Islamic warfare, including Constantinople 1453: The End of Byzantium (2000), Nicopolis 1396: The Last Crusade (2001), Crusader Warfare (2007), and Knights of Jerusalem: The Crusading Order of the Hospitallers 1100-1565 (2008).  He has been a prolific writer for the Osprey military history series.  In the present study, the author provides a narrative that examines the complex history of Southeast Europe and the rise of the Ottoman Empire.  Nicolle addresses the culture of the numerous groups of people in the region, including government and politics, economics, religion, law, literature, as well as military tactics and equipment.  His study focuses on the turbulent history of the Middle East and the gradual unifying effect of Ottoman military might over a fragmented Anatolia and Southeast Europe.

The main thrust of this study that will interest military historians is on the Ottoman conquest of Southeast Europe.  By the fourteenth century the Byzantine Empire was weak militarily.  The Byzantines needed the alliance of the Ottoman Turks in the struggle against Christian Balkan states.  In 1353-55, the Ottomans gained their first foothold on the European continent as an ally of the Byzantine Emperor.  The Turks manned the fort of Çinbi and neighboring towns on the Gallipoli peninsula.  As Nicolle writes: “This would thereafter be the launch-pad for the Ottoman state’s eventual conquest of the entire Balkan peninsula” (p.64).  In fact, the Byzantines soon turned to the Serbs and Bulgarians for assistance against the Ottoman Turks.  But, the Ottomans, under Emir Murat (Murad) I (1362-89), pushed deep into Thrace, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Serbia.  He became “one of the most remarkable conquerors in medieval European history” (p.66).  Having captured Adrianople in eastern Thrace, Murat I renamed it Edirne and established the capital of the Ottoman Empire there in 1365.  He conquered western Thrace and Macedonia in 1371-76, and then obtained the vassal states of Bulgaria in 1376 and Dobruja in 1388.  Murat I took the title of sultan in 1383.  He led the Ottoman forces that defeated the Serbs at the First Battle of Kosovo in 1389.

Bayezit (Bayezid) I (1389-1402) picked up where his father left off.  He forced Serbia and Bosnia to become vassals of the Ottoman Empire in 1389, followed by Wallachia in 1391.  The Ottomans had control of the southern Balkans, having reduced the Byzantine Empire to the area immediately surrounding Constantinople.  In 1393, the Turks captured Nikopol (Nicopolis) in Bulgaria.  At this point, in 1394, Pope Boniface IX, with encouragement from the threatened states of Hungary, Venice, and Genoa, declared a crusade against the Ottoman Turks.  The crusade would include ground and naval forces from France, Burgundy, Hungary, Knights of St. John, the German Empire, Italian city-states, Byzantine Empire, and various other Christian states.  The crusade ended at the Battle of Nikopol, where the Ottomans soundly defeated the Crusaders, in September 1396.  The author stresses that, “the best Crusading army that western Christendom could muster had been utterly defeated in its first real battle” (p.123).  As a result, the Kingdom of Hungary was gravely weakened in its defense against the Turkish threat.  Fortunately, Bayezit I turned his attention away from Europe to the danger of Timur-i Lenk (Tamerlane) on the Asian front.  Timur had already overrun large parts of Russia, Iran, India, and Central Asia.  In 1400, Timur moved his army into Anatolia and northern Syria, capturing Damascus in 1401, and then outmaneuvering and defeating Bayezit I at the Battle of Ankara in 1402.  The Sultan was captured (and died in captivity) while the shattered Ottoman army fled to the west.  Timur ravaged Turkish lands to the Aegean Sea, capturing Izmir in 1402.  Nicolle points out that “the defeat . . . could have spelled the end of the Ottoman state, but the fact that it did not do so says a great deal for the inherent strength of early Ottoman government and military systems” (p.136).  Fortunately, Timur turned towards the goal of conquering Chinese territory.

The Ottoman Sultanate remained in turmoil for a number of years.  The Ottoman Empire experienced a series of civil wars between the four sons of Bayezit I for control of the Sultanate.  As a result, Serbia, Bosnia, and Wallachia threw off Ottoman control.  Eventually, in 1413, Mehmet I (Mehmed) (1413-21) emerged as the leader of the Ottomans.  Ottoman power would rise under the leadership of Mehmet I, his son Murat II (1421-44, 1446-51), and his son Mehmet II (1444-46, 1451-81).  The Ottomans regained the lost Balkan provinces by 1524, and forced Dubrovnik (Ragusa) to become a vassal state in 1430, followed by conquering Epirus and southern Albania in 1431-33.  The growth of Ottoman power resulted in King Wladislaw (Wladyslaw) III of Poland-Hungary launching a crusade against the Turks in 1443.  However, Murat II defeated the Crusaders at the Battle of Varna in 1444.  “Once again,” so declares Nicolle, “a victory against the biggest and best-equipped army that Western Christendom could send against them brought huge prestige to the Ottomans” (p.153).  Now the Turks forced Morea to become a vassal state, and then imposed direct rule over Bulgaria in 1446.  Shortly thereafter, in 1448, Janos Hunyadi, the Regent-Governor of Hungary, led a Hungarian-Wallachian invasion of Ottoman territory.  This time the Turkish army under Murat II defeated the invaders at the Second Battle of Kosovo.  The Turks now dominated the Balkan Region.

The youthful Mehmet II sought to conquer the fragmented remnants of the Byzantine Empire.  The main goal was the city of Constantinople, technically a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, ruled by Constantine XI Palaiologos (1449-53).  The author points out that in “purely military terms the Byzantine Empire was now a very minor player in the events of south-eastern Europe” (p.176).  But Constantinople was protected by massive walls, a small army and navy, and held the strategic island of Imroz off the mouth of the Dardanelles.  Even so, the Ottomans had the advantages of a larger naval fleet, massive siege guns, and a large army against the Byzantines and their allies in the siege of Constantinople in 1453.  The actual siege lasted for fifty-four days before the Turks overran the city.  “The impact of the fall of Constantinople on the Byzantine world,” Nicolle writes, “was of course catastrophic and sent shock waves across Orthodox Christendom . . .” (p.217).

Mehmet II “the Conqueror” next turned towards Wallachia, Moldavia, and Greece, taking control of most of the Balkans by 1460.  All that was left to resist Turkish power in the region were Venetian enclaves around Greece and the Balkans, Venetian and Genoese outposts in the Aegean and Adriatic Seas, as well as Genoese outposts in the Crimea.  The Aegean and Black Seas, however, would become Ottoman lakes in the late fifteenth century, and the Venetian Republic and its overseas empire would continue its struggle against the Ottoman Empire in the Eastern Mediterranean Region.  The Turks would raid into northeastern Italy in the late 1490s and soon be knocking on the door of the Kingdom of Hungary.

Nicolle’s Cross and Crescent in the Balkans: The Ottoman Conquest of South-Eastern Europe (14^th-15^th Centuries) is a good introduction to the early Ottoman Empire and the conquest of Southeast Europe.  It conveys the complex history of the region with its numerous fragmented states over several hundred years of history.  It is highly informative, but the author goes off track at times from the theme of the Ottoman’s conquest of Southeast Europe and the study almost becomes a general history of the region.  The book has a few typographical errors and mistakes, which the editor should have caught, resulting in frustration and confusion for the reader.  It also lacks notes citing the sources used.  Overall, however, this study is useful for general readers and undergraduate students.

Dr William Young
University of North Dakota

NEW PBS DOCUMENTARY “THE WAR OF 1812” EXPLORES THE TRUTH AND MYTHMAKING OF HISTORY

— Television Program Presents American, Canadian, British and Native Perspectives, Leading the Way of Bicentennial Activities, Airs October 10 —

WASHINGTON, D.C. and BUFFALO, NY — Nearly two centuries after it was fought, the two-and-a-half year conflict that forged the destiny of a continent comes to public television in a comprehensive film history.  “The War of 1812” airs on PBS stations nationwide on Monday, October 10, 2011 at 9 p.m. ET (check local listings).  From 1812 to 1815, Americans battled against the British, Canadian colonists, and Native warriors; the outcomes shaped the geography and the identity of North America.  This two-hour HD documentary uses stunning re-enactments, evocative animation, and the incisive commentary of key experts to reveal little-known sides of an important war — one that some only recognize for the “Star-Spangled Banner.”  The broadcast is accompanied by a companion book and website, as well as comprehensive bi-national educational resources.

Across the United States and Canada, communities are planning events to commemorate the 200th Anniversary of the War of 1812.  “We have proudly created ‘The War of 1812’ for both nations,” said Donald K. Boswell, president and CEO of WNED, the producing station of the program. Broadcasting from Buffalo, New York, WNED has significant viewership in Southern Ontario.  “This timely examination of a shared history allows us to celebrate our past together, and renew the bond of our present and future as national neighbors.  With this production, WNED also continues a tradition of showcasing cultural and historical treasures of our bi-national region to the PBS audience.”  WNED is one of fourteen public broadcasting stations that share a border with Canada, extending the national broadcast of “The War of 1812” throughout the United States into many Canadian communities.

“WETA is pleased to join WNED in bringing this important project to all viewers,” noted Sharon Percy Rockefeller, president and CEO of WETA, the flagship public broadcasting stations in the nation’s capital and a partner in the project.  “It is an excellent example of the intellectual integrity and cultural merit for which public broadcasting stands.”

The War of 1812 is a celebrated event by Canadians, forgotten by many Americans and British, and dealt a resounding blow to most of the Native nations involved.  The film is in many ways an examination of how the mythical versions of history are formed — how the glories of war become enshrined in memory, how failures are quickly forgotten, and how inconvenient truths are ignored forever, while we often change history to justify and celebrate our national cultures and heritage.

“The War of 1812” explores the events leading up to the conflict, the multifold causes of the war, and the questions that emerged about the way a new democracy should conduct war.  It was a surprisingly wide war.  Dozens of battles were fought on land in Canada and in the northern, western, southern and eastern parts of the United States — in the present-day states of Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, New York, Maryland, Louisiana, and Alabama.  There were crucial naval battles on Lakes Erie and Champlain, and a wide-ranging maritime struggle with many episodes off Virginia, Massachusetts, Nova Scotia, Cuba, Ireland, the Azores, the Canaries, British Guyana, and Brazil.  The U.S. proved surprisingly successful against the great British navy, but the War of 1812 also saw American armies surrender en masse and the American capital burned.

Great characters emerge in the film, including Tecumseh of the Shawnee nation, who attempted to form a confederation of Native nations, and died in battle; his adversary, William Henry Harrison, Governor of the Indiana Territory, whose debatable success at Tippecanoe, Indiana eventually helped him become President of the United States; James Madison, Father of the U.S. Constitution, a brilliant thinker and writer who was not a great President; and such storied Canadian figures as Canadian Governor-General George Prévost, who led the largest army ever to invade the Continental United States; Laura Secord, a Canadian woman who walked many miles to warn the British of an impending American attack; and Major General Isaac Brock, a brave and audacious British general who captured a large American army at Detroit without a fight.  The film also recounts dramatic human stories of ordinary citizens, the political alliances of the various Native Americans nations, and the African-American
slaves who reached for their freedom by fighting for the British.

“The War of 1812” recollects defining moments that are more familiar: the burning of Washington, D.C., and First Lady Dolley Madison’s rescue of a portrait of George Washington from the White House; Andrew Jackson’s total victory at the Battle of New Orleans; and the birth of the American national anthem, penned by Francis Scott Key during the Battle of Baltimore at Fort McHenry.  Yet “The War of 1812” pierces the heroic mythology that has grown up around the war to reveal a brutal, spiteful conflict dominated by fiascos and blunders.

The war shaped North America in the most literal way possible: had one or two battles or decisions gone a different way, a map of the continent today might look entirely different.  The U.S. could well have included parts of Canada — but was also on the verge of losing much of the Midwest.  The New England states, meanwhile, were poised on the brink of secession just months before a peace treaty was signed.  However, the U.S. and Canada ultimately each gained a sense of nationalism from the conflict, while the result tolled the end of Native American dreams of a separate nation.

Interviews with twenty-six leading authorities on the War of 1812 — American, British, Canadian and Native historians — present important accounts and research, including from the following individuals:

·       Donald R. Hickey, professor of history at Wayne State College, Wayne, Nebraska.~ He is the author of~Don’t Give Up the Ship!: Myths of the War of 1812~and~The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict.

·       Peter Twist, the Canadian director of Military Heritage, a historical military uniform and arms supply company.~ He has served as consultant on numerous film and theater projects, and is an expert on the military history of the War of 1812.

·       Donald Fixico, a Shawnee Native American, is the Distinguished Foundation Professor of History at Arizona State University, and author of~Treaties with American Indians: An Encyclopedia of Rights, Conflicts and Sovereignty~and~Rethinking American Indian History.

·       Sir Christopher Gerald Prevost, great-great-great-grandson to George Prévost, Governor-in-Chief of British North America during the War of 1812.~ He is co-author of~The Incredible War of 1812: A Military History.~

A complete list of those interviewed is available in the project’s electronic press kit.

The film’s companion book, The War of 1812: A Guide to Battlefields and Historic Sites, by John Grant and Ray Jones, is illustrated with more than 120 color photographs and archival paintings.  Each chapter focuses on one of several distinct theaters of the war, allowing the reader to follow the course of events and their importance to the war as a whole.  Jones is the author of more than 40 books, including several highly successful companion books for PBS, among them Legendary Lighthouses.  Grant is the executive producer of “The War of 1812” and chief content officer for WNED Buffalo/Toronto; he has also produced for PBS “Window to the Sea”, “The Marines” and “Chautauqua: An American Narrative.”

The project is also accompanied by a rich bi-national education and outreach component.  It includes Educator’s Guides with lesson plans, activities, and a host of educational-based resources designed for the United States and Canada, classroom posters, and several instructional events.  Expansive educational resources will also be found on the full companion website to the television documentary at pbs.org.  The full site will launch in early September with features such as a battlefield map and guide, web-only video features, scholar essays, and links to key 1812 sites on both sides of the border.

For more information about “The War of 1812,” including details on how to purchase the DVD and companion book, visit www.pbs.org/war-of-1812.  An electronic press kit, including downloadable photos for promotional use, is available at pressroom.pbs.org.

“The War of 1812” is a production of WNED-TV, Buffalo/Toronto and Florentine Films/Hott Productions Inc.,~in association with WETA Washington, D.C.  The executive producers are John Grant and David Rotterman for WNED, and Dalton Delan and Karen Kenton for WETA.  Produced by Lawrence Hott and Diane Garey of Florentine Films/Hott Productions Inc.  Directed by Lawrence Hott.  Written by Ken Chowder.  Narrated by Joe Mantegna.  Principal Cinematography by Stephen McCarthy.  Production Design by Peter Twist.  “The War of 1812” has been made possible by a major grant from The National Endowment for the Humanities: Because democracy demands wisdom*.~ With funding provided by The Wilson Foundation, Warren and Barbara Goldring, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting: a private corporation funded by the American people, The Arthur Vining Davis Foundations: Dedicated to strengthening America’s future through education, Phil Lind and The Annenberg Foundation.~ With additional support
from The Baird Foundation, the Niagara Falls Bridge Commission and Jackman Foundation. *Any views, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in this program do not necessarily represent those of the National Endowment for the Humanities.

WNED-TV is a leading producer of single-topic documentary programming for national broadcast on PBS including “Chautauqua: An American Narrative,” “Elbert Hubbard: An American Original,” “The Adirondacks,” “Niagara Falls,” “The Marines,” “Window to the Sea,” “Frank Lloyd Wright’s Buffalo” and “America’s Houses of Worship.”  Also in development are films on the Underground Railroad and the history of golf course architecture in America.  More information on WNED and its programs and services is available at www.wned.org.

WETA Washington, D.C., is the third-largest producing station for public television.~ WETA’s other productions and co-productions include “Washington Week with Gwen Ifill and National Journal,” the arts series “In Performance at the White House” and “The Kennedy Center Mark Twain Prize,” and documentaries by filmmaker Ken Burns, including the premiere this fall of “Prohibition.”  More information on WETA and its programs and services is available at www.weta.org.

Florentine Films/Hott Productions Inc. is the production company of Lawrence Hott and Diane Garey, who have worked together since 1978.  They are part of the Florentine Films group.  Hott and Garey have received an Emmy Award, two Academy Award nominations, five American Film Festival Blue Ribbons, fourteen CINE Golden Eagles, a George Foster Peabody Award, the Alfred I. duPont-Columbia University Award, the Erik Barnouw Award.~~Their work has been shown on PBS and screened at dozens of major film festivals, including the New York Film Festival, Telluride, Mountainfilm, and Women in the Director’s Chair.~ More information is available at www.florentinefilms.org.